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ABSTRACT 
 This study examines fair trial/free press issues involved in the federal criminal 
trials of Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols for the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. 
Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoman. The bombing case attracted 
intense press coverage resulting in conflicts between the First Amendment right of the 
press to cover court proceedings and the Sixth Amendment right of the defendants to 
receive a fair trial before an impartial jury. In resolving the fair trial/free press conflicts, 
the courts managing the case made several decisions deserving examination. These 
decisions included a rare federal change of venue, a decision to seal hundreds of case 
documents, and a decision to impose orders restricting out-of-court statements on two 
different occasions. The change of venue decision had ramifications that made the 
bombing trials a truly unique episode in American justice. In response to the change of 
venue, Congress passed legislation allowing for closed-circuit broadcasts of the trial. 
Thus the Oklahoma City bombing trials became the first, and to date the only, federal 
criminal trials with a live camera presence. The Oklahoma City bombing trials were 
important episodes in American legal history; however, the literature suggests the trials, 
and specifically the fair trial/free press issues implicated in the trials, have remained 
relatively unexplored. 
 This study employed historical methods to evaluate primary source materials. 
Primary sources consisted of court documents, contemporaneous press reports, and oral 
history interviews with defense attorneys Stephen Jones and Michael Tigar. The study 
identified 12 major fair trial/free press issues present in the Oklahoma City bombing 
case. The study explains how those issues emerged, how the courts resolved those 
  ix 
issues, and how the courts’ resolution of those issues affected management of the trials. 
This study also explains how the unprecedented closed-circuit broadcasts became a part 
of the trials and how the trial court managed the closed-circuit broadcasts. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 On Thursday, April 24, 1997, Special Prosecutor Joseph Hartzler addressed a 
panel of twelve jurors and six alternate jurors in Denver, Colorado’s Byron G. Rogers 
Federal Building. “Ladies and gentlemen of the jury,” Hartzler said. “April 19th, 1995, 
was a beautiful day. The sun was shining. Flowers were blooming. It was springtime in 
Oklahoma City.”1 With those words, the federal bombing trial of Timothy McVeigh 
began. In many respects, this was a trial like no other before or since. 
 Hartzler made his remarks in a packed courtroom. Reporters from across the 
United States and from around the world took up ten rows of reserved media seating in 
the courtroom. Many more reporters listened to a live audio feed of Hartzler’s statement 
in an adjacent courtroom set aside by the court to provide for the anticipated overflow 
crowd.2 Outside the Byron G. Rogers Federal Building, the remainder of the 2,000-
member press corps stood watch in a specially designed media area known as the 
“bullpen.”3 Five hundred miles away in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, 150 bombing 
victims watched and listened to Hartzler’s statement via a closed-circuit broadcast of 
the proceedings fed live to the Federal Aviation Administration’s facility at Will Rogers 
World Airport.4 The closed-circuit broadcast made the McVeigh trial the first federal 
criminal trial in U.S. history with any type of live camera presence. 
 The prosecution of the Oklahoma City bombing defendants, Timothy McVeigh 
and Terry Nichols, was a unique journey to justice in many respects. The crime itself 
was unprecedented at the time it occurred. The bombing on April 19, 1995, killed 168 
people and injured many more. The victims, including family members of those killed 
and injured in the blast and people who suffered property damage and financial loss 
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resulting from the bombing, numbered into the thousands. Prior to September 11, 2001, 
the Oklahoma City bombing was known as the worst act of terrorism ever committed on 
American soil. 
 The investigation and prosecution of the suspects took place in a glaring media 
spotlight. In 1995, the twenty-four-hour-a-day cable news culture was firmly 
established in the media marketplace, and the Internet was beginning to stake its claim 
as a viable information source. Both around-the-clock media coverage and the 
burgeoning Internet would play key roles in coverage of the bombing case.5 These 
modern media technologies also helped broaden the scope of the media spotlight. News 
organizations from across the United States and from countries around the world came 
to Oklahoma City, and later Denver, to cover the investigation and prosecution of the 
case.6 It was a story of international importance, and the intense press focus presented 
challenges for the court in trying to balance the rights of the defendants and the rights of 
the press. 
 The unique nature of the crime, the large number of victims, and the intense 
focus of the press set the stage for a clash between First Amendment and Sixth 
Amendment rights. Before the federal trials were concluded with the conviction and 
sentencing of Terry Nichols in 1998, there would be several rare, and sometimes 
unprecedented, actions taken by the court and federal lawmakers.  
 In the interest of preserving the defendants’ rights to a fair trial, the United 
States Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals removed the federal judge in Oklahoma in charge 
of the case and turned it over to U.S. District Court Judge Richard P. Matsch in the U.S. 
District of Colorado.7 Judge Matsch would later issue a change of venue, moving the 
  3 
case to Denver, a rarity in federal criminal prosecutions. Press coverage in Oklahoma 
City, the venue of original jurisdiction, was a significant factor in Judge Matsch’s 
decision.8 
 Due to the large number of press organizations covering the case, Judge Matsch 
made several decisions related to press and public access to the courts and court 
records. First, he allowed a live audio feed to an adjacent courtroom for the press and 
the public during times when an overflow crowed was expected. Second, Matsch 
allowed reporters to receive audiotaped copies of pretrial hearings, a practice that lasted 
only a short while.9 While these decisions promoted access to the court for the press and 
the public, Judge Matsch made other decisions that greatly restricted access to 
information. These decisions drew protests from the press. Even before Judge Matsch 
took over the case, judges in the Western District of Oklahoma instructed attorneys to 
file all documents that might reveal investigative information, evidence, or trial strategy 
under seal. Judge Matsch modified this practice once he took control of the case, but 
filing documents under seal lasted throughout the case, and it was an ongoing point of 
contention with the press.10  
 Judge Matsch also imposed restrictions on the out-of-court statements made by 
attorneys and other persons under the court’s authority. These restrictions drew the ire 
of the press and the defense teams as well. McVeigh’s defense team, and to a lesser 
degree the Nichols defense team, claimed the orders made it impossible for them to 
defend their clients in the court of public opinion, which they deemed especially 
important in a case that drew such intense press coverage.11 Also, allegations of leaks to 
the press came from both prosecutors and defense attorneys, who charged each other 
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several times with violating the judge’s orders. The issue of press leaks reached a crisis 
point on the eve of the McVeigh trial when two stories reporting alleged confessions by 
Timothy McVeigh were published via the Internet and threatened to derail the case.12 
 The press was not the only group fighting for access to the court and information 
about the case. Many victims, upset over the change of venue, began searching for ways 
to have the trial broadcast so that they could see justice done without incurring the 
expense and inconvenience of traveling to Denver. When petitions to the court failed to 
produce the results they wanted, a group of victims organized and took their fight to 
Washington, D.C.13 Their efforts succeeded with the passage of the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, which included a provision for a closed-circuit 
broadcasting of any federal trial moved more than 350 miles from the court of original 
jurisdiction. This law directly challenged the federal court’s long-standing prohibition 
against cameras at criminal trials, even though it restricted the “broadcast” to a limited 
audience of court-approved viewers.14 Judge Matsch’s decisions on complying with the 
new law and his decision on whether or not to allow the press access to the closed-
circuit broadcast were firsts for a United States federal judge. 
 The press corps covering the McVeigh and Nichols trials took some 
unprecedented steps of its own in preparing for the trial. Early on in the case, 
broadcasters and print media formed their own respective groups to petition the court on 
free press issues. The group representing broadcasters was known as The Colorado-
Oklahoma Trial Group. The group representing print media was known as The 
Colorado-Oklahoma Print Media Group. These two organizations served as the 
foundation for what would become known as the Oklahoma City Bombing Trial Media 
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Consortium. The purpose of the consortium was to coordinate logistics for media 
organizations covering the trials and to serve as a liaison organization for the press and 
the court. Eventually more than 130 media organizations joined the consortium.15 The 
consortium was a major component in the negotiated coverage strategy that the press 
corps operated under to cover the McVeigh and Nichols trials. Such a coordinated and 
negotiated coverage strategy for a federal criminal trial was not common in the United 
States. 
 The trials of Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols were important events in the 
history of American justice. In many respects the trials were unique. The crime itself 
was unprecedented at the time. The case attracted intense press coverage, and the court 
had to take measures to mitigate the press coverage to preserve the defendants’ rights to 
a fair trial. Granting a change of venue in a federal criminal case, while not 
unprecedented, was a rare occurrence nonetheless. Other prescriptive measures such as 
restricting out-of-court statements and allowing for sealed court filings were also not 
unheard of, but in a case that attracted national and international press coverage, 
limiting pretrial publicity was a major challenge. The most unique aspect of the trial 
was the closed-circuit broadcast of testimony from Denver to Oklahoma City to which 
the press was not allowed. No court before or since has faced such a situation, and the 
court’s decision to bar the press from the viewing may set a precedent for courts in the 
future. 
 Despite the unique nature of the McVeigh and Nichols trials and the evidence of 
fair trial/free press conflicts, no researcher has yet fully examined the First and Sixth 
Amendment issues involved in the case. Most of the major scholarly work on the 
  6 
Oklahoma City bombing consists of studies focusing on the militia movement in 
America and its influence on the bombing conspirators.16 Other scholarly studies have 
examined governmental and emergency personnel response to the bombing scene 
itself.17 Another focus of researchers has been the physical and emotional impact of the 
Murrah Building bombing.18 There have also been examinations of the investigation of 
the crime, most of which seek evidence to support or discredit claims of a broader 
conspiracy.19 Participants in the McVeigh and Nichols trials have written sparingly on 
the topic. Terry Nichols’s lead attorney, Michael Tigar, has written an article discussing 
how he came to accept the Nichols case and his views on the ethics of defending 
unpopular clients.20 The International Society of Barristers has published remarks given 
by bombing prosecutor Larry Mackey and McVeigh’s lead counsel Stephen Jones at the 
society’s 1998 convention.21 Stephen Jones has published most frequently on the topic, 
with a book and three journal articles.22 Jones also co-authored the sole article to 
address fair trial/free press issues in the McVeigh trial in any detail, a 1998 article 
published in The Chicago Legal Forum titled “McVeigh, McJustice, McMedia”.23 
 The historical study presented here focuses squarely on fair trial/free press 
issues in the McVeigh/Nichols cases; it does so for three primary reasons. First, the 
conflict between the First Amendment, which protects the right of the press to cover 
trials, and the Sixth Amendment, which protects defendants’ rights to a trial before an 
impartial jury, likely played a significant role in the courts’ management of the trial 
from the beginning through to its conclusion. Understanding the influence of the press 
on the management of the trials is vital in understanding how the trials took the form 
they did.  
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 Secondly, the closed-circuit telecast of the trial was an unprecedented event that 
deserves scholarly examination. The change of venue that moved the case to Denver 
prevented many bombing victims from being able to attend the trials in person. Also, 
the federal court rules prohibiting broadcasting from federal courts meant broadcasting 
the trial was not possible. Congress intervened and passed a measure providing for  
closed-circuit broadcasts of trials, making the federal trials of Timothy McVeigh and 
Terry Nichols the first, and to date the only, federal criminal trials televised in any form. 
The precedent-setting closed-circuit broadcast of these trials could serve as a model for 
future high profile federal trials. An understanding of how the Oklahoma City bombing 
closed-circuit broadcast was conceived and implemented could assist scholars studying 
similar trials in the future. Finally, while researchers have examined several aspects of 
the bombing case in detail, only a small amount of literature has focused on the trials 
and the fair trial/free press issues the courts had to address during the life of the case. 
The in-depth examination of those issues presented in this study fills a gap in the 
literature and advances knowledge in the fields of journalism and legal studies.
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CHAPTER I 
Review of Literature 
 On April 19, 1995, Americans witnessed the worst act of domestic terrorism 
ever committed against the United States. On that bright spring day, a bomb ripped 
apart the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in downtown Oklahoma City, killing 168 
people. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 would later eclipse the physical 
damage and lives lost in the Oklahoma City bombing, but the events of September 11 
were the design of a foreign enemy. The Oklahoma City bombing was an act of 
terrorism designed by citizens of the United States and carried out against citizens of the 
United States. At the time of the bombing, the initial suspicion of law enforcement and 
of the general public was that the bombing must be the work of foreign terrorists. The 
realization that the suspects were the product of homegrown hate came as a shock to 
many people.1 
 The three bombing conspirators – Timothy McVeigh, Terry Nichols, and 
Michael Fortier – were drawn together and driven to commit the crime in part due to 
their strong anti-government views.2 Such anti-government ideology was at the core of 
militia groups, the Patriot Movement, and white supremacist groups, all of which were 
on the rise in the years leading up to the Oklahoma City bombing.3 Much of the 
scholarly work regarding the Oklahoma City bombing and the conspirators has focused 
on the role anti-government ideology played in the motives of the conspirators.4 
 Another focus of Oklahoma City bombing researchers has been the possibility 
that the bombing was part of a broader conspiracy and the possibility that not all of the 
conspirators have been brought to justice.5 Stephen Jones, who was McVeigh’s lead 
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attorney at his trial, advances such a theory in his book titled Others Unknown: The 
Oklahoma City Bombing and Conspiracy.6 Jones’s book, co-authored by Peter Israel, is 
one of the few works to give extensive attention to the prosecution of the conspirators; 
however, the main focus of the book is to advance the theory of a broader conspiracy. 
 Journalists from around the world covered the arrests and prosecution of the 
three suspects.7 Fortier made a plea agreement with the government. In exchange for 
testifying against McVeigh and Nichols, and in exchange for pleading guilty to having 
knowledge of the bomb plot and failing to warn police, Fortier received a reduced jail 
sentence. Fortier served approximately 10 years in prison. He was released in January 
2006.8 Terry Nichols stood trial in federal court in Colorado, and the jury found him 
guilty of involuntary manslaughter in the deaths of eight federal agents who died in the 
bombing. The jury could not reach a unanimous decision on the penalty for Nichols, 
and in June 1998, Judge Richard Matsch sentenced Nichols to life in prison without the 
possibility of parole. In May 2004, Nichols was found guilty on 160 counts of first-
degree murder in Oklahoma, and again he received a sentence of life in prison without 
parole.9 Timothy McVeigh, the mastermind of the bombing plot, was the first to stand 
trial. On June 2, 1997, a federal jury in Denver found McVeigh guilty of first-degree 
murder in the deaths of eight federal agents who died in the bombing. The jury 
recommended the death penalty for McVeigh, and he was executed on June 11, 2001. 
 How the trials came to take place in Denver appears to have much to do with the 
magnitude of the crime and the pervasive press coverage of the crime. Soon after 
prosecutors filed the initial charges against the defendants in federal court, the Western 
District of Oklahoma located in Oklahoma City, defense attorneys began to ask for the 
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recusal of Western District judges and a change of venue for the proceedings.10 The 
defense claimed all judges in the Western District were themselves victims of the crime 
because their courthouse, which sat across the street from the Murrah Building, was 
damaged in the bombing. The defense also suggested that the sheer number of victims 
and the pervasive press coverage of the bombing in the Oklahoma City made it highly 
unlikely the trial court could find jurors who did not either know a victim or had not 
formed strong opinions about the defendants.11 
 The defense was partially successful in its initial request for a change of venue. 
On September 7, 1995, Judge Wayne Alley decided that the case would be tried in 
Lawton, Oklahoma, beginning in May 1996. Lawton was still within the Western 
District, but Judge Alley said the venue away from Oklahoma City would, “…provide a 
trial setting appropriate for detached and dispassionate deliberation.”12 
 The defense did not give up efforts to remove the case from the Western District 
entirely, and they were successful in getting the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals to 
consider their motions. The Tenth Circuit granted the defense motions, and on 
December 4, 1995, the court removed Judge Alley from the case and assigned it to 
Chief Judge of the Federal District Court in Colorado Richard P. Matsch.13 
 The first decision Judge Matsch would have to make would be whether to 
follow Judge Alley’s order to hold the trial in Lawton or move the trial yet again. 
Following hearings that included expert testimony from jury consultants and media 
analysts, Judge Matsch issued an order on February 20, 1996, moving the trial to 
Denver.14 In his order, Judge Matsch wrote that Oklahoma media had “demonized” 
McVeigh and Nichols and that the prejudice against the defendants was so great that it 
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necessitated a change of venue.15 Prior to the bombing case, no Western District case 
had been moved to another federal court, and between 1980 and 1996, only about 
twelve federal cases had been granted a change of venue.16  
  Concerns about press coverage infringing on the defendants’ rights to a fair trial 
led to judicial restrictions on information released about the case. Early on in the case, 
Western District judges ordered attorneys to file documents under seal that referenced 
evidentiary matters and payment of defense attorneys.17 Judge Matsch continued the 
practice with modifications through his handling of the case.18 The issue of sealed 
documents drew repeated protests from the press, the defense, and, in some instances, 
prosecutors.19 
 Judge Matsch exerted further control over information about the case by issuing 
two orders that limited the information attorneys in the case could provide to the 
press.20 Prosecutors and defense attorneys accused each other of violating these orders 
repeatedly by allegedly leaking documents to the press or making comments to the 
press directly that violated the order.21 McVeigh’s lead attorney, Stephen Jones, said the 
orders limited his ability to combat negative publicity about his client. Jones presented 
the court with a plan to conduct a series of interviews between McVeigh and nationally 
known journalists. Jones’s elaborate plan specified which journalists would have access 
to McVeigh, proposed a limited scope of questioning, and placed time restrictions on 
when the stories from those interviews could be published or broadcast. The plan also 
required journalists to agree to these stipulations. The court considered the request, but 
it never came to fruition.22 
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 Perhaps the most unique feature of the bombing trials was the closed-circuit 
broadcast of the trials. After Judge Matsch ordered the change of venue to Denver, 
bombing victims began asking the court to provide a means of viewing the proceedings 
since many of them could not travel to Denver to attend the proceedings in person.23 
Furthermore, the Victims Assistance Office for the Western District of Oklahoma had 
identified more than 2,000 victims who wished to attend the proceedings, which made 
attendance for all practically impossible regardless of the venue.24 The primary obstacle 
to a closed-circuit broadcast came from Rule 53 of the Federal Criminal Code and Rules 
that banned cameras and microphones in federal criminal courts, and Judge Matsch 
stated he would not make an exception to the rule.25 
 The prospect of a closed-circuit broadcast gained little traction until federal 
lawmakers took up the issue. In the spring of 1996, Oklahoma’s congressional 
delegation led an effort to provide a means of closed-circuit viewing for federal trials 
through legislation.26 The legislative vehicle was the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996.27 The act contained a provision that required federal courts to 
provide a closed-circuit broadcast of trials moved more than 350 miles on a change of 
venue. President Bill Clinton signed the act on April 24, 1996.28 
 The passage and signing of the Antiterrorism Act put federal law at odds with 
federal court rules. It also raised the issue that if the courts complied with the law, they 
would establish a forum to which the press and public could seek access. Judge Matsch 
eventually did allow for a closed-circuit broadcast of the trials open to court-recognized 
victims, rescue workers who worked at the bombing site, and court personnel, but the 
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press and the public were banned.29 This was the first, and to date the only, federal trial 
conducted with a live closed-circuit broadcasting of the proceedings. 
 The fair trial/free press issues of venue, pretrial publicity, and closed-circuit 
broadcasting were three of the most important issues facing the court and the press in 
the prosecution of the Oklahoma City bombing cases. In deciding how to handle these 
issues, the courts looked to precedent established through previous cases in which the 
First and Sixth Amendments met with conflict. The conflict is almost as old as the 
Constitution itself, and it took almost two centuries for the Supreme Court of the United 
States and other courts to establish the laws, procedures, and protocols that would be 
employed in the Oklahoma City bombing trials. 
Fair Trial/Free Press: Clashes Between the First and Sixth Amendments 
 The First Amendment right to free speech and a free press and the Sixth 
Amendment right to a fair trial are three of the American people’s most closely held 
fundamental liberties. However, these three liberties often come into conflict with each 
other. The press has a right and an obligation to inform citizens about the workings of 
their government, including the court system. The press also has a right and an 
obligation to inform citizens about crimes that have happened in their communities. The 
publicity created in reporting these events may pose a risk to the defendant’s right to a 
fair trial. Pretrial publicity may influence potential jurors such that they are not able to 
set aside opinions they may have formed about the defendant and judge the case solely 
by the facts in evidence. Also, press activities during the trial, such as the presence of 
cameras in the courtroom, may be disruptive to the court or intimidating to jurors, 
further hampering efforts to make the trial as fair as possible for the defendant. These 
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are but two of the concerns courts in the United States have had to deal with over the 
years. The courts have also wrestled with whether or not the press and the public have a 
constitutionally protected right to attend trials at all. If so, under what conditions might 
the press and the public be barred from the courtroom? 
Early Fair Trial/Free Press Issues. One of the first cases to reveal a clash 
between the First and Sixth Amendments came less than two decades after ratification 
of the Constitution. The case involved a controversial and well-known public figure, 
former Vice President Aaron Burr, who stood accused of treason. Specifically, the 
United States charged Burr with plotting to form a new nation in territory shared by 
Spain and the United States. A former Vice President charged with treason would 
certainly attract media attention at any time, and it certainly did so in 1807 when Burr 
came to trial.30 
 Supreme Court Chief Justice John Marshall presided over the trial in Virginia, 
and he was well aware of the extent to which newspapers had discussed the case and 
how well informed the public was about the case. To counter this, Marshall undertook a 
lengthy and thorough voir dire, which is the process of questioning potential jurors to 
determine their ability to judge the case fairly. Marshall said there was a difference 
between impressions and opinions. Impressions were lightly held and might be changed 
by evidence presented during trial. Potential jurors with impressions about the case 
could be reasonable jurors. On the other hand, opinions were stronger, and they were 
less apt to change, thus potential jurors with opinions about the case should be 
excused.31 
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 Marshall recognized the influence pretrial publicity could have on potential 
jurors. His definitions of impressions and opinions and his prescriptive measures for 
discerning between the two would serve as the first guidelines for negotiating fair 
trial/free press issues.32 
 The next case to address pretrial publicity and juror bias was the appeal of 
Mormon leader Brigham Young’s personal secretary, George Reynolds, who had been 
convicted of polygamy and other crimes. In Reynolds v. United States (1879), Chief 
Justice Morrison R. Waite extended Marshall’s reasoning from the Burr trial, and Waite 
offered two more points to consider. Like Marshall, Waite noted the difference between 
what he called light opinions and firm opinions. He said thorough voir dire could help 
the courts make the distinction between the two and eliminate potential jurors with firm 
opinions. Next, Waite said appellate courts should show great deference to the original 
trial courts when considering accusations of juror bias. Finally, Waite said it was up to 
the defendant’s attorney to prove any individual juror was biased and not fit to serve.33 
 For more than eighty years, the guidelines established by the Burr case and 
Reynolds served as the prescriptive guidelines for judges seeking to empanel unbiased 
juries in cases that received heavy publicity in the press. Then, beginning in the 1950s, 
the Supreme Court took on a series of cases that would establish the fair trial/free press 
precedents followed by the courts to this day. The development of these precedents 
during the remainder of the twentieth century establishes a historical understanding and 
context for how fair trial/free press issues impacted the prosecution of the Oklahoma 
City bombing defendants. 
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 Shepherd v. Florida. Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter wrote that 
Shepherd v. Florida (1951)“…presents one of the best examples of one of the worst 
menaces to American justice.”34 With that statement, the Court overturned the rape 
convictions and death sentences of four African-American men in Florida accused of 
raping a white woman at gunpoint. The appeal to the Supreme Court focused on pretrial 
publicity in the case that led to violence, a call-out of the National Guard, and a jury 
verdict the Court said “[did] not meet any civilized conception of due process of law.”35 
 Shortly after the arrest of the suspects, newspapers and radio broadcasts reported 
the suspects had confessed to the crime. While the reported confessions were not 
presented at trial, the Court noted that numerous witnesses and juror candidates said 
they had heard of the confessions. The Court reasoned that knowledge of these alleged 
confessions could only have come from the press.36 
 Press reports of the crime inflamed emotions in the community, leading to 
violence. The county sheriff moved the suspects to a prison to await trial after a mob 
surrounded the jail one night calling for the sheriff to turn the men over to the mob. 
Later, another mob burned the house of one defendant’s parents and those of other 
African-Americans, causing many to flee the town, and the governor had to send the 
National Guard to restore order. Area newspapers covered these acts of mob violence 
with headlines such as “Night Riders Burn Lake Negro Homes.”37 It was in this climate 
that the case came to trial and ended with convictions and death sentences.38 
 The Court noted that the judge in the case denied defense requests for a 
continuance and a change of venue – both attempts to escape the highly charged 
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emotions in the community. However, in the decision to reverse the convictions and 
sentences, Justice Frankfurter laid substantial blame at the feet of the press: 
But prejudicial influences outside the courtroom, becoming all too typical of a 
highly publicized trial, were brought to bear on this jury with such force that the 
conclusion is inescapable that these defendants were prejudged as guilty and the 
trial was but a legal gesture to register a verdict already dictated by the press and 
the public opinion which it generated.39  
Through Shepherd v. Florida, the Court had shown the First Amendment rights 
of the press could not trample the Sixth Amendment rights of defendants. Reflecting on 
the decision, Whitebread and Contreras wrote, “[T]he Court demonstrated a 
commitment to preserving the fair trial rights of the defendant, yet it failed to define any 
limitations.”40 Defining those limitations would become the focus of the Court in the 
1960s. 
 Irvin v. Dowd. Ten years after Shepherd v. Florida, the Court was presented 
with another case in which intense media attention appeared to have tainted the jury 
pool. In this case, the jurors themselves said they had followed press reports of the 
crime, and they had formed strong opinions about the guilt of the accused, and, yet, 
many of these people were allowed to serve on the jury. The case came to the Supreme 
Court as Irvin v. Dowd (1961).41 
 In April 1955, Indiana police arrested Leslie Irvin as a suspect in six murders 
that took place near Evansville, Indiana, from December 1954 through March 1955. 
Press coverage of the crimes was intense both during the crime spree and following 
Irvin’s arrest. Irvin’s attorneys were successful in getting a change of venue for the trial, 
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but only to a neighboring county where potential jurors had been exposed to much of 
the press coverage of the crimes and the arrest.42 
 Jury selection for the Irvin trial proved to be an arduous process. A panel of 430 
people presented themselves for voir dire. Initial questioning resulted in 268 people 
being excused for cause because they expressed fixed opinions about Irvin’s guilt. Once 
a jury was seated, eight of the twelve jurors had admitted they thought Irvin was indeed 
guilty, but they still thought they could judge the case fairly. The Supreme Court 
disagreed.43 
 Justice Tom Clark wrote the opinion vacating Irvin’s conviction and sentence. 
Justice Clark noted that there was no simple formula for seating an impartial jury in any 
case. He also noted the impracticality of requiring jurors to have no knowledge of the 
case at all. Clark wrote: 
In these days of swift, widespread and diverse methods of communication, an 
important case can be expected to arouse the interest of the public in the 
vicinity, and scarcely any of those best qualified to serve as jurors will not have 
formed some impression or opinion as to the merits of the case.44 
 In considering press attention given to the case, the Court noted evidence of 
extensive coverage given to the case and the expansive reach of the press. Newspapers 
that covered the case reached 95% of the homes in the county where the trial took place. 
The Court considered broadcast coverage almost equally as expansive.45 
 Press reports about the crimes included accounts of Irvin’s previous convictions, 
including a juvenile conviction, and more than one report of alleged confessions. One of 
  19 
those confession stories appeared on the eve of the trial. Concerning the press attention 
prior to trial, Clarke wrote, “Here the build-up of prejudice is clear and convincing.”46 
 The Court concluded that the impact of press coverage on jurors was 
inescapable and insurmountable.47 The Court noted that two-thirds of the jurors who 
convicted Irvin and sentenced him to death had admitted in voir dire that they thought 
Irvin was guilty. Some of those who sat on the jury went as far as to say they would 
need evidence of Irvin’s innocence to change their minds. With these facts in mind, the 
Court unanimously vacated Irvin’s conviction and sentence. The Court said jurors may 
have been sincere in their attempts to serve as impartial jurors, but the evidence of such 
strongly held opinions about the case prior to trial indicated those opinions could not 
likely be set aside. In conclusion, Clark wrote: 
With his life at stake, it is not requiring too much that petitioner be tried in an 
atmosphere undisturbed by so huge a wave of public passion and by a jury other 
than one in which two-thirds of the members admit, before hearing any 
testimony, to possessing a belief in his guilt.48 
 In a concurring opinion, Justice Frankfurter took particular note of the role the 
press played in the case, reminiscent of his opinion in Shepherd v. Florida: 
This Court has not yet decided that the fair administration of criminal justice 
must be subordinated to another safeguard of our constitutional system – 
freedom of the press, properly conceived. The Court has not yet decided that, 
while convictions must be reversed and miscarriages of justice result because 
the minds of jurors or potential jurors were poisoned, the poisoner is 
constitutionally protected in plying his trade.49 
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 Frankfurter’s opinion noted the frequency with which cases involving the clash 
between the First and Sixth Amendments were reaching the Court. It also suggested 
some frustration the Justices seemed to be feeling about such cases. That frustration 
would come to a head just five years later with a landmark case known as Sheppard v. 
Maxwell. 
 Sheppard v. Maxwell. The case known as Sheppard v. Maxwell (1966) was the 
appeal of an Ohio physician named Sam Sheppard, convicted of murdering his wife in 
1954. The case was a media sensation around the Cleveland, Ohio area and eventually 
all across America from July 1954 until Sheppard’s conviction in December 1954.50 
Later, the Sheppard case would serve as the inspiration for a popular television series 
and a motion picture both titled “The Fugitive.” The Sheppard murder case provided 
plenty of fodder for the news media and later the entertainment media, and it was this 
intense media attention that served as the basis for the appeal.51 
 The Supreme Court ruling in Sheppard v. Maxwell was a landmark decision. 
The opinion written by Justice Tom Clark not only addressed the fair trial/free press 
problems present in the case, but also it set forth remedies for those problems.52 It was a 
defining moment in the evolution of fair trial/free press legal theory that had been 
building since Shepherd v. Florida more than a decade earlier, and the legal community 
immediately took notice.53 The remedies and suggestions set forth in the Sheppard v. 
Maxwell opinion would serve as the basis for the America Bar Association ethical 
guidelines for judges, attorneys, and reporters adopted shortly after the decision. These 
guidelines became a cornerstone of high profile case management in the years since.54 
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 Dr. Sam Sheppard was a physician in the Cleveland, Ohio, suburb of Bay 
Village, who was charged with murdering his wife, Marilyn, on July 4, 1954. Sheppard 
claimed a mysterious man broke into their home and beat his wife to death while Dr. 
Sheppard was asleep in another room. Sheppard said he chased the mystery man from 
the house and fought with him on the beach behind the house before the man knocked 
Sheppard unconscious and escaped. Sheppard’s prominence in the community, the 
brutality of the crime, and the sensational story of the mysterious suspect fueled intense 
press coverage.55 
 The trial of Dr. Sam Sheppard in October 1954 was nothing short of a media 
spectacle. The lengths to which the trial court went to accommodate members of the 
press drew some of the sharpest criticism from the Supreme Court. The press essentially 
took over the courtroom and the courthouse where the trial took place. The press corps 
had its own table inside the well of the courtroom, a space usually reserved only for the 
judge, the defendant, attorneys, and jurors. One broadcast station was allowed to set up 
a studio next door to the jury deliberation room from which reporters broadcast updates 
even as the jury was deliberating. Members of the press had priority seating in the 
courtroom with Sheppard’s family relegated to a backbench, and the public could only 
get access with special passes and only when there was a seat vacated by an absent 
reporter.56 
 Particularly problematic was the potential influence this whirlwind of press 
activity had on jurors. During voir dire, all but one juror admitted to reading or hearing 
about the case. The judge did not sequester the jury, and he seriously admonished jurors 
to avoid press coverage about the case only once early on in the trial. Jurors had their 
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pictures taken and their names and addresses published multiple times, and some jurors 
admitted that community members had contacted them offering opinions on the case.57 
 In the clash between the First Amendment and the Sixth Amendment present in 
the Sheppard case, the First Amendment trumped the Sixth Amendment. Justice Clark’s 
opinion stated, “…every court that has considered this case, save the court that tried it, 
has deplored the manner in which the news media inflamed and prejudiced the 
public.”58 Clark went on to detail specific tools trial judges had at their disposal to 
mitigate the influence of press coverage. 
 The Court noted that both the judge and the prosecutor were running for re-
election at the same time the trial took place. The Court said the judge should have 
considered delaying the trial until after the election. The judge also should have 
considered a change of venue and sequestration of the jury to prevent them from 
exposure to prejudicial coverage during the trial itself.59 
 The Court said the judge should not have allowed the press to have free reign in 
the courtroom and the courthouse. It was within the judge’s powers to limit the number 
of press members in the courtroom, and it was within his powers to place parameters 
around their actions in the courtroom and the courthouse. Once it became apparent that 
the comings and goings of the reporters were disruptive to the courtroom, the judge 
could have implemented restrictions to preserve decorum.60 
 Finally, the Court said the judge should have instructed court personnel, 
attorneys, and investigators not to make any statements regarding facts not in evidence. 
While the judge could not have imposed similar restrictions on the press, he could have 
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strongly warned those who reported speculative information of the jeopardy such 
reports posed to the prospects of a fair trial. Justice Clark wrote: 
Had the judge, the other officers of the court, and the police placed the interest 
of justice first, the news media would have soon learned to be content with the 
task of reporting the case as it unfolded in the courtroom – not pieced together 
from extrajudicial statements.61 
 The lasting importance of Sheppard v. Maxwell is that the Supreme Court ruling 
on the case set out several guidelines for courts to use in jury selection and case 
management in an effort to avoid or reduce the chances that pretrial publicity might 
taint the jury pool.62 Five of the most often cited prescriptive measures from the 
Sheppard decision are: (1) Courts have the ability to limit statements made by court 
personnel and law enforcement, and the court should exercise this ability. (2) The court 
can delay the trial until media attention dies down. (3) The defense may ask for a 
change of venue. (4) Voir dire should be thorough, and it should focus on pretrial 
publicity in cases that have drawn intense media attention. (5) The court can sequester 
the jury to prevent jurors from being influenced by the media or others outside the 
case.63  
 Following the Sheppard case, the American Bar Association revised its ethics 
standards for attorneys and published a list of voluntary guidelines for the courts and the 
press when dealing with high profile cases. These guidelines include a list of things the 
press should not do. Chief among those press proscriptions are: The press should not 
report (1) confessions made by the defendant, (2) prior convictions or criminal records 
of the defendant, (3) the results of physical or psychological tests relevant to the case, 
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(4) nor speculate on the defendant’s mental status at the time of the crime. These 
guidelines are voluntary, and the press has no obligation to follow them; however, they 
have been implemented to various degrees by judges managing high profile cases, and 
they had their beginnings in the landmark decision in Sheppard v. Maxwell.64 
 The Manson Family Murders. Three years after the Supreme Court’s Sheppard 
v. Maxwell decision, a California murder case presented an exceptionally high-profile 
case in which to apply some of the provisions outlined in the Court’s Sheppard opinion 
and the A.B.A. Guidelines. The case was the infamous Manson family murders, also 
known as Tate-LaBianca murders. The Tate-LaBianca murders had all the elements 
needed to inspire sensational media coverage. There were seven victims, one of whom 
was a beautiful and well-known actress pregnant with the child of a film director. The 
brutality of the murders shocked even the most jaded of investigators, and it all 
appeared to be the work of a deranged, cultish leader and his followers.65 The fact that 
the murders happened right on the doorstep of Hollywood only intensified the massive 
press attention. 
 The Tate-LaBianca murders were two separate crimes that investigators first 
thought were unrelated. The first of these murders occurred on August 9, 1969. The 
victims were actress Sharon Tate, celebrity hair stylist Jay Sebring, coffee heiress 
Abigail Folger, Viotyck Frykowski, and Steve Parent, all found dead at a house rented 
by film director Roman Polanski who was Tate’s husband. Polanski was working in 
Europe at the time. The crime scene was gruesome. Bodies were strewn about the 
house, the yard, and the driveway. All of the victims had been stabbed multiple times, 
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and some had been shot. The killers used the victim’s blood to write the word “PIG” on 
the door before leaving the house.66  
 The second crime happened on August 10, 1969 when Leon LaBianca and his 
wife were murdered in their home a few miles from the first crime scene. The 
LaBiancas were also stabbed numerous times. Again, the killers scrawled a message in 
the victim’s blood. This message would become the moniker for the case – “Helter 
Skelter.”67 
 After months of investigation, Los Angeles police identified their suspects. 
What the press learned about the suspects only added to the already bizarre story. The 
suspects were a rag-tag bunch of young drifters looking to find life’s meaning through 
drugs and promiscuity. While such a group was not unheard of in the turbulent late-
1960s, this group had the misfortune of falling under the spell of a small time burglar 
and want-to-be music star whose grandiose ideas had turned to the extremes of 
violence. He had become the messianic leader of the cult-like group, and his name was 
Charles Manson. The suspect list included Manson, Susan Atkins, Linda Kasabian, 
Patricia Krenwinkel, Leslie Van Houten, and Charles “Tex” Watson. Manson, Atkins, 
Krenwinkel, and Van Houten would stand trial together in July 1970.68 
 After indictment of the suspects, Judge William Keene issued a gag order. The 
judge was well aware of the intense media focus on the trial, and he wanted to do what 
he could to keep information under control in hopes of seating an impartial jury. In his 
book Helter Skelter, prosecutor Vincent Bugliosi noted a comparison with the Sheppard 
case: 
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[O]wing to the incredible amount of pretrial publicity – a New York Times 
reporter told me that already it far exceeded that given the first Sam Sheppard 
trial – Judge Keene, without consulting our office, now went ahead and issued a 
detailed publicity order. Later amended several times, it would run to a dozen 
pages. In essence, it forbade anyone connected with the case – prosecutors, 
defense attorneys, police officers, witnesses, and so forth – to discuss the 
evidence with any representative of the media.69 
Bugliosi wrote that the order was violated several times prior to jury selection, 
but generally it appeared to have met its purpose. The court was able to seat a twelve-
member jury and six alternate jurors after an extensive five-week voir dire, during 
which 205 candidates answered questions about their ability to serve. Many of the 
questions focused on the amount of media coverage surrounding the case, but all who 
ultimately sat on the jury said they could, and would, judge the case by the evidence 
presented at trial.70 
 To further insulate the jury, the trial judge, Charles Older, had the jury 
sequestered for the duration of the trial. Each day, jurors traveled from their hotel to the 
courthouse on a special bus with the windows blacked out so they could not be seen nor 
could they see any signage, newspaper racks, or demonstrations that might have taken 
place outside the courthouse.71 
 The press covered the prosecution of the case as thoroughly as they had the 
investigation that preceded it. During the trial, two major events thrust First 
Amendment rights and Sixth Amendment rights into conflict; however, these two 
events were not directly related to reporters covering the case from the courtroom. Still, 
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both incidents had the potential to contaminate the jury and threaten the defendants’ 
rights to a fair trial. 
 The first incident happened only a few days after Judge Keene had implemented 
the gag order. On the morning of Sunday, December 14, 1969, Los Angeles Times 
readers opened their papers and read the headline, “SUSAN ATKINS’ STORY OF 2 
NIGHTS OF MURDER.”72 Prior to the gag order, Atkins and her attorney had arranged 
to have a European press syndicate publish her description and explanation of the 
crimes. Atkins reportedly received $80,000 for her story.73 It is still disputed exactly 
how the Times got the story, but, nonetheless, within two days of publication in Europe, 
the story appeared on the front-page of the Los Angeles Times.74 A paperback book 
based on the Atkins account soon followed. All of this happened before jury selection 
began. Prosecutor Bugliosi recalled these publications as a major threat to the case: 
Whatever the ethics of the whole matter, the Atkins story created immense 
problems, which would plague both the defense and the prosecution throughout 
the trial ... It was felt by some that the Atkins revelations would make it 
impossible for the defendants to obtain a fair trial ... [W]e were all too aware, 
from the moment the story broke, that finding twelve jurors who hadn’t read or 
heard of the account, and then keeping any mention of it out of the courtroom 
itself, would be a difficult task.75 
 The second incident sprang from an incriminating comment made by none other 
than the President of the United States. On August 3, 1970, with the trial of the first four 
defendants barely a week old, President Richard M. Nixon gave a speech at a national 
law enforcement convention in Denver, Colorado. During the speech, President Nixon 
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pointed out what he found to be a particular problem in press coverage of crime – the 
glorification of people who committed crimes. President Nixon, an attorney prior to 
entering politics, pointed to the ongoing Manson trial as a case in point: 
I noted, for example, the coverage of the Charles Manson case … front-page 
everyday in the papers. It usually got a couple of minutes in the evening news. 
Here is a man who was guilty, directly or indirectly, of eight murders. Yet here 
is a man who, as far as the coverage is concerned, appeared to be a glamorous 
figure.76 
 Bugliosi said he learned of the statement from reporters during a midday recess, 
and attorneys from both sides met with trial judge Charles Older in chambers to discuss 
the implications. The defense wanted to voir dire jurors immediately, but Judge Older 
held off. Jurors were already restricted from reading newspapers and receiving 
broadcast news during their sequestration; therefore they should have been shielded 
from hearing about the President’s comments. Judge Older did take two precautionary 
measures, however. He ordered bailiffs to keep the lone television at the jurors’ hotel 
turned off that night. He also banned attorneys from bringing newspapers into the 
courtroom from that day forward, lest a juror should catch sight of a headline about the 
President’s speech that might follow in the coming days.77 
 Judge Older’s plan was foiled, however, by Charles Manson himself. The 
following day, defense attorney Daye Shinn pulled a newspaper out of a bailiff’s file 
cabinet to check the sports page, and he left the paper on the defense table. He later 
claimed he was unaware the front-page was still attached to the paper. Just as the court 
was breaking for lunch, Manson grabbed the paper, stood, and held the paper above his 
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head, showing the jury the headline, “MANSON GUILTY, NIXON DECLARES.”78 
Judge Older was furious, and when the jury returned, he conducted voir dire to see if 
the spectacle had any impact on the jurors. To a person, the jurors said the headline had 
no impact on them, and they could continue judging the case on the evidence presented 
in court alone. Shinn admitted to his mistake the next day, but Judge Older did not show 
any leniency. The judge found Shinn in contempt of his order against bringing 
newspapers into court. Shinn spent the next three days conducting the defense in the 
courtroom and the next three nights serving a contempt citation in the county jail.79 
 The Manson trial ended in convictions for all of the defendants. Despite massive 
publicity, a confession story published around the world, and claim of guilt made by the 
President of the United States, the convictions stood. The trial court had used several of 
the tools prescribed in the Sheppard v. Maxwell opinion and had managed to effectively 
prosecute one of the most notorious crimes in American history. The gag order, though 
occasionally violated, appeared to have kept leaks to a minimum. The extensive voir 
dire, focusing in part on press coverage, produced a jury and alternates able to judge the 
case by the facts. Sequestration of the jury once testimony began further prevented jury 
contamination. Finally, the second voir dire, following Manson’s display of the 
President Nixon headline, foreclosed what almost certainly would have been grounds 
for an appeal had Judge Older not taken such action. In these respects, the Manson case 
showed judges and attorneys how to use the tools at their disposal to manage a highly 
publicized case.80 
 If the Sheppard case showed the dangers of a judge throwing up his hands and 
allowing the press to run amok, the Manson case showed how a judge could take the 
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reins and guide a course between the often conflicting issues of fair trial versus free 
press. But could a judge go too far and use an iron fist approach to squash First 
Amendment freedoms of the press? That was the issue the Supreme Court faced in 
another landmark case known as Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart. 
 Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart. The crime at the center of Nebraska Press 
Association v. Stuart (1976) had many of the elements of a crime sure to attract press 
attention. There were multiple murder victims, including children. Some of the victims 
had also been sexually assaulted. Another intriguing aspect of the crime was its 
location. Instead of a mass murder in the glamorous Hollywood hills, as was the case in 
the Tate-LaBianca murders, this crime happened in the pastoral setting of a small, 
isolated town in western Nebraska. The setting for the crime was a crucial element in 
the events of the case that would ultimately reach the Supreme Court, culminating in 
one of the most important fair trial/free press cases in American history. 
 Sutherland, Nebraska, sits on the vast plains of western Nebraska. In 1975, the 
town boasted 850 residents, and on the night of October 19, 1975, many of them were 
shocked to learn that six of their fellow townsfolk had been shot and killed by one of 
their own.81 Charles Edward Simants was no stranger to law enforcement in Lincoln 
County. He had a string of small crimes to his name dating back to his teen years, and 
many of them were related to his penchant for alcohol. No one at the Rodeo Bar in 
Sutherland was surprised to see Simants there drinking from the afternoon into the 
evening of October 19, but everyone was likely shocked at what he did next.82 
 After leaving the bar, Simants went to his sister’s and brother-in-law’s house 
where he had been living, took a .22 rifle from a closet, and went next door to the Kellie 
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home. There he shot and killed Henry and Marie Kellie, their adult son David, and 
Henry and Marie’s three grandchildren, Florence, Deanne, and Daniel. Simants also 
sexually assaulted Marie Kellie and Florence after shooting them.83 
 Following the murders, Simants went back home, wrote a note confessing to the 
crimes, and called his parents by phone confessing to them too. Simants’s parents 
alerted police, but Charles Simants was gone when officers got to the house. As if 
nothing had happened, Simants walked back to the bar, drank two more beers, and then 
wandered off into the night as the nightmare of his crime settled in on Sutherland.84 
 Police found Simants early Sunday morning and took him to the Lincoln County 
jail in North Platte just fifteen miles from Sutherland. By now reporters from across 
Nebraska and across the nation knew about the crime and the confession Simants had 
made. They flocked to the Lincoln County courthouse for a rare Sunday arraignment. 
The local press and even the NBC broadcast network would report on the arraignment 
and the confessions before day’s end. It was in this environment that judges and 
attorneys assigned to the case – most of whom had no experience with murder trials – 
began to worry about what all of the press attention might do to Simants’ prospects for 
receiving a fair trial.85 
 The judges and attorneys handling the Simants case had a legitimate concern. 
Lincoln County had so few people and publicity about the crime had been so great that 
it was safe to assume anyone who would be called as a potential juror had most likely 
heard something about the case. With this in mind, Simants’s attorneys approached 
Judge Ronald Ruff with a request for a gag order. Judge Ruff issued the order, and the 
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press immediately and vehemently objected, for it was an order like no one remembered 
seeing before. The judge’s order was a gag on the press.86 
 The gag order originally drafted by Ruff went through revisions by the trial 
judge and the Nebraska Supreme Court, which upheld the order with modifications. 
Still, the effect of the order remained the same throughout revisions and appeals. The 
press was prohibited from reporting almost anything that happened in open court prior 
to the seating of a jury. Furthermore, journalists could report that a gag order was in 
place, but they could not report specifics of the order. Reporters were left in a position 
where they could tell their audiences that they could not speak, but they could not tell 
their audiences why.87  
 The court used the voluntary trial coverage guidelines from the Nebraska Bar 
Association (adopted from the A.B.A. ethics rules for attorneys and influenced by 
Sheppard v. Maxwell), tailored them specifically to the Simants case, and made them 
obligatory by order of the court. The court defined pretrial publicity as any reporting 
that would take place before the seating of a jury. This meant reporters could attend 
open court sessions, and they could examine public documents related to the case, but 
they could not report what they observed. Specifically the court banned reporting on 
statements Simants made to police and the confessions Simants made on the night of the 
crime. All of these statements had already been reported prior to the gag order. The 
press could not report expert forensic testimony given in pretrial proceedings in regard 
to the sexual assaults, and finally the press could not report on the specifics of the gag 
order itself. Attorneys for the press failed in all of their appeals, and it was left to the 
Supreme Court to decided if the Nebraska courts had gone too far in protecting 
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Simants’s Sixth Amendment rights and thus abridged the First Amendment rights of the 
press.88 
 The Supreme Court decision in Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart was 
unanimous. The Court was sympathetic to the intent of the Nebraska court’s order, but 
the justices of the High Court determined that the order that had indeed gone too far. 
Writing the opinion of the Court, Justice Warren Burger stated, “…pretrial publicity – 
even pervasive, adverse publicity – does not inevitably lead to an unfair trial.”89 
However, in trying to mitigate the potential impact of such publicity, the Court said the 
Nebraska judges did not fully explore the alternatives outlined in Sheppard v. Maxwell, 
such as a change of venue, delaying the trial, conducting thorough voir dire about press 
coverage, instructing jurors to consider only evidence presented in the courtroom, and 
sequestering the jury.90 The Court also pointed to the fact that the ban applied to press 
organizations based outside Nebraska and thus outside the trial court’s jurisdiction. 
Finally, the opinion focused on the issue of allowing the press to attend open hearings, 
but restricting the press from reporting on those hearings. The Court considered this an 
unjustifiable prior restraint. Justice Burger wrote, “To the extent that this order 
prohibited the reporting on evidence adducted at the open preliminary hearing, it plainly 
violated settled principles: ‘[T]here is nothing that proscribes the press from reporting 
events that transpire in the courtroom.’”91  
 The Nebraska Press Association case left judges with a three-part test to help 
guide them in the use of gag orders. Judges should only issue gag orders if three 
conditions are met. First, there must be a real danger that the release of information will 
impact the defendant’s rights to a fair trial. Second, implementation of the gag order 
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must be shown to reduce the danger posed. Third, it must be shown that less severe 
measures (i.e. change of venue, delay of trial, careful voir dire, etc.) will not reduce the 
danger.92 The Court had made it clear through Nebraska Press Association that 
imposing restrictions on the press was a last option for trial judges and that option could 
not be exercised when other options exist.93  
Scherer noted the importance and the legacy of the Nebraska Press Association 
decision: 
Despite the lingering ambiguity regarding the viability of pretrial gag orders in 
other cases, the announcement of the Nebraska Press Association decision left 
two matters quite clear: the order entered by the Nebraska courts in the Simants 
litigation had been unanimously rejected by the High Court, and the presumptive 
unconstitutionality of all such prior restraints of the press had been strongly 
reiterated. Under any interpretation of the justices’ various opinions, the net 
result was a significant victory for First Amendment advocates in general and 
for the Nebraska media petitioners in particular. They and the rest of the national 
press quickly took notice of their accomplishment.94 
 In a footnote of the Nebraska Press Association decision, Justice Burger wrote, 
“Closing of pretrial proceedings with the consent of the defendant when required is also 
recommended in guidelines that have emerged from various studies. We are not now 
confronted with such issues.”95 But that was exactly the issue that would come before 
the court in a series of cases in the late 1970s and the 1980s. In a sense, the move to 
limit press access to the courtroom was the logical next step for judges concerned about 
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pretrial publicity.96 If they could not prohibit the press from reporting what happened in 
the courtroom, they could simply lock the courtroom doors. 
 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia. Such a situation presented itself in 
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia (1980). The case behind Richmond Newspapers 
was a murder case, but it was not a case as highly publicized as the Sheppard, Manson, 
or Simants cases. The defendant in the case was John Paul Stevenson, who was charged 
with murdering a Virginia hotel manager in 1975. In 1976, a Virginia jury convicted 
Stevenson of second-degree murder, but the conviction was overturned on appeal due to 
improperly admitted evidence. Stevenson’s second trial ended in a mistrial when a juror 
asked to be excused and the court had no alternate jurors for replacement. Stevenson’s 
third trial also ended with a mistrial when the court discovered that one juror had 
learned about Stevenson’s case from press reports and that juror talked to other jurors 
about what he knew. Finally, a fourth jury was seated in September 1978, and just 
before testimony was to begin, Stevenson’s attorneys asked Judge Richard H.C. Taylor 
to close the trial to the press and the public. Stevenson’s attorney said he was concerned 
that a family member of the victim who was present in the courtroom might relay 
information about testimony to witnesses. Prosecutors did not object to the request, and 
Judge Taylor cleared the courtroom.97 
 Judge Taylor found justification for closing the trial in a Virginia law providing 
for judicial discretion that stated judges could exclude “from the trial any person whose 
presence would impair the conduct of a fair trial, provided that the right of the accused 
to a public trial shall not be violated.”98 Two reporters for Richmond Newspapers, Inc. 
objected, and Judge Taylor agreed to conduct a hearing after the day’s testimony. Judge 
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Taylor further stated that the hearing on the closure order was considered part of the 
trial, and so the hearing was conducted in a closed courtroom with only media counsel, 
defense counsel, prosecutors, Judge Taylor, and court personnel present. Again, Judge 
Taylor stood by his order, and the remainder of the trial would be closed.99 Day two, 
however, would be the final day of the trial. After prosecutors presented their evidence 
(apparently insufficient evidence), the defense moved to strike the evidence and declare 
Stevenson not guilty. Judge Taylor granted the motion, and the fourth and final trial of 
John Paul Stevenson ended with Stevenson leaving the courthouse a free man.100 
 Richmond Newspapers Inc. advanced its appeal, and that appeal finally reached 
the High Court in 1980. It was left to the Supreme Court to decide the important 
question presented in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia: Does the Constitution 
guarantee the public and the press the right to attend criminal trials? In answer to that 
question, the Court looked first to history. Public attendance at trials as a historical 
practice dates back to pre-Norman England through what was called the “Rule of 
Publicity.”101 The rule required all free men to attend trials of their peers that took place 
in their communities. The rationale underlying the rule was that the witness of all free 
men in the community would affirm the punishment meted out in the case of a guilty 
verdict or it would equally affirm the innocence of the accused in the case of an 
acquittal. Over time, the Rule of Publicity gave way to voluntary and discretionary 
attendance, but it established a historic precedent for public attendance at trials and the 
right for defendants to face their accusers in a public forum that would carry over to the 
courts of Colonial America and on through the founding of the United States. In the 
Richmond Newspapers decision, Justice Warren Burger wrote, “…the historical 
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evidence demonstrates conclusively that, at the time when our organic laws were 
adopted, criminal trials both here and in England had long been presumptively open.”102  
 Next, the Court noted the value to society in allowing for open observation of its 
institutions. The Court also said that in modern society the press played an important 
role as a proxy for individuals who could not observe institutions such as the courts for 
themselves. Finally, the Court considered the need to preserve public forums: 
A trial courtroom also is a public place where the people generally – and 
representatives of the media – have a right to be present, and where their 
presence historically has been thought to enhance the integrity and quality of 
what takes place.103 
 The Court concluded by making note of the fact that Judge Taylor had not 
considered any alternatives before issuing his closure order. The Court pointed to the 
alternatives listed in Nebraska Press Association and Sheppard v. Maxwell as options to 
consider before issuing a closure order. The opinion concluded with the statement, 
“Absent an overriding interest articulated in findings, the trial of a criminal case must 
be open to the public.”104 
 Justice William Rehnquist was the lone dissenter in Richmond Newspapers. In 
his Richmond Newspapers dissent, Rehnquist referred back to his opinion in a case the 
Court ruled on one year earlier in which he said the right to a public trial rests with the 
defendant, and if the defense and prosecution agree to a closed court, the judge may 
grant their request.105 Rehnquist wrote that he found nothing in the First and Sixth 
Amendments to prevent closed trials when the adversarial parties agree to such an 
arrangement.106  
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 The result of Richmond Newspapers was a presumed openness for criminal 
trials, but not an absolute right for public and press attendance at criminal trials.107 
Parkinson and Parkinson called this, “… a qualified and limited right of access for the 
press to criminal trials.”108 The Court’s opinion did leave the door open for some 
possible exceptions in cases where the state might be able to show an overriding interest 
restricting access to trials. Finally, the Richmond Newspapers decision did not address 
other types of court proceedings such as pretrial hearings and voir dire. Those issues 
would be the focus of a quartet of cases that began in the late 1970s and extended 
through the 1980s. 
 Gannett Co. v. DePasquale. The year before Richmond Newspapers came to the 
Supreme Court, the justices considered a case involving the closure of a pretrial hearing 
on evidence suppression. The case was known as Gannett Co. v. DePasquale (1979). 
The crime at the center of the case was the 1976 murder of a former police officer in 
upstate New York. Prior to trial, the two defendants made a motion to suppress some of 
their statements made to police and some of the evidence (specifically the murder 
weapon) collected under questionable police practices.109 The defense asked the judge 
to close the hearing to the press and the public, claiming that publicity up to that point 
had already jeopardized the defendant’s chances at receiving a fair trial. Furthermore, 
the defense claimed that if the suppression motion succeeded, news reports about the 
hearing would disclose the evidence to be withheld, and thus the publicity would defeat 
the purpose of the suppression order. Prosecutors did not object to the closure request, 
and the judge granted the closure order.110 
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 Press appeals were unsuccessful, and the case reached the Supreme Court in 
1978. It was decided in 1979. The decision in Gannett Co. v. DePasquale was a 5-4 
majority, and the different lines of reasoning taken by the justices made for a 
convoluted ruling. In the end, however, the majority stated that the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments do not give the press and the public the right to attend trials. The Gannett 
decision may appear contradictory and confusing when juxtaposed with the decision 
reached in Richmond Newspapers just a year later. However, it is important to note that 
the scope of the Gannett decision was limited to pretrial hearings, and, more 
specifically, a suppression hearing. Furthermore, the denial of access was imposed only 
temporarily before the trial, and the court did release transcripts of the proceedings 
later.111 In such a case, the majority said protecting the defendant’s rights to a fair trial 
took precedence over public access.112 
 Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior 
Court (1982) was a press challenge to a Massachusetts law that barred the press and 
public from the courtroom during testimony from minor victims of sex offenses. In the 
case, a Massachusetts judge denied press appeals and closed the court during the 
testimony of three teenage rape victims. The court found this blanket closure law 
unconstitutional. In Justice Brennan’s opinion, he wrote: 
Where … the State attempts to deny the right of access in order to inhibit the 
disclosure of sensitive information, it must be shown that the denial is 
necessitated by a compelling governmental interest, and is narrowly tailored to 
serve that interest.113 
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The Court reversed the closure order of the Massachusetts judge because the order was 
not narrowly tailored. The Court did allow that protecting minor victims of sex crimes 
could be a compelling state interest warranting closure; however, judges would have to 
consider the specifics of each case and tailor closure orders to the specifics of the case 
before closing their courtrooms to the public and the press.114 
Press-Enterprise I and Press-Enterprise II. A pair of cases originating in 
California known as Press Enterprise I and Press Enterprise II considered the openness 
of voir dire and preliminary hearings respectively. Press-Enterprise v. Superior Court 
of California for the County of Riverside (Press-Enterprise I) was decided by the 
Supreme Court in 1984.115 The facts of the case focused on the voir dire for a defendant 
accused of the rape and murder of a teenage girl. The California trial court had allowed 
the press to observe the general voir dire proceedings, but not the individual voir dire of 
potential jurors. The entire voir dire process was quite lengthy, lasting a total of six 
weeks, of which the press was able to observe only three days. The Supreme Court 
ruled that the exclusion of the press, barring the state’s showing of an overriding 
interest, was unconstitutional. Again, the Court pointed to the long history of openness 
in the Anglo-American courts. The court also said openness is essential to preserving 
public confidence in the judicial system.116 
 Press-Enterprise II, Press-Enterprise v. Superior Court of California for the 
County of Riverside, came before the Supreme Court in 1986. In this case, the press 
objected to being barred from a lengthy, forty-one-day preliminary hearing for a nurse 
accused of murdering twelve patients using overdoses of medication.117 The Court 
considered the closed preliminary hearing unconstitutional on the same grounds as 
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Press-Enterprise I. Specific to the purpose of the preliminary hearing, the opinion 
stated: 
[T]he absence of a jury, long recognized as “an inestimable safeguard against 
the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor … and against the compliant, biased, or 
eccentric judge,” Duncan v. Louisiana,…makes the importance of public access 
to a preliminary hearing even more significant. “People in an open society do 
not demand infallibility from their institutions, but it is difficult for them to 
accept what they are prohibited from observing.”118 
 The line of cases beginning with Nebraska Press Association and extending 
through Press-Enterprise II established a presumption of openness for trials, preliminary 
hearings and voir dire. However, the courts may restrict press and public access in 
individual cases and for individual witnesses providing it meets the following criteria: 
The court must (1) find an overriding state interest, (2) show that closure is the only 
means of meeting that interest, (3) narrowly tailor the closure order to meet that interest, 
and (4) hold hearings on the record to prove the three criteria.119 
Attorney Advocacy in the Press 
 The highly publicized cases that came before the Court in the last half of the 
twentieth century also focused attention within the legal community on professional 
ethics in such cases with fair trial/free press implications. The central question was how 
much should attorneys be allowed to say publicly regarding pending cases? The issue 
became a priority for the American Bar Association in the 1960s after a series of cases 
drew criticism from the Supreme Court regarding how attorneys conducted themselves 
in relation to the press prior to trial.120 From the 1960s through the 1990s, the A.B.A. 
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would debate professional codes of ethics regarding attorney/press relations, but the 
literature shows such codes had been a part of American jurisprudence since the late 
nineteenth century.121 
 Early Professional Codes. The first known code of ethics to address 
attorney/press relations in the United States was the “Alabama Code of 1887.”122 The 
Alabama Code advised attorneys that they should not talk to journalists about pending 
cases. The code stated, “[n]ewspaper publications by an attorney as to the merits of 
pending or anticipated litigation ... tend to prevent a fair trial in the courts, and 
otherwise prejudice the due administration of justice.”123 The American Bar Association 
first addressed the issue in 1908 with Canon 20. The canon stated a position similar to 
the Alabama Code, and it was used in the drafting of professional ethics codes in 
several states. Canon 20 read: 
Newspaper publications by a lawyer as to pending or anticipated litigation may 
interfere with the fair trial in the Courts and otherwise prejudice the due 
administration of justice. Generally they are to be condemned. If the extreme 
circumstances of a particular case justify a statement to the public, it is 
unprofessional to make it anonymously. An ex parte reference to the facts 
should not go beyond quotation from the records and papers on file in the court; 
but even in extreme cases it is better to avoid any ex parte statement.124 
 Calls for Change. Canon 20 remained essentially untouched until the mid 1960s. 
By the mid-1960s though, the Supreme Court was growing increasingly frustrated by 
fair trial/free press cases, particularly those focusing on pretrial publicity.125 Two cases 
  43 
in particular brought the issue of pretrial publicity to a critical point causing many in the 
legal community to demand action. 
 The first case was the assassination of President John F. Kennedy in 1963. 
While the Supreme Court as a body did not have a role in investigating the case, 
Supreme Court Chief Justice Earl Warren headed the commission investigating the 
assassination. The commission’s final report on the assassination was highly critical of 
the relationship between the Dallas Police Department and the press following the 
President’s assassination.126 The Warren Commission claimed police had given the 
press too much information about the accused assassin, Lee Harvey Oswald, and police 
had given the press too much physical access to Oswald. The commission claimed this 
flood of information and easy physical access to the suspect were partially responsible 
for the assassination of Oswald by Jack Ruby just two days after the president’s 
murder.127 The commission also suggested that so much information had been released 
in the two days between President Kennedy’s assassination and Oswald’s assassination 
that if was doubtful Oswald would have received a fair trial had he not been 
murdered.128 
 The Warren Commission’s criticism of the police/press relationship in the 
Kennedy assassination led the American Bar Association to take action. In 1964, the 
A.B.A. formed a committee that would become known as the Reardon Committee.129 
The Committee was charged with the task of establishing professional standards for 
attorneys and law enforcement regarding public comments and the release of 
information in the pretrial stage of criminal proceedings.130 The Reardon Committee 
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was working on developing these standards when the second significant case emerged 
in 1966. That case was Sheppard v. Maxwell.131 
 In Sheppard v. Maxwell, the Court was highly critical of the relationship 
between law enforcement, the court, and the press.132 The Court determined that the 
trial judge had the authority to limit extrajudicial statements made by attorneys and law 
enforcement officers, and he should have exercised this authority to protect Sheppard’s 
right to a fair trial.133 The Court’s endorsement of judicial control was one of the most 
important provisions in the Sheppard decision.134 It was a landmark fair trial/free press 
ruling, and the Reardon Committee took notice.135 
 Model Code of Professional Responsibility. The Reardon Committee relied 
heavily on the language of Sheppard in drafting what would become known as the 
A.B.A. Model Code of Professional Responsibility.136 The committee was looking for a 
legal standard to define the limits of speech, and it found that standard in the language 
of Sheppard. In the Sheppard opinion, Justice Clark wrote, “[W]here there is a 
reasonable likelihood that prejudicial news prior to trial will prevent a fair trial, the 
judge should continue the case until the threat abates, or transfer it to another county not 
so permeated with publicity.”137 Thus, “reasonable likelihood” of prejudicing the jury 
became the test for determining the limits of pretrial public statements.138 
 The American Bar Association adopted the Model Code of Professional 
Responsibility in 1969.139 The code gave specific guidelines for what attorneys could 
and could not say publicly in the pretrial stage. The code stated: 
It is the duty of the lawyer not to release or authorize the release of information 
or opinion for dissemination by any means of public communication in 
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connection with pending or imminent criminal litigation with which he is 
associated, if there is a reasonable likelihood that such dissemination will 
interfere with a fair trial or otherwise prejudice the due administration of 
justice.140 
 The code provided guidelines for what attorneys could and could not discuss 
publicly. Items attorneys could discuss publicly included: (1) information that was part 
of public records, (2) confirmation that an investigation had begun and the general 
nature of that investigation, (3) general descriptions of physical evidence, (4) requests 
for assistance in collecting information or evidence, and (5) warnings to the public 
about any dangers they might face related to the case.141 Items attorneys could not 
discuss publicly included: (1) a defendant’s reputation, character, and criminal 
background, (2) negotiations for a plea agreement, (3) statements made by a defendant 
or his/her refusal to make statements, (4) the performance of and results of any tests, (5) 
witnesses who might testify in the case or the testimony they might offer, and (6) 
opinions about the case against the defendant, opinions about evidence in the case, and 
opinions about the guilt or innocence of the defendant.142 The A.B.A. Model Code 
would become the basis for professional codes adopted in every state.143 The Model 
Code would also be the basis for the voluntary press guidelines established by press and 
bar associations in several states.144 
 Less than a decade after adoption, the Model Code would come under scrutiny 
due to the Court’s ruling in another landmark fair trial/free press case – Nebraska Press 
Association v. Stuart. In the Nebraska Press Association decision, the Court examined 
the trial judge’s gag order targeting the press using the “clear and present danger” 
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test.145 The opinion cited Justice Hand’s definition of  “clear and present danger” 
offered in United States v. Dennis that said the court must determine if, “the gravity of 
the ‘evil,’ discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech is 
necessary to avoid the danger.”146 Here the Court had applied a standard more stringent 
than the “reasonable likelihood” test to the question of proscribing pretrial speech. Even 
though the gag order in Nebraska Press Association targeted the press, the Supreme 
Court’s unanimous condemnation of the order and the application of the strict 
constitutional test caused the American Bar Association to reconsider its Model 
Code.147 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct. In 1983, the A.B.A. adopted a revised 
code known as the Model Rules of Profession Conduct.148 The Model Rules established 
a new legal standard for attorney speech that fell between the “reasonable likelihood” 
test and the “clear and present danger” test.149 This new standard was the “‘substantial 
likelihood” test.150 The Model Rules stated: 
A lawyer shall not make an extrajudicial statement that a reasonable person 
would expect to be disseminated by means of public communication if the 
lawyer knows or reasonably should know that it will have a substantial 
likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding.151 
The detailed guidelines for specific items attorneys could and could not discuss 
remained essentially unchanged from the original Model Code.152 
The American Bar Association had responded to the call for action to address 
the fair trial/free press issue of pretrial publicity. Based on the precedent of Sheppard, 
the A.B.A. developed the Model Code using the “reasonable likelihood” standard. 
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Following the Nebraska Press Association decision, the A.B.A. reconsidered the code 
and drafted the Model Rules using the more stringent “substantial likelihood” standard. 
Despite the A.B.A.’s diligence in modifying the rules, defense attorneys with an interest 
in defending their clients in the court of public opinion claimed the standards were far 
from clear. Many in the legal community wanted the Supreme Court to address the 
issue and resolve the question of how much attorneys could say publicly prior to trial.153 
The Court would do that in a case known as Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada. 
 Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada. The case that would become Gentile v. State Bar 
of Nevada (1991) began as a sensational Las Vegas burglary case involving drugs, 
money, and allegations of police corruption.154 The crime occurred in early 1987 at 
Western Vault Corporation in Las Vegas. Western Vault was a private high-security 
storage company specializing in vault storage of highly valuable items.155 The Las 
Vegas Police Department had a vault there in which undercover detectives had stored 
cocaine and large amounts of cash used in undercover investigations. On January 31, 
1987, the police discovered that four kilograms of cocaine and nearly $300,000 dollars 
in cash were missing from the vault.156 Immediately the investigators’ attention focused 
on Western Vault’s owner, Grady Sanders. This was despite the fact that the only two 
people with unfettered access to the vault were two Las Vegas police officers, and there 
was no log recording when the vault was accessed.157 
 As the investigation of the theft moved forward, information leaked to the press 
resulting in multiple published stories about the case.158 The reports gave information 
exculpating the police officers and other persons of interest, while at the same time 
further implicating Sanders in the crime. Several months later, a grand jury indicted 
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Sanders.159 Immediately following the indictment on February 5, 1988, Sanders’s 
attorney, Dominic Gentile, held a press conference in an attempt to respond to the 
pretrial publicity about his client. This press conference was the basis of the case that 
would become Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada.160 
 At the press conference, Gentile told the press Sanders was “being used as a 
scapegoat” and that there were other people implicated in the investigation who had 
convictions for drug dealing and money laundering.161 Though asked by reporters to 
name these people and to elaborate on their backgrounds, Gentile declined, citing Rule 
177 of the Nevada Bar Association’s professional standards, which had been adopted 
from the A.B.A. Model Rule.162 Gentile did, however, say that much of the background 
of these other suspects had previously been reported in the press.163 
 Gentile claimed he had studied the Nevada bar’s professional standards and 
believed he was acting within the limits of the standards during the press conference.164 
The Nevada standards were based on the “substantial likelihood” test set forth in the 
A.B.A. Model Rule. The Nevada standards also included the Model Rule’s list of items 
attorneys could not discuss publicly followed by the list of items attorneys could discuss 
publicly as identified in the Model Rule.165 The two lists were joined by a paragraph 
that read, “Notwithstanding subsection 1 and 2 (a-f), a lawyer involved in the 
investigation or litigation of a matter may state without elaboration ...”166 Gentile would 
later say he interpreted the language of that paragraph to mean his statements made at 
the press conference were allowable under the guidelines.167 
 Six months after the press conference, Grady Sanders went to trial. During voir 
dire, none of the prospective jurors claimed to remember Gentile’s press conference, 
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but some did recall reading press reports about other suspects during the pretrial 
period.168 The trial resulted in an acquittal for Sanders. After the trial, the Nevada Bar’s 
disciplinary committee accused Gentile of violating professional ethics in his press 
conference.169 Gentile was reprimanded, and the Nevada Supreme Court upheld the 
reprimand, which prompted Gentile to appeal to the United States Supreme Court. 
Michael Tigar, who would later represent Terry Nichols in the Oklahoma City bombing 
case, was Gentile’s attorney for the Supreme Court appeal.170 
 The Supreme Court decision in Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada was a 
complicated 5-4 decision. The Court reversed Gentile’s reprimand claiming Nevada’s 
Rule 177 was “void for vagueness.”171 The Court was most critical of the paragraph that 
used the term “notwithstanding” to join the section of prohibited statements with the 
section of allowable statements. The Court determined that Rule 177, as written, 
contained ambiguities and contradictions that could lead a well-intentioned attorney 
astray. Indeed, this is what the majority determined had happened to Gentile. The 
majority wrote, “The fact that Gentile was found in violation of the Rules after studying 
them and making a conscious effort at compliance demonstrates that Rule 177 creates a 
trap for the wary as well as the unwary.”172 Based on the language of the rule and the 
possibility it could allow for discriminatory enforcement, the majority determined Rule 
177 was void for vagueness. But the larger issue that the American Bar Association had 
been wrestling with for two decades remained – What should be the legal standard for 
imposing limitations on the First Amendment rights of attorneys? 
 The Court was clearly divided on the proper standard; however, the majority 
concluded the “substantial likelihood” test was the appropriate standard for balancing 
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attorneys’ First Amendment rights with the state’s Sixth Amendment interest of 
ensuring a fair trial for defendants.173 Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the majority, 
and he was joined by Justices O’Connor, Scalia, Souter, and White. Justice Rehnquist 
wrote, “Lawyers representing clients in pending cases are key participants in the 
criminal justice system, and the State may demand some adherence to the precepts of 
that system in regulating their speech as well as their conduct.”174 Justice Rehnquist also 
wrote that, as key participants, attorneys have access to investigative information during 
the pretrial stage that could be prejudicial if it were made public. Furthermore, because 
attorneys hold a privileged position in the legal system, the majority claimed attorney 
statements might be more likely to sway public opinion. The majority also suggested 
existing alternative methods of mitigating pretrial publicity might have become less 
effective due to the ever-broadening reach of mass communication. Justice Rehnquist 
wrote, “… with increasingly widespread media coverage of criminal trials, a change of 
venue may not suffice to undo the effects of statements such as those made by 
petitioner.”175 Weighing the state’s interest in preserving the Sixth Amendment’s 
guarantee of a fair trial against attorneys’ First Amendment right to free speech, the 
majority determined the state’s interest took precedent. In conclusion, Justice Rehnquist 
wrote: 
The restraint on speech is narrowly tailored … The regulation of attorneys’ 
speech is limited – it applies only to speech that is substantially likely to have a 
materially prejudicial effect; it is neutral as to points of view, applying equally 
to all attorneys’ participating in a pending case; and it merely postpones the 
attorney’s comments until after the trial. While supported by the substantial state 
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interest in preventing prejudice to an adjudicative proceeding by those who have 
a duty to protect its integrity, the rule is limited on its face to preventing only 
speech having a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing that 
proceeding.176 
Justice Kennedy along with Justices Blackmun, Marshall, and Stevens disagreed 
with the majority. Justice Kennedy wrote for the group claiming the “substantial 
likelihood” standard as applied in the Gentile case lacked justification.177 The Kennedy 
minority suggested the higher “clear and present danger” standard should be applied 
instead. Justice Kennedy challenged the majority’s claim that attorney speech should be 
circumscribed because their position might make their statements persuasive. The 
justice wrote, “The First Amendment does not permit suppression of speech because of 
its power to command assent.”178 The minority opinion also claimed defense attorneys 
in particular faced a disadvantage in the court of public opinion. Justice Kennedy wrote: 
The police, the prosecution, other government officials, and the community at 
large hold innumerable avenues for the dissemination of information adverse to 
a criminal defendant, many of which are not within the scope of Rule 177 or any 
other regulation. By contrast, a defendant cannot speak without fear of 
incriminating himself and prejudicing his defense, and most criminal defendants 
have insufficient means to retain a public relations team apart from defense 
counsel for the sole purpose of countering prosecution statements. These factors 
underscore my conclusion that blanket rules restricting speech of defense 
attorneys should not be accepted without careful First Amendment scrutiny.179 
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Justice Kennedy called Gentile a less than perfect case to test the Constitutional limits 
of attorney speech, but he surmised, “At the very least … we can say that the Rule 
which punished petitioner’s statements represents a limitation of the First Amendment 
freedoms greater than is necessary or essential to the protection of the particular 
governmental interest …”180 
In Gentile, the Court had finally considered the issue of restricting extrajudicial 
statements, which the American Bar Association and state bar associations had wrestled 
with for two decades. Still, Gentile did not provide the definitive answers many in the 
legal community – especially defense attorneys – had hoped for.181 What was clear after 
Gentile was that the Court had suggested pretrial attorney speech could be subordinated 
to the state’s interest in preserving the fairness of the trial process.182 Also, a majority of 
justices believed the “substantial likelihood” test was a constitutional method for 
establishing the limits of proscribing pretrial attorney speech.183 What was left unclear 
after Gentile was whether or not attorneys should attempt to advocate for clients in the 
court of public opinion, and if so how they should approach the task.184 
Broadcasting and Cameras in the Courts  
 Technological advances during the twentieth century brought new players to the 
fair trial/free press arena. Radio and television news made the use of microphones and 
cameras in courtrooms an issue of concern. The history and case law involving 
broadcasting trials shows that some courts allowed broadcasting when the technology 
first appeared. As problems with cameras in the courts emerged, many courts began to 
shy away from the practice, but changes in the technology of broadcasting created a 
climate in which cameras made their way back into the courtroom. Currently, only the 
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District of Columbia and Federal Criminal Courts completely prohibit cameras from all 
of their courts according to an annual report by the Radio Television News Directors 
Association; however, some states have made the rules for cameras so restrictive as to 
be almost impossible.185 
 The arguments against cameras in the court include the fear that the presence of 
cameras will physically disrupt the courtroom. There is also concern that cameras will 
have a negative psychological impact on court personnel, judges, attorneys, jurors, 
witnesses, and defendants. Broadcasting trials could be considered an invasion of 
privacy for some trial participants. The possibility of the media using trial coverage for 
commercial purposes is another reason to contest cameras. Finally, and most 
importantly, broadcasting trials presents a risk of prejudicing the jury.186 
 Proponents of cameras in the courtroom say that the practice opens the 
courtroom to the public and that it levels the playing field for print and broadcast media. 
Supporters say cameras allow people who would not otherwise be able to go to the 
courthouse the opportunity to see the courts in action. This is an exercise in informing 
the citizenry about the operations of its government, and thus it produces a more 
informed public by putting government operations on display for all to see. There is 
also the argument that allowing cameras in the courtroom creates parity between 
broadcast journalists and print journalists by allowing broadcasters to use the full 
spectrum of technology at their disposal. Broadcasters often use this argument. Finally, 
some proponents say that broadcasting court proceedings and trials can help bring forth 
new evidence and new witnesses who have valuable information but were previously 
unknown to investigators.187 
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 The Hauptmann Case. Cameras and microphones did make it into highly 
publicized cases in the twentieth century and not always with good results. The 1935 
murder trial of Richard Bruno Hauptmann, accused of murdering the son of famous 
aviator Charles Lindbergh, is often cited as one of the most sensational trials of the 
twentieth century. The case is also often held up as a prime example of sensational 
media trial coverage run amok. The questionable actions of the press during the 
Hauptmann trial were a significant factor in later court attempts to restrict the press, 
including the prohibition of cameras in U.S. Federal Courts.188 
 Charles Lindbergh was one of the most famous people in the United States and 
around the world in the early 1930s. His rise to fame came with his 1927 non-stop flight 
across the Atlantic, making him the first person to accomplish this feat. Lindbergh 
returned a national hero, and he was still very much in the spotlight in the early 
1930s.189 
 While most Americans were feeling the tightening grip of the Great Depression 
in 1932, Charles Lindbergh enjoyed a life of luxury. He and his wife, Ann, along with 
their one-year-old son, Charles A. Lindbergh, Jr., had recently moved into a newly- 
constructed fourteen-room mansion on a 390-acre estate near Hopewell, New Jersey. 
Lindbergh’s fame, fortune, and family made him a prime target for a crime that was 
becoming all too common in the desperate 1930s – kidnapping for ransom.190 
 On the night of March 1, 1932, the kidnapper struck. Using a ladder to get in 
through the upstairs nursery window, the kidnapper took Charles Jr. from his crib. 
Neither Charles Sr., nor Ann, nor any of their house staff heard or saw anything. 
Despite the payment of a ransom, the child was not returned. Several weeks after the 
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kidnapping, the child’s body was found not far from the Lindbergh home. The 
following investigation would lead to the arrest of a German immigrant named Richard 
Bruno Hauptmann. Intense press coverage chronicled every twist and turn in the case 
that resulted in Hauptmann’s conviction and execution. On the eve of the trial’s 
beginning in January 1935, the famous journalist H.L. Mencken called it “the biggest 
story since the Resurrection.”191 
 The trial for Richard Bruno Hauptmann began on January 2, 1935, in the small 
town of Flemington, New Jersey. Reporters and newsreel camerapersons converged on 
the courthouse by the dozens. Some estimates are that as many as 700 reporters and 130 
cameras covered the trial.192 The trial was front-page news and newsreel fodder across 
the nation and around the world. Kennedy stated:  
The demand for copy was staggering – the coverage given to the trial exceeded 
that of any other comparable event in America history, including the Armistice 
and the Olympic Games. It was estimated that an average of half a million 
words spewed out of Flemington daily.193  
The press went to extremes to get the latest information from the courtroom to the 
public. Photos of the courthouse exterior show a web work of telegraph and phone lines 
running from poles in the street to the courthouse roof. These lines included a direct 
cable from Flemington, New Jersey, to London to get the latest news from the trial to 
Europe as quickly as possible. On the eve of the verdict in the trial, the sheriff instructed 
deputies to keep people away from windows in the courtroom to prevent reporters from 
signaling the verdict to colleagues waiting out in the street. To circumvent this plan, an 
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Associated Press reporter sneaked a shortwave radio into the courtroom so he could 
relay the decision to a colleague hiding in the courthouse attic.194 
 The Hauptmann trial was one of the first high profile trials covered by newsreel 
cameras capable of capturing moving images and sound. All of the major newsreel 
studios of the time had a camera in Fleming, and several of those cameras made it into 
the courtroom itself. There remains some question about how complicit the court was in 
allowing newsreel coverage, but the court reacted strongly and angrily when, near the 
end of the trial, film with sound of testimony began appearing on the screens of movie 
theaters. Fisher explained how the situation came to a head: 
Judge Trenchard was shocked to learn that newsreel films of the trial were 
showing in several theaters in New York City and New Jersey. The next 
morning, the judge discovered that a motion picture camera, housed in a special 
box to deaden its noise, had been set up in the balcony. The witnesses’ voices 
had been picked up by a directional beam microphone installed on a windowsill 
thirty-five feet from the stand. The mike was partially hidden by an electric fan 
that didn’t work. 
 Friday evening, [prosecutor] Wilentz and the representatives of five 
motion picture companies conferred in the judge’s chambers. When the meeting 
broke up, Wilentz told the press that the motion picture companies had violated 
a gentlemen’s agreement not to film the proceedings. The prosecutor said that he 
had sent a message to the companies involved – Universal Pictures, Fox 
Movietone, Pathe News, Paramount Pictures, and Hearst Metrotone News – 
asking them not to show the films until the trial was over. The camera had been 
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operated, Wilentz said, without the knowledge of the judge, the prosecution, the 
defense, or Sheriff John Curtiss. Wilentz then lashed out at the executives of 
these companies:  “These cheap tricksters sit in their offices in New York and 
Hollywood and think that nothing is superior to the movies and the dollar. They 
give their word of honor though their representatives – and it was violated.” 
 Fox, Paramount, and Hearst agreed to withhold their films, but Universal 
and Pathe did not. As Wilentz spoke, newsreels of the trial were playing in 
moviehouses all over New York City and New Jersey. 
 Truman Talley, the editor of Fox Movietone News, stood next to 
Wilentz, and when the prosecutor finished speaking, Talley said that Judge 
Trenchard, Wilentz, and the defense counsel knew about the camera. “Why, 
they had a state trooper stationed next to the camera to make sure it wasn’t 
making any noticeable noise,” he said.195 
 Reaction to the media spectacle surrounding the Hauptmann trial was highly 
critical even from some members of the press.196 The trial raised concerns about fair 
trial/free press issues in the legal community as well. In a paper delivered at the 1935 
American Bar Association convention, Conference of Bar Association Delegates 
Chairman E. Smyth Gambrell touched on the issue. His comments did not mention the 
Hauptmann trial specifically, but he generally condemned attorneys involved in high 
profile cases whom he accused of taking on the role of public relations specialists as 
opposed to lawyers. Gambrell placed the responsibility of fixing the problem with 
members of the bar.197 The next year, the A.B.A. decided to take the initiative and 
formed the Special Committee for Cooperation between Radio, Press, and the Courts. In 
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1937, the committee presented what would become Canon 35. Canon 35 recommended 
banning photography and broadcasting in courtrooms, saying it degraded the 
proceedings. Every state but Texas and Colorado implemented the ban soon after.198 
 Regardless of whether or not the newsreel cameras were authorized by the court, 
the impact of the Hauptmann trial films was significant. The newsreels and the general 
media circus around this case were so widely and roundly criticized that it led many 
states to ban cameras for nearly 40 years. The federal criminal courts responded in 1944 
by establishing Rule 53 of the Federal Criminal Procedure Codes, which expressly 
forbids any type of broadcasting in U.S. District Court criminal matters. Rule 53 is still 
in place today.199 
 By the 1960s, some state courts were beginning to experiment with cameras in 
their courtrooms. The technological limits of this early broadcasting equipment made 
cameras a threat to courtroom decorum. Cameras of the time were large and required 
bright lights to make the picture quality sufficient for broadcast. The presence of these 
cameras and auxiliary equipment were an intrusion on the courtroom, but did they 
impact the defendant’s right to a fair trial? This was a question presented to the 
Supreme Court in the 1965 case Estes v. Texas. 
 Estes v. Texas. Estes v. Texas (1965) was the appeal of a Texas swindling case 
that garnered a large amount of publicity including television coverage. Two days of 
pretrial hearings were broadcast in their entirety by local television stations, and 
portions of the closing arguments in the trial and the return of the verdict were also 
broadcast. All of this was done over the objections of the defendant.200 
 The Court noted the disruption the cameras caused in the courtroom: 
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[T]he picture presented was not one of that judicial serenity and calm to which 
petitioner was entitled. Indeed, at least 12 cameramen were engaged in the 
courtroom throughout the hearing taking motion and still pictures and televising 
the proceedings. Cables and wires were snaked across the courtroom floor, three 
microphones were on the judge’s bench and others were beamed at the jury box 
and the counsel table. It is conceded that the activities of the television crews 
and news photographers led to considerable disruption of the hearings.201 
 The Court took efforts to explain that barring disruptive broadcast equipment 
did not put the broadcast media at a disadvantage to their print colleagues.  “The 
television and radio reporter has the same privilege [as the newspaper reporter]. All are 
entitled to the same right as the general public. The news reporter is not permitted to 
bring his typewriter or printing press,” the Court said.202 Here the court said that the 
right to be protected was the right of reporter presence in the courtroom, not the 
privilege of using equipment specific to the medium employing the reporter. 
 The Court specified four problems with broadcasting trials. First, the broadcast 
might inform about particulars of the case so much so that seating an impartial jury 
would be impossible. Second, broadcasting might adversely affect the testimony of 
witnesses by making them fearful of testifying and by violating the rule of sequestration 
for witnesses. Third, broadcasting might be a distraction for judges and attorneys 
involved in the case, making them feel they must play to the cameras and thereby lose 
focus on their duties to the court. Fourth, broadcasting might negatively affect the 
defendant, and it could possibly intrude on the relationship between the defendant and 
the defense attorney. Beyond these primary concerns, the Court also considered the 
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possibility that the media might try to use trial coverage for commercial and/or 
entertainment purposes, thus degrading the solemnity of the judicial process.203 
 Whether or not Estes v. Texas should have been interpreted as a complete ban on 
cameras in the courtroom was a matter of debate in the legal community following the 
decision.204 Even so, the effect of Estes was that it stalled the migration of cameras into 
the courtroom in the early days of television broadcast journalism. However, as local 
television news became a more professional and profitable proposition, technology 
improvements made the equipment used by broadcast journalists less intrusive.205 These 
changes would make one sentence from the Estes decision prophetic: “When the 
advances in these arts [the practice of journalism] permit reporting by printing press or 
by television without their present hazards to a fair trial we will have another case.”206 
That case would be called Chandler v. Florida, and it would come before the Supreme 
Court in 1981. 
 Chandler v. Florida. In the ten years that passed between the Estes decision and 
the mid-1970s, television technology made significant advances. Cameras had become 
smaller, and portable videotape recorders were becoming more common in local 
television news and commercial video production. By the end of the 1970s, most local 
network affiliates had adopted videotape for use in their news departments.207 This 
improved technology spurred an interest in some states to examine the possibilities of 
introducing cameras in the courtroom under the strict supervision of the courts. One of 
these states was Florida. 
 In 1976, the Florida Supreme Court began surveying the possibility of 
introducing cameras in the state’s criminal and civil courts. In July 1977, the state 
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conducted a one-year trial in which cameras were present in some courtrooms during 
trial. After reviewing its own experiment and the results in other states conducting 
similar experiments, the Florida Supreme Court adopted standing rules that allowed for 
video coverage of trials in Florida in 1979.208 
 The argument for Florida’s admission of cameras was that the judicial process 
was a significant civic process that should be observed by the public. If more members 
of the public were able to observe the judicial process via video, it might serve to instill 
confidence in the justice system, and it might also serve to educate the public about the 
judicial system.209 
 The rules for cameras in Florida courts placed the defendant’s rights to a fair 
trial as the paramount concern. Judges had discretion to augment or eliminate camera 
coverage should they feel the defendant’s rights were threatened. The rules also 
addressed some of the problems with camera coverage that were noted in Estes v. 
Texas. For instance, the Florida rules allowed only one stationary camera and one 
camera operator in the courtroom. News organizations wanting to tape the proceedings 
would have to accept recordings from a pool feed, and that recording would be done in 
a room separate from the courtroom. Artificial lighting was prohibited in the courtroom. 
Audio was to be obtained from the established courtroom audio system, and the rules 
prohibited the recording of any bench conferences involving the judge and attorneys. 
These rules were designed to make the cameras as unobtrusive as possible, and they 
allowed the judges to have a high degree of control over what the cameras presented.210 
 One of the cases to come to trial during Florida’s camera experiment was the 
case of two police officers accused of conspiring to burglarize a Miami restaurant. The 
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fact that two people sworn to uphold the law were charged with conspiring to break the 
law, and the fact that the restaurant involved was fairly well known, attracted a 
considerable amount of press interest in the case. Despite defense objections, the judge 
allowed portions of the trial to be recorded, and excerpts were aired by broadcast news 
outlets. The defendants were convicted, and they immediately appealed, claiming the 
television coverage denied them their right to a fair trial. The appeal reached the 
Supreme Court as Chandler v. Florida in 1980.211 
 The Court ruled on Chandler v. Florida in 1981. The decision upheld the 
convictions. With this decision, the Court clarified that Estes v. Texas was not a 
declaration that broadcast or photographic coverage of trials was unconstitutional.212 
While nothing in the Constitution required broadcast coverage, it was not 
unconstitutional for states to permit it either, as long as defendants’ Sixth Amendment 
rights were not violated. In his opinion for the Court, Justice Warren Burger went to 
lengths to explain the High Court was not judging state court policies and procedures. 
The Court’s sole interest was in the extent to which those policies and procedures might 
violate the Constitution.213 Specific to the facts of the case, the Court noted that the 
appellant offered no evidence of how the camera made the trial unfair. Further, the 
Court stated there was no evidence of “…the ‘Roman circus’ or ‘Yankee Stadium’ 
atmosphere, as in Estes.”214 In conclusion, the Court did not “endorse or … invalidate 
Florida’s experiment,” and it made it clear that states could pursue their own 
experiments in bringing cameras into the courtroom.215 Thus, after the Chandler 
decision, similar experiments began in many other states.216 
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 The Radio Television News Directors Association tracks state laws regarding 
cameras in the courtroom. As of 2010, all fifty states have made some provision for 
cameras; however, according to the RTNDA guide, fifteen states have laws that are so 
restrictive as to make camera access impractical.217 The widespread adoption of 
cameras in state courts has not been without controversy, but it has not led to an 
overwhelming problem for the courts either. Goldfarb wrote, “…since 1981, when 
Chandler opened the way for cameras in courts, no verdict has been overturned on the 
basis of prejudice caused by television.”218 
 Around the time the Court decided Chandler, cable broadcasting was taking hold 
in the United States. When the Cable News Network (CNN) came on the scene, and 
later Court TV, broadcasting trials would move from a local proposition to a national 
concern. Goldfarb wrote that CNN has broadcast portions, or in some cases all, of 
several high profile trials including the 1982 murder trial of Claus von Bulow, libel 
trials involving entertainer Carol Burnett and the CBS news magazine 60 Minutes, and 
the highly publicized and lengthy child abuse case involving the McMartin nursery 
school in California.219 
 Many cable channels and some network affiliates carried portions of the 1995 
O.J. Simpson trial, and some carried the trial in its entirety. Despite the criticism the 
ceaseless O.J. trial coverage generated, one episode during the trial showed how 
cameras could aid courts in the search for truth. During cross-examination of Los 
Angeles Police Department Detective Mark Fuhrman, the detective denied he had ever 
used racist language in reference to African-Americans. This testimony was broadcast 
nationwide, and it caught the attention of a woman in North Carolina. Years earlier, this 
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woman had interviewed Fuhrman, and she still had possession of the tapes from those 
interviews. She recalled that Fuhrman had indeed used racist language during the 
interviews. She contacted the Simpson defense, and defense attorneys were able to 
confront Fuhrman with his earlier statements. It could be argued that were it not for live 
trial coverage, such information might not have surfaced, and, even if it had, it might 
not have been made available to the defense as quickly.220 
 Yet support for broadcasting trials suffered a major setback with the trial of O.J. 
Simpson.221 Following the media spectacle that was the Simpson trial, many scholars 
and lawyers began to ask if the critics of cameras in the courts were not correct.222 
However, according the RTNDA, the number of states that have adopted rules for 
cameras has increased since the Simpson trial, so there does not appear to be a large-
scale retreat from the practice.223 
 By the time of the Oklahoma City bombing, cameras had found their way into 
courtrooms in many state courts; however, federal criminal courts remained off limits to 
cameras. Still, the experiments in other federal courts suggested some members of the 
federal judiciary were willing to at least consider a possible role for video coverage of 
federal proceedings. It was into this environment that the case against Timothy 
McVeigh and Terry Nichols arrived in 1995. 
 The trials of Oklahoma City bombers Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols 
were important events in legal history as it pertained to cameras in courtrooms. Several 
media outlets including Court TV sought permission to broadcast the trials, and even 
some legal experts called the trials a textbook case for gavel-to-gavel coverage.224 
However, broadcasting to a nationwide audience was not to be. The trials were, in fact, 
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broadcast though. This makes the McVeigh and Nichols trials the only federal criminal 
trials to deviate from Rule 53 since the rule’s inception in 1944. 
 The McVeigh and Nichols trials were broadcast via closed-circuit to an audience 
of bombing victims and court personnel in Oklahoma City due to a provision of the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.225 The law was passed after the 
case had been moved from Oklahoma City to Denver. Lawmakers recognized that the 
change of venue would mean many of the 2,000 people who had registered with the 
court as victims would not be able to attend the trial. To compensate these victims, the 
law made a provision that federal criminal trials moved more than 350 miles from the 
original jurisdiction would have to be available to victims via closed-circuit television. 
This law included stipulations that only court recognized victims and court personnel 
would be allowed to view the closed-circuit broadcast.226 This is not the same as Court 
TV coverage, but it is a significant event in that Congress compelled the federal courts 
to deviate from Rule 53, even if only in a limited case. 
 Finding a balance in the fair trial/free press debate has been a long and complex 
journey for the American legal system. It is also a journey that is still not complete. 
New technologies and new cases will present more challenges that the Court and the 
press will have to take up in the future. The Oklahoma City bombing case is one such 
case that presented a most unusual circumstance for the federal courts. The nature of the 
crime and the technology available at the time offered an opportunity for the courts and 
the legislative branch to break new ground in the area of fair trial/free press conflicts. 
Federal law was changed to allow for a broadcast of the trials, though not an open 
broadcast to all potential viewers. As such, the McVeigh and Nichols trials were a 
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deviation from the proscriptions of Rule 53. To the degree that these closed-circuit 
broadcasts were successful in meeting the intent of the law that provided for them, they 
may serve as a model for future change of venue cases in federal criminal courts. 
 
Research Problem and Questions 
 The literature on fair trial/free press conflicts in the American legal system 
shows that the courts have had to deal with the problems presented by the often-
conflicting rights established by First and Sixth Amendments almost since the founding 
of the nation. The primary fair trial/free press conflict pits the right of the press to report 
on criminal matters and the operations of the courts against the defendant’s right to a 
fair trial before an impartial jury, presumably unaffected by pretrial publicity. 
 Concerns over juror bias and the role the press may have played in forming bias 
were a common thread that ran through cases from the Burr trial of 1807 to the 
landmark cases of Sheppard v. Maxwell in 1966 and Nebraska Press Association v. 
Stuart in 1976. While it took nearly 160 years from the Burr trial to the Sheppard 
decision to establish methods for dealing with the dangers of pretrial publicity, the legal 
community quickly adopted the suggestions put forth in the Sheppard decision. The 
American Bar Association and some state bar associations, such as Nebraska’s, used the 
Sheppard ruling as the basis of their press/bar guidelines. Successful prosecution of 
high profile cases like the Manson trial suggests the Sheppard provisions have served 
their purpose – protecting the defendant’s right to a fair trial including an impartial jury. 
Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart took the guidelines too far, however, and the 
Court determined that even well-intentioned efforts to follow the guidelines and protect 
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the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights could not go so far as to be an a priori restraint 
infringing on the First Amendment rights of the press. 
 In the 1970s and 1980s, the Supreme Court began to consider whether trial 
courts should have the right to restrict press access to court proceedings. The Richmond 
Newspapers decision, while not unanimous, established a presumption of openness for 
trial proceedings. Gannett v. DePasquale, Press Enterprise I, and Press Enterprise II 
brought the issue of openness in suppression hearings, pretrial hearings, and jury 
selection before the Court. From these cases, the Court developed the tests to be used 
before excluding the press from these proceedings. 
 Beginning in the 1960s, the Court and the American Bar Association began a 
two-decade process of determining the limits of extra judicial statements. Sheppard v. 
Maxwell held that trial judges could limit the speech of persons under their control in 
the interest of preserving a defendant’s right to a fair trial. The American Bar 
Association would use Sheppard and later Nebraska Press Association to establish a 
sufficient legal standard for ethics rules regarding extrajudicial statements. The A.B.A. 
settled on the “substantial likelihood” standard in the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct adopted in 1983, but many defense attorneys believed the rules were too 
restrictive and possibly unconstitutional. The Court finally took up the issue in Gentile v 
State Bar of Nevada. A slim majority of the Court determined the “substantial 
likelihood” standard was constitutional, but the decision did not provide the definitive 
answer many attorneys had wanted. 
 With the emergence of broadcasting in the first half of the twentieth century, the 
courts began to face the issue of whether to allow broadcasting of court proceedings. 
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Early on, the courts were permissive, but episodes like the Hauptmann trial, in which 
the presence of cameras appeared to play a role in sensational coverage, led to a near 
nationwide ban on broadcasting from state courts and a complete ban on broadcasting 
from federal courts. Cameras would not find their way back into state courtrooms on a 
large scale until after the 1981 Chandler v. Florida decision. Following the Chandler 
ruling, broadcasting of state criminal trials began to increase nationwide, yet the federal 
court ban remained in place. 
 The literature on the Oklahoma City bombing shows that much effort has gone 
into the study of the crime itself, the government response to the crime, and the 
psychological and sociological factors that likely influenced the perpetrators. However, 
little has been written on the trials of the conspirators. This is despite the fact that the 
trials for Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols were highly publicized prosecutions of 
an unprecedented crime that involved the first and, to date, only implementation of the 
closed-circuit viewing provision of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
of 1996. 
 As the literature review suggests, by the time of the Oklahoma City bombing 
trials, the courts had developed procedures and protocols for managing fair trial/free 
press issues arising from conflict between the rights of the press, contained in the First 
Amendment, and the rights of criminal defendants, contained in the Sixth Amendment. 
The Oklahoma City bombing case though was in many respects a case unlike any other 
prior to 1995. At the time, it was the most deadly terrorist attack ever committed in the 
United States. As such, the case attracted intense press coverage, making fair trial/free 
press issues of paramount concern to the trial court. This study examines the fair 
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trial/free press issues raised in the Oklahoma City bombing case. Its primary purpose is 
to explain which fair trial/free press issues came before the courts and why. Included in 
the primary purpose is an attempt to explain how the courts resolved the fair trial/fair 
press issues and the impact the courts’ decisions had on the management of the trials. 
Research Questions 
 The research questions posed here advance knowledge about the prosecution of 
the Oklahoma City bombing conspirators. They also advance knowledge regarding fair 
trial/free press issues in the American judicial system by focusing attention on the 
Oklahoma City bombing trials, which were both important and unique in the annals of 
American justice. 
 Writings about the Oklahoma City bombing case suggest that researchers have 
paid relatively little attention to the trials of Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols and 
less attention to the fair trial/free press issues raised in the trials. One of the few 
examinations of these issues is a single article written by Timothy McVeigh’s lead 
attorney Stephen Jones and attorney Holly Hillerman shortly after the conclusion of the 
trials. While this writing is of value as the recollections of a key trial participant, the 
first-hand participant’s perspective carries with it the partiality of a participant. In this 
respect, the literature would be strengthened by an objective examination of the specific 
fair trial/free press issues brought before the court in the Oklahoma City bombing case. 
Furthermore, identifying the specific fair trial/free press issues raised in the case is 
essential to reach a deeper understanding of how those issues impacted the trials. Thus, 
the first research question focuses on identifying these issues. 
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RQ 1: What were the fair trial/free press issues brought before the courts in the 
Oklahoma City bombing trials? 
 Prior research shows that by the time of the Oklahoma City bombing trials, the 
courts had established precedent to guide trial courts in resolving fair trial/free press 
issues that are inherent aspects of high profile criminal trials. Supreme Court decisions, 
bar association guidelines, and local court rules provided protocols for dealing with the 
tensions between the First Amendment rights of the press and the Sixth Amendment 
rights of the defendants. The literature suggests that the courts handling the Oklahoma 
City bombing case utilized existing precedent and protocol when dealing with fair 
trial/free press issues. Understanding how the courts resolved these issues will advance 
knowledge about the Oklahoma City bombing case and fair trial/free press issues on a 
broader scale.  
RQ 2:  How did the courts employ precedent and protocol to resolve the fair 
trial/free press issues present in the Oklahoma City bombing trials? 
 Writings on the Oklahoma City bombing case suggest that the courts’ attempts 
to alleviate fair trial/free press concerns impacted the management of the case. The 
literature suggests that concerns about pretrial publicity were a factor in the courts’ 
establishment of procedures for filing documents under seal. Similar concerns led to 
restrictive orders on attorney comments and appeals from Timothy McVeigh’s attorneys 
to modify those orders. Press coverage was also a factor in the decision to grant a 
change of venue, moving the case from the Western District of Oklahoma to the District 
of Colorado. The change of venue was the impetus for congressional action, which led 
to closed-circuit broadcasts of the trials. These facts suggest that the steps the court took 
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to resolve fair trial/free press issues in the Oklahoma City bombing case had an impact 
on several aspects of managing the case, including when and where the trials took place, 
how attorneys fulfilled their obligations, and special accommodations for bombing 
victims to view the trials. 
RQ 3:  How did the courts’ resolution of the fair trial/free press issues affect the 
courts’ management of the Oklahoma City bombing trials? 
 The federal trials of Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols are, to date, the only 
federal criminal trials conducted in the presence of live television cameras. These live 
broadcasts were restricted to a closed-circuit feed, and the court limited the viewing 
audience to court-approved viewers, primarily bombing victims, and court personnel. 
The closed-circuit viewing was a provision of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996. Writings on the bombing case suggest that appeals from bombing 
victims to Congress following the change of venue were a significant factor in getting 
the closed-circuit provisions added to the legislation. Understanding how the closed-
circuit provisions became a part of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 
1996 is necessary to understand how the closed-circuit broadcasts became a feature of 
the Oklahoma City bombing trials. Since these broadcasts were the first and only of 
their kind, understanding how they came to take place will advance knowledge about 
the fair trial/free press issue of broadcasting trials. 
RQ 4:  How did the closed-circuit viewing provisions become a part of the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996? 
 Writings on the bombing suggest that the trial court faced an unprecedented 
decision after President Bill Clinton signed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
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Penalty Act of 1996. The court could stand on the Rule 53 that banned broadcasting of 
federal trials or it could accommodate the closed-circuit provisions included in the law. 
Ultimately the court allowed the closed-circuit broadcasts. In doing so, the court 
established rules for viewing, employed technology needed for the broadcasts that was 
unfamiliar to the federal courts, and responded to requests from the press for access to 
the broadcasts. No other federal court before or since has dealt with a closed-circuit 
broadcasts. Understanding how the court decided to accommodate the closed-circuit 
broadcasts and how it ultimately managed the broadcasts will advance knowledge about 
the Oklahoma City bombing trials and the fair trial/free press issue of broadcasting 
trials in general. 
RQ 5:  How did the court implement and manage the closed-circuit viewing 
provision of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996?   
 The research questions provide a logical progression of inquiry. The first step in 
the progression identifies the specific fair trial/free press issues that came before the 
courts and why those issues were raised. With the issues identified, it is possible to 
explain how the courts used existing precedent and protocol to resolve those issues. 
Understanding how and why the courts resolved the issues in the ways they did makes it 
possible to examine how the courts’ decisions affected management of the trials. The 
trial court in the Oklahoma City bombing case managed an unprecedented closed-
circuit television feed. This made the trials of Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols 
unprecedented trials in that respect. The research questions on the closed-circuit 
broadcasts will show how the court came to allow the closed-circuit broadcast and how 
the court implemented and managed the closed-circuit broadcasts. Answering these 
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research questions will strengthen the literature on the Oklahoma City bombing by 
providing a deeper understanding of how fair trial/free press issues played a role in 
shaping the trials of Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols. Until now, scholars have 
paid little attention to the fair trial/free press issues in this case, yet the literature 
suggests that fair trial/free press issues were a significant concern for the courts 
managing the case. Answering these questions will also advance knowledge in the 
broader fair trial/free press literature by examining how the courts employed precedent 
and protocol to manage fair trial/free press issues in one of the most highly publicized 
criminal trials in American history. 
This study will also make a valuable contribution to the developing body of 
historical and conceptual knowledge about the continuing challenges fair trial/free press 
issues raise for legal scholars, mass communication scholars, practitioners, and public 
policy makers. This study will reveal the precedents the courts relied on to resolve the 
fair trial/free press issues in the Oklahoma City bombing trials. It will also show how 
past events shaped the precedent employed in the Oklahoma City bombing case and 
how those precedents may affect future highly publicized trials involving terrorism. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  74 
CHAPTER II 
Method 
Introduction 
 History, the study of the past, is one of the oldest and most venerated ways of 
knowing that people have used to interpret and understand the world around them. As a 
discipline, history in the West has its methodological beginnings in ancient Greece. 
Herodotus (c. 485 – c. 425 BC) is credited with being “the father of history.”1 
Herodotus’s contribution came from the use of evidence to record verifiable events of 
the past and make distinctions between evidence-based accounts and myths.2 
Thucydides (c. 460 – c. 399 BC) is generally recognized as the first “genuinely 
scientific historian.”3 Thucydides’s goal was to create a record for the purpose of 
instruction. Thucydides sought accuracy through evidence, and he was the first to 
introduce the concept of critical analysis in cases where witness accounts differed. He 
recognized that human memory was not infallible and that sympathies and allegiances 
could color and shape recollections of past events.4  
 The Renaissance and the Reformation did much to advance history and the 
methods of historical research. The Renaissance brought renewed interest in the works 
of the Greeks and Romans, thus challenging religious authorities’ exclusive claims on 
knowledge and learning. The Reformation served to further develop critical textual 
analysis as Catholic and Protestant scholars reexamined medieval texts in an effort to 
prove or disprove the lineage and legitimacy of the Roman Church.5 
 Garraghan called the late eighteenth century and all of the nineteenth century an 
era of significant methodological advancement.6 The professional historian emerged 
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during this time, and many of these historians were inspired by intellectual movements, 
such as positivism, to bring scientific methods and considerations of causality to 
history. Historians such as Barthold Niebuhr, John Lingard, and Leopold von Ranke 
advocated primacy of original documents, rigorous criticism of sources, and the use of 
archives that were becoming more common at the time.7 Garraghan called Ranke “the 
‘father of modern scientific history’” for having established the first seminars in 
historical methods and pioneering archival research.8 Howell and Prevenier wrote, “In 
Ranke’s view, history was a learned craft, the science of ‘telling things as they actually 
occurred,’ of insisting that ‘if it is not in the documents, it did not exist’”9 In its most 
basic form, Ranke’s view of scientific history pointed to the supremacy of the 
document. The document contained the facts, and if one were to assemble enough facts 
using rigorous methods, the truth about the past would emerge. Novick claimed this 
Rankean approach led to a myth of objectivity among historians of the nineteenth 
century.10 Novick wrote: 
This, then, was the model of scientific method which, in principle, the historians 
embraced. Science must be rigidly factual and empirical, shunning hypothesis; 
the scientific venture was scrupulously neutral on larger questions of end and 
meaning; and, if systematically pursued, it might ultimately produce a 
comprehensive, “definitive” history.11 
 In the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, a new generation of 
historians known as “Progressive” historians began to challenge the Rankean view of 
scientific history.12 Some of the leading early Progressive historians included Charles 
A. Beard, Carl Becker, James Harvey Robinson, and Frederick Jackson Turner.13 
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Progressives wanted to advance the purpose of history beyond mere explanation of the 
past and give their histories a purpose. That purpose was to give history relevance in the 
present often with the goal of advancing social or political reform.14 The Progressive 
historians recognized that sources were not objective accounts of the past from which a 
complete objective history would merely emerge. Documents were the creation of 
historical actors who had motives and goals of their own. Understanding and 
interpreting these motives and goals was part of the job of the historian, according to the 
Progressives. Also, Progressive historians realized that historians themselves 
approached their subjects of study with motives and goals that could influence what 
they looked for and ultimately what they found in their sources.15 Becker and Beard 
eventually set notions of objectivity aside and argued for historical relativism. Harrison, 
Jones, and Lambert explained the historical relativism argument: 
They [Progressives] argued that the past could not be accessed directly, but only 
through the documentary traces that had been left behind. Historical “facts,” 
therefore, rather than being “found,” were constructed by the historian herself. 
History does not have an inner structure, and immanent pattern, other than that 
imposed by the historian. Historical interpretation, therefore, must inevitably 
involve the application of “transcendent” concepts and hypotheses that come 
from the mind of the historian rather than from the evidence. It was impossible 
to exclude human prejudices and presuppositions from the process of 
interpretation, since the subject-matter of history was inevitably charged with 
values.16 
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 The issue of objectivity remains a matter of debate among historians.17 The 
Progressive historians and others who followed them have raised compelling arguments 
about subjectivity and the role of interpretation in producing history. Tosh has provided 
three strategies for historians “to ensure … they are as true as they can be to reality of 
the past.”18 First, historians should examine their own values, beliefs, and assumptions 
that might introduce bias into the subject of their study. Second, historians should 
clearly state their hypotheses or research questions and actively challenge the answers 
they research regarding those hypotheses and research questions. Finally, historians 
should devote themselves continually to understanding the context of the past events 
they study.19 While these strategies will not lead to a purely objective study, they can 
help the researcher recognize potential bias, and they offer a degree of transparency to 
the research process. 
 This study borrows from both the Rankean and the Progressive schools of 
thought. It borrows from the Rankean scientific school by application of the empirical 
approach to study design and the vetting of sources, but not the claims of objectivity 
advanced by scientific history scholars of the past. The study recognizes the practical 
purpose advanced by the Progressive school by seeking to create a study that is 
meaningful and informative to a present audience. The study further recognizes the 
Progressive criticism of scientific history’s claims to truth and objectivity, and the study 
utilizes the prescriptive measure of explicit research questions explained by Tosh to 
bring transparency to the study. 
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Empirical History 
 The methods of historical research allow historians to make the claim that their 
discipline is empirical. Nord wrote, “History is an empirical study that uses various 
levels of generalization to describe, interpret, or explain collections of data.”20 
Empiricism, a way of knowing based on observation, is most often associated with the 
sciences.21 The scientific method provides rigorous and controlled processes of 
collecting data and analyzing that data to answer specific research questions in an 
attempt to advance knowledge.22 Notwithstanding their claims of objectivity and the 
ability of the truth to emerge from properly aligned sources, the Rankean scientific 
historians of the nineteenth century sought to bring a similar measure of recognized, 
rigorous method to the study of history.23 To the extent that they succeeded, modern 
historians can make a claim to empiricism; however, a direct comparison to empirical 
science is not always possible. 
 The methods of the empirical historian share similarities with the methods of the 
empirical social scientist. The historian and the social scientist both begin their research 
by examining the literature in their area of interest. This review of literature should 
direct the researcher to a topic suitable for study. The review of literature also leads to 
the development of research questions. With a research topic and research questions in 
place, the researcher may begin collecting data to answer the research questions. In the 
case of the historical researcher, the data are historical sources. Once the data are 
collected, the researcher may begin analyzing the data and interpreting the data in an 
effort to answer the research questions. The tools for data collection and analysis may 
differ for the historical researcher and the social science researcher, but in both cases, 
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the application of recognized and proven methods provides a systematic and rigorous 
means of producing results that will advance knowledge with a measure of reliability to 
the results.24 
 Nord argues that the influence of social science on historical research has led to 
two types of historians – social science historians and humanist historians. Nord wrote 
that the social science historian “is interested primarily in general processes and 
ultimately hopes to construct generalizations and theories to explain classes of events 
without regard to space and time.”25 The social science historian’s goal then is more 
closely related to the scientist’s goal. On the other hand, the humanist historian “is 
interested primarily in unique events and sequences, seeks to understand an event by 
understanding its context in a particular place and time.”26 The humanist historian has a 
goal of advancing knowledge by providing a detailed explanation of specific events 
relative to a specific place and time. Generalization is not the goal of the humanist 
historian. The humanist approach to history is the more traditional approach, but both 
humanist and social science historians have contributed to the advancement of 
knowledge.27 While the goals of the scientist, the social science historian, and the 
humanist historian may differ, each type of researcher may utilize empirical methods in 
the research process, thus historical research can claim to be empirical research. 
Application of Method 
 The historical method has developed as a means of producing knowledge about 
the past. It is empirical when the researcher uses systematic and rigorous methods of 
data collection and data analysis. To achieve the purpose of this study, the researcher 
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applied recognized historical research methods to examine fair trial/free press issues in 
the Oklahoma City bombing case. 
 Startt and Sloan placed two major tasks before the historical researcher. “One is 
to describe the essential nature of the past. The other is to explain why that essential 
nature was as it was.”28 In searching for the essential nature of the past, the historian 
operates with three primary assumptions in mind. First, the historian assumes that 
people did live in the past and, during their lives, these people formed thoughts based 
on their perceived reality and took actions based on their thoughts. Second, the historian 
assumes these people of the past left artifacts behind that preserved their thoughts and 
actions. Third, the historian assumes that the artifacts left behind provide clues about 
the people of the past and the times in which they lived.29 The artifacts left for the 
historian to examine then become the sources, or raw data, for historical studies. 
Topic Definition 
 The historian’s first use of sources is for the purpose of topic definition. The 
research topic should be well-defined with the goal of creating significant research that 
will advance knowledge in the subject area.30 The well-defined topic will help the 
researcher pose an informed research question and design a focused research plan to 
answer that question. The methods of immersion and guided entry help the researcher 
define the topic and begin to get a clear focus on the research question.31 
 Immersion. Immersion is a method to get the researcher deeply involved in the 
literature of a particular area of historical interest. Essentially, the researcher will search 
for and read as much as possible related to the issue of interest. Smith suggested a 
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strategy to make the immersion process productive while not overwhelming for the 
researcher. Smith wrote: 
As the immersion process begins, the historian might ask the journalist’s 
traditional who, what, when, where, why, how questions to guide the data search. 
In this way the historian generally limits the area of immersion (to prevent 
drowning by arbitrary, but helpful, geographical, biographical, chronological, 
functional, or occupational boundaries.32 
Immersion reading should begin with the most relevant historical works that focus on 
the topic of interest. While reading these major historical works, the researcher should 
take note of other sources that indirectly address the topic. The sources may include 
works in other fields such as economics, political science, or psychology. The 
importance of this broad immersion reading is that it allows the researcher to gain an 
understanding of the issue that is both broad and deep.33 
 Writings about the Oklahoma City bombing referenced in the review of 
literature presented in Chapter 1 of this dissertation were used in the immersion stage of 
this study. The works consulted in this immersion process included historical accounts 
as well as works from the fields of sociology and law. Journalistic accounts and 
personal accounts from bombing victims were also consulted. 
 Works directly related to the Oklahoma City bombing read as part of the 
immersion process included American Terrorist: Timothy McVeigh and the Oklahoma 
City Bombing, written by journalists Lou Michel and Dan Herbeck. American Terrorist 
is an account of the bombing based on interviews Michel and Herbeck conducted with 
Timothy McVeigh following his conviction. Another journalistic account consulted was 
  82 
9:02 a.m. April 19, 1995: The Official Record of the Oklahoma City Bombing, 
published by Oklahoma Today Magazine. This book, published in 2005, is a 
chronological account of the bombing, the investigation, the trials, and the development 
of the Oklahoma City National Memorial based on news reports and government 
documents. 
 Two books by criminologist Mark S. Hamm, Apocalypse in Oklahoma: Waco 
and Ruby Ridge Revenged and In Bad Company: America’s Terrorist Underground 
were also consulted. Hamm’s work provides historical background on the bombing 
itself as well as sociological examination of militia and anti-government ideology in 
America. Another sociological account included in immersion reading was Patriots, 
Politics and the Oklahoma City Bombing by Stuart A. Wright. Wright’s book examines 
the rise of the Patriot Movement and the influence of Patriot Movement rhetoric on the 
bombing conspirators. Wright was a consultant for the McVeigh defense team, and he 
conducted interviews with McVeigh for his research. 
 Others Unknown: The Oklahoma City Bombing Case and Conspiracy is a book 
by McVeigh’s lead trial attorney, Stephen Jones, and author Peter Israel. The book 
advances Jones’s claims that McVeigh and Nichols acted as part of a broader 
conspiracy, but it also provides a first-hand account of the McVeigh trial including 
some of the fair trial/free press issues of interest in the present study. Stephen Jones and 
Holly Hillerman focused specifically on fair trial/free press issues in the Oklahoma City 
bombing trials in their 1998 article McVeigh, McJustice, McMedia. This article is the 
only work to focus solely on fair trial/free press issues related to the case. Another legal 
work included in immersion reading was Michael E. Tigar’s Opening Statement and 
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Closing Argument: United States vs. Terry Nichols published by the Professional 
Education Group as part of the series Classics of the Courtroom. As the title implies, 
this work is a transcript of the opening and closing statements made by Nichols’s lead 
counsel. 
 Forever Changed: Remembering Oklahoma City, April 19, 1995 is a collection 
of essays written by bombing survivors and family members of bombing victims. The 
editor of the book, Marsha Kight, lost her daughter in the bombing. Kight’s book 
reveals the loss and emotional toll the bombing had on the victims and their families. 
Collectively, these works read during the immersion process provided a broad range of 
perspective on the Oklahoma City bombing case. This reading aided in preparing for the 
next process, which is guided entry. 
 Guided Entry. Guided entry is a method for using the large amount of material 
generated through immersion to guide the researcher to a focused topic and ultimately 
the research questions.34 Guided entry is a process of delimiting data so that researchers 
can begin to focus on exactly what it is they want to know, and they can begin to 
develop a research question based on that interest.35 Startt and Sloan suggested 
returning to the questions of who, what, where, and when to help narrow the focus of 
guided entry.36 The guided entry method should lead the researcher to informed 
research questions for which there is an ample body of source material to answer.37 
 In this study, the guided entry process led to a focus on fair trial/free press issues 
in the Oklahoma City bombing case. The immersion process showed a rich body of 
literature on the Oklahoma City bombing, but it also identified a weakness in the 
literature; little has been written on the trials of the bombing conspirators, and little has 
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been written on the conflicts between the press and the courts in the case. At the same 
time, the literature suggested these fair trial/free press issues did occupy the attention of 
the courts on multiple occasions, and the actions the courts took regarding these issues 
did play a role in shaping the trials of the defendants. 
Developing the Research Question 
 Immersion and guided entry help lead the researcher to a relevant research 
question capable of being answered by the source material acquired. The research 
question should focus the researcher’s efforts, but it should not be inflexible. Smith 
wrote “… the historical research question should be open-ended in that it dictates the 
kinds of facts to be observed in responding to the question without dictating the solution 
or the analysis to be offered in the response.”38 The initial research question may be 
refined as the research process moves forward. Other research questions may emerge 
during the process. In either case, the research questions should serve as a means to 
focus the research, but they should not prevent the researcher’s efforts to make 
inferences from the sources and to draw conclusions from those inferences in the 
analysis.39 
 In this study, immersion and guided entry led to a focus on fair trial/free press 
issues in the Oklahoma City bombing case. The research questions developed to explore 
those issues were designed to determine which fair trial/free press issues came before 
the courts, how the courts resolved those issues, and how resolution of those issues 
affected management of the case. Two research questions also focused on the 
unprecedented closed-circuit broadcasts of the trials. 
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Sources 
 To answer the historical research question, the researcher looks to sources, 
which are the raw data for the historian. Startt and Sloan wrote that there are four basic 
methods of historical research in which sources are employed.40 Those elements are 
“compiling a complete record, evaluating the sources that compose that record, 
understanding the explicit and implicit meaning of those sources, and explicating the 
essence of those sources in the history one produces.”41 The strategies and tools 
historians use in meeting the requirements of the four elements are at the heart of the 
historical method. 
Types of Sources 
 Historians generally categorize sources in two classes: primary sources and 
secondary sources. Startt and Sloan called primary sources “the raw materials of 
history.”42 Primary documents are records contemporaneous with the events under 
study. Examples of primary documents include court records generated at the time of 
the case being studied, or diaries of a person involved in the events being studied, 
interviews with persons involved in the events being studied, or newspaper articles 
published at the time the event happened. These could all be classified as primary 
sources. Secondary sources, “rest on primary sources and they are not contemporaneous 
with the subject under study.”43 Secondary sources can do much to inform the historical 
researchers, but primary sources, as the name implies, are of the most importance to 
historians creating original historical research. 
 Primary source materials for this study consisted of court records, 
contemporaneous press accounts, and oral history interviews with trial participants. The 
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archival source of court records was the Oklahoma City National Memorial and 
Museum in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. The museum archive contains more than 
600,000 artifacts related to the Oklahoma City bombing.44 One of the six major 
categories of museum holdings focuses on the investigation of the bombing and the 
trials of the bombing conspirators. The investigation and trial holdings include a 
twenty-box collection of court documents that are presented as a complete copy of case 
documents obtained from the federal courts for the Western District of Oklahoma and 
the District of Colorado. This collection contains briefs, motions, minutes, orders and 
opinions, and other legal documents from the beginning of the case in 1995 to the end 
of federal appeals in 2001. This collection includes documents related to fair trial/free 
press issues raised during prosecution of the McVeigh and Nichols cases. 
 In April, May, and December 2010, the researcher visited the Oklahoma City 
National Memorial and Museum to conduct research in the archive. The researcher 
examined the entire collection of trial documents and identified key documents related 
to fair trial/free press issues in the bombing case. These documents address issues 
central to the focus of this study including: (1) the change of venue, (2) press access to 
court documents and court proceedings, (3) press access to audio recordings of court 
proceedings, (4) restrictive orders governing extra judicial statements made by 
attorneys, investigators and court personnel, (5) closed-circuit television coverage of the 
trials, and (6) court actions taken subsequent to the publication of confession stories on 
the eve of the McVeigh trial. These key documents number approximately fifty and 
total more than 400 pages. 
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 Contemporaneous press reports regarding fair trial/free press issues in the 
bombing cases were also examined as primary sources. Historians have long used press 
accounts of events under study to aid in factual verification and to provide context for 
said events.45 For this study, press accounts were used to supplement the court records 
in establishing a chronological record of motions and hearings related to fair trial/free 
press issues in the case. The press accounts also contained quotes from trial participants 
reacting to motions filed and decisions made in the case. These contemporaneous 
reactions and comments assisted in putting events into context and assessing the impact 
of major developments in the cases on trial participants. 
 The researcher identified six newspapers that provided extensive coverage of the 
bombing trials. Those newspapers were The Oklahoman, The Dallas Morning News, 
The Denver Post, The Rocky Mountain News, the New York Times, and The Tulsa 
World. As the hometown paper in the city in which the bombing occurred, The 
Oklahoman dedicated perhaps the most staff and space to covering the bombing. This is 
apparent from the number of articles and the number of reporters writing those articles 
from the time of the bombing through the end of the Nichols trial. As the daily 
newspaper serving Oklahoma’s second largest city, The Tulsa World also provided 
regular coverage of the bombing investigation and subsequent trials. The Dallas 
Morning News gave extensive coverage to the bombing case. As a media litigant, the 
Dallas Morning News filed two motions asking the court to unseal documents in the 
case.46 The Dallas Morning News also published one of the confession stories on the 
eve of the McVeigh trial.47 The Denver newspapers, The Denver Post and The Rocky 
Mountain News, gave extensive coverage to the case once the District of Colorado 
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assumed jurisdiction. The New York Times has a national audience and a reputation with 
media historians as a source for events of national importance. In total, the researcher 
collected 534 individual newspapers articles focusing on the prosecution of the 
Oklahoma City bombing case from these six newspapers that were originally published 
between April 1995 and August 1998. Press reports for this study were collected using 
two full-text newspaper archive databases available through the University of 
Oklahoma Libraries. The archival databases were the Oklahoma Archives, a full-text 
database for The Oklahoman newspaper, and NewsBank, a full-text database that 
archives newspapers published in the United States and also internationally. 
 In April 2011, the researcher was able to conduct oral history interviews with 
Stephen Jones and Michael Tigar. Stephen Jones served as lead counsel for defendant 
Timothy McVeigh in his federal trial. Michael Tigar served as lead counsel for 
defendant Terry Nichols in his federal trial. As lead defense counsels, Jones and Tigar 
directed the drafting of defense motions related to fair trial/free press issues in the 
Oklahoma City bombing trials. Jones and Tigar also argued many of the fair trial/free 
press motions before the court. Their recollection of issues and events during the 
progression of the case provided first-hand accounts of and unique insight into fair 
trial/free press issues that emerged in the bombing case. The researcher sought oral 
history interviews with other trial participants, but was unsuccessful. Interview subjects 
who were sent letters of inquiry requesting oral history interviews but who did not 
respond included: (1) Joseph Hartzler, lead prosecutor in the McVeigh trial, (2) Thomas 
Kelley, attorney for the media consortium, (3) Judge Richard Matsch, trial judge for 
both the McVeigh and Nichols cases, and (4) Patrick Ryan, Western District United 
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States Attorney at the time of the bombing trials and prosecutor in both the McVeigh 
and Nichols trials. All oral history interviews conducted for this study were approved by 
the University of Oklahoma Institutional Review Board, and the interviews were 
conducted in compliance with I.R.B. protocol. 
Source Criticism 
 Once the historian has classified the sources, it is time to move on to the critical 
evaluation of those sources. Howell and Prevenier wrote “… the historian’s basic task is 
to choose reliable sources, to read them reliably, and to put them together in ways that 
provide reliable narratives about the past.”48 Historians use the method known as source 
criticism to evaluate the reliability of the sources they acquire. The source criticism 
method is a two-step process that subjects sources to external criticism and internal 
criticism. 
 External criticism focuses on the authenticity of the source. In the case of an 
original document, a primary source, the researcher must determine if the document was 
indeed produced at the time it was supposed to have been written.49 The researcher must 
also determine if the document was indeed authored by the person or entity claiming 
authorship. Even if other historians have treated the document as authentic, it behooves 
the researcher to conduct external criticism of the document. The steps taken in external 
criticism are coalition, identification, and textual verification. Coalition is the 
comparison of multiple texts for the purpose of establishing authenticity of the text in 
question. Identification is the attempt to identify authorship in cases where the author is 
not identified. Textual verification is a process in which the researcher examines a text 
for punctuation, word usage, and thought patterns. These patterns can be compared to 
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known examples of the author’s writing to help determine if it is plausible that the 
author wrote the text in question.50 
 Internal criticism focuses on the accuracy of the source. If the source is found to 
be authentic, the researcher must determine if the source accurately represents the past 
events described in the source. The researcher should ask several questions about the 
source such as whether or not the author would have been in a position to observe and 
then describe the events detailed in the source material. Another consideration for 
establishing internal criticism focuses on the motivation of the author who created the 
source. The question here focuses on whether the author was seeking to objectively 
describe events or to promote a biased account of those events. The researcher should 
also seek multiple sources that provide accounts of the events in question.51 Comparing 
multiple sources pertaining to a common event is one way the researcher can conduct 
internal criticism. Establishing what these multiple sources agree on and disagree on 
can help the researcher draw conclusions about the accuracy of the source in question. 
Historians must recognize that no single source is omniscient. Each source provides a 
perspective of an event, but no source can provide all perspectives of an event.52  
 In conducting source criticism, the researcher examined all court documents for 
the court clerk’s filing stamp and author signatures. The researcher also verified that 
each document corresponded with the entries on the docket sheets. This process of 
external criticism provided reasonable certainty in the authenticity of the primary source 
legal documents. Primary source newspaper articles were retrieved from databases 
provided for the purpose of scholarly research and created with the support of 
newspaper publishers. To the extent these databases are supported by research 
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institutions with the permission and cooperation of publishers, the researcher was 
satisfied in the authenticity of these articles. The oral history interviews were conducted 
with key trial participants, whom the researcher spoke to personally, thus satisfying the 
claim to authenticity of these interviews. 
 In conducting internal criticism, the researcher employed a triangulation 
approach using the methods of multiple source comparison described previously. This 
approach allowed the researcher to compare court documents, contemporaneous press 
reports, secondary reflective sources, and information obtained through the oral history 
interviews related to specific events and episodes in the case. Comparing these multiple 
sources and the different perspectives they represented allowed the researcher to make 
determinations relative to internal criticism. 
Evidence, Interpretation, and Narrative 
 Once the historical researcher has formed the research question, collected 
sources needed to answer that question, and vetted those sources for authenticity and 
accuracy, the researcher is ready to begin analyzing the sources. The process of analysis 
involves searching the sources for evidence related to the research question. The 
researcher must interpret the evidence and make inferences from it. Finally, the 
evidence and interpretation is explained in a narrative that answers the research 
question. This then is the history the researcher produces.53 
 The evidence historians seek in sources comes by way of the facts contained in 
those sources. Berkhofer wrote, “The ultimate goal of the historical method is to 
produce facts about past persons, their ideas and actions, their experiences and 
institutions, and the events involving them.”54 The historian analyzes the facts found in 
  92 
sources and makes inferences about those facts in an effort to answer the research 
questions. The inferences and interpretations of the historian are the essence of the 
historian’s work. To simply list events and actions (facts) in chronological order is not 
history. Making meaning out of facts is the historian’s job. Garraghan cautioned against 
the notion that the facts speak for themselves.55 Garraghan wrote, “Normal historical 
writing is … necessarily both factual and interpretive. Facts must be the substantial, the 
major element of the blend, but interpretation, though supplementary and accessory, is 
nonetheless indispensable.”56 
 Historical researchers must understand the context of sources to properly 
interpret those sources. Knowing the social, political, and economic climate in which 
the source was produced is crucial to understanding that source. When considering 
events, knowing what preceded and followed the event is important.57 
 Two concepts related to context that are important for historical understanding 
are past-consciousness and present-mindedness. Past-consciousness is an understanding 
of the past on its own terms. The historian must try to see and understand events of the 
past as the people who lived then saw and understood those events. People of the past 
may not have understood their world as fully as we do today, nor may they have 
interpreted events in the same way that we do, but the historian must resist the urge to 
project modern interpretations of events onto the people of the past. To do so is to 
exercise present-mindedness. Present-mindedness is judging the past by current 
standards.58 Indeed, current understanding of science and technology may explain 
processes that may have mystified people centuries ago, but it would be wrong to 
consider those people ignorant or uninterested in understanding simply because they 
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lacked the technology and knowledge we have today. Certainly current knowledge is 
indispensable for interpreting the past, but judging past people and past events by 
modern standards without allowing for consideration of how those events were 
understood by the people who lived at that time is to judge the past unfairly.59 
Berkhofer placed the historian as standing between the contexts of the past and 
present.60 From this metaphorical middle ground, the historian is able to mentally move 
back and forth between past context and present context using the perspective offered 
by each to reach a new understanding about the events under examination. 
 In this study, the potential for present-mindedness was present in contemporary 
views of terrorism following the attacks of September 11, 2001. Modern perceptions 
and understandings of terrorism have been shaped significantly by the 9/11 attacks, so 
much so that they provide a framework through which to consider and judge all other 
incidents of terrorism. The researcher had to guard against viewing the Oklahoma City 
bombing – a preceding event – through such a framework. This was done through 
developing past consciousness. 
 Past-consciousness in this study was achieved through the immersion literature 
and by reviews of the contemporaneous press reports. Consultation of contemporaneous 
press reports helped the author gain an understanding of how people at the time of the 
Oklahoma City bombing perceived the event. The unprecedented nature of the 
Oklahoma City bombing case was consistently reflected in press reports, and it aided 
the researcher in understanding the uncertainty and concerns surrounding the 
prosecution of the case – including the focus on fair trial/free press issues raised in the 
case. 
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 The researcher’s interpretation of the evidence culminates often with the 
narrative. Some historians have used other forms of explaining their analysis, but 
narrative is the traditional form. Berkhofer called narrative “… the genre of time par 
excellence.”61 Through the narrative, the historian explains the inferences made from 
the evidence. Any claims of causation should also be explained. The narrative is the 
historian’s analysis. Nord wrote, “… a narrative is more than a description; it is a 
logistical organization of material into a chronological sequence for the purpose of 
explanation.”62 Thus, the narrative brings all of the evidence together to answer the 
historical research question in a compelling and meaningful manner. It is more than a 
mere listing of facts and occurrences. It is the story that is the historical account, and, in 
a narrative form, it allows for literary style that explains the researcher’s efforts and 
interpretations, while hopefully capturing the interest of readers.63 In keeping with the 
historical convention of narrative, the researcher used the narrative form in this study. 
Summary 
 Historical research is a well-established, empirical method for producing 
knowledge. Historical methods provide researchers with tools to systematically and 
rationally develop research questions, collect sources that will provide data to answer 
that question, critically analyze those sources, and make inferences to answer the 
research question. Historical methods allow the researchers to examine past events and 
offer evidence-based analysis and explanation of those events. Utilizing historical 
methods in this study allowed the researcher to answer the research questions. The 
nature of the research questions and the nature of the materials required for answering 
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those questions, archival materials, made historical methodology the most practical 
methodology for such a study. 
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CHAPTER III 
Findings 
This chapter provides a narrative focusing on the fair trial/free press issues 
present in the federal prosecution of the Oklahoma City bombing case. The narrative 
will answer each of the five research questions. These research questions seek to 
identify which fair trial/free press issues were raised in the bombing case, how the court 
used precedent in resolving those issues, how resolution of the issues affected 
management of the case, how closed-circuit broadcasting became a feature of the 
bombing trials, and how the court’s implementation of closed-circuit broadcasting 
affected its management of the trials. 
The narrative is presented chronologically. The chronological presentation 
makes it possible to identify which fair trial/free press issues came before the court and 
why they came to the court’s attention at that time. The chronological presentation of 
findings also will show how the court’s resolution of fair trial/free press issues affected 
subsequent decisions and the overall management of the case as it progressed over time. 
An inductive periodization scheme was applied to the findings to show key turning 
points in the case that resulted from fair trial/free press decisions made by the courts. 
Utilizing an inductive periodization scheme allows the researcher to identify key 
turning points, or periods, in the analysis of source materials, which aids in historical 
interpretation. The researcher can then organize the narrative chronologically around 
these periods, which aids in presentation of the findings. Periodization thus aids the 
researcher in analyzing and organizing the findings, and it aids the reader in 
understanding the findings presented in the narrative. 
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Pre-indictment Posturing 
 At 9:02 a.m. on the morning of April 19, 1995, a 4,000 pound truck bomb 
exploded outside the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in downtown Oklahoma City.1 
In less than two hours, the Oklahoma Highway Patrol had taken Timothy McVeigh into 
custody on traffic and weapons violations.2 It would take two more days for the F.B.I. 
to link McVeigh to the crime and to locate him at the Noble County Jail in Perry, 
Oklahoma.3 The F.B.I. would detain Terry Nichols when he voluntarily went to the 
Herrington, Kansas Police Department and offered to give a statement about his friend 
McVeigh.4 By Friday, April 21, 1995, the government had the only two people ever to 
be tried for the crime behind bars, but due to the scale of the investigation and the legal 
machinations of attorneys, the suspects would not be indicted and charged with any 
crimes until August 1995.5 
 During this lengthy pre-indictment period, the press produced hundreds of 
stories about the crime and the suspects.6 The defense teams representing the defendants 
considered much of the information prejudicial to their clients.7 Thus, the pre-
indictment period saw the first emergence of fair trial/free press issues in the Oklahoma 
City bombing case. The primary issue during this period was prejudicial pretrial 
publicity. How the defense teams dealt with the publicity would raise another fair 
trial/free press issue – attorney statements to the press. Both of these issues would 
eventually lead to court action that affected management of the case. The pre-
indictment period was a time of planning and posturing as defense attorneys and the 
government dealt with the press while awaiting the indictments, and it began with the 
first court appearance for McVeigh. 
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Legal proceedings in the Oklahoma City bombing case began on Friday, April 
21, 1995, with the initial court appearance of Timothy McVeigh.8 U.S. Magistrate 
Ronald Howland of the Federal District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma 
presided over the proceedings, which took place at Tinker Air Force Base in Midwest 
City, Oklahoma, because the federal courthouse in Oklahoma City had been badly 
damaged in the bombing.9 The attorneys representing McVeigh that evening were 
Federal Public Defender Susan Otto and Oklahoma City criminal defense attorney John 
Coyle III.10 Otto and Coyle would be the first participants to raise fair trial/free press 
issues in the bombing case. 
 Otto and Coyle did not want to continue on the case, citing conflicts of interest 
and questioning whether a fair trial could be had in Oklahoma due in part to the intense 
press coverage the bombing was receiving. Coyle and Otto had both known people 
killed in the bombing.11 The Oklahoma City United States Courthouse, where the trial 
was likely to take place, had been badly damaged, and court staff had been injured.12 
Furthermore, the press was reporting on the bombing around the clock, and coverage of 
the crime was almost inescapable.13 On the Monday following McVeigh’s initial 
appearance, the attorneys filed a motion asking the court to transfer the case to the 
Tenth Circuit Court for reassignment to another federal district. The attorneys again 
cited conflicts of interest and press coverage as the basis for their motion.14 
After filing the motion, Coyle held a press conference to publicly explain why 
he and Otto wanted off the case and to explain why they had doubts about the future of 
the case in the Western District of Oklahoma. The Oklahoman quoted Coyle as saying: 
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I think no matter how fair someone thinks they can be, it’s very difficult to be 
fair in this circumstance when the federal courthouse was [damaged], where 
rooms where the jurors sit and deliberate in the federal courthouse overlook the 
A.P. Murrah Building … I can’t imagine a situation that would be more 
prejudicial to someone than that.15 
 On April 26, 1995, U.S. Magistrate Ronald Howland denied the motion. 
Howland specifically mentioned the concerns about prejudicial pretrial publicity, but he 
disregarded them. The Oklahoman printed an excerpt from Magistrate Howland’s order 
that read: 
It is true that an extensive amount of media coverage has accompanied the 
bombing of the Murrah Building … This circumstance alone, however, is 
insufficient to warrant a change of venue, especially at this preliminary and 
narrowly focused stage of the proceedings.16 
Even at the earliest proceedings in the case, the enormity of the crime, its impact on the 
community, and the intense press focus on the crime raised fair trial/free press concerns 
for defense attorneys. Otto and Coyle had questioned whether the Western District 
prosecutors and judges could serve as objective participants when the crime hit so close 
to home. They had also questioned whether the people of Oklahoma could serve as 
impartial jurors after being subjected to so much press about the case. These were the 
first fair trial/free press issues presented in the Oklahoma City bombing case. The next 
group of attorneys to take over the case would continue to focus on these issues, which 
would dominate the focus of the court through the remainder of 1995.17 
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 As Magistrate Howland was denying the request from Otto and Coyle to relieve 
them of the case and to move the case out of the Western District of Oklahoma, 
Western District Chief Judge David Russell, the United States Office of Court 
Administration, and the Department of Justice were conducting a national search for 
defense counsel and prosecutors.18 By the end of May, the legal teams were in place. 
Noted Oklahoma defense attorney Stephen Jones became lead counsel for McVeigh on 
May 8, 1995.19 On May 12, 1995, nationally known defense attorney and law professor 
Michael E. Tigar took over as Nichols’s chief counsel.20 On May 22, 1995, Attorney 
General Janet Reno appointed Illinois federal prosecutor Joseph H. Hartzler as special 
prosecutor for the case.21 These were the leaders of the defense teams and the 
government’s prosecutorial team that would see the case through to trial, and they 
would address several fair trial/free press issues along the way. 
 Coyle and Otto had raised the issue of a change of venue. Jones would 
eventually take up the cause, but Tigar did not – at least initially. Tigar instead sought 
the disqualification of all judges in the Western District of Oklahoma. Soon after his 
appointment, Tigar filed a brief seeking the disqualification of Magistrate Howland and 
Western District prosecutors.22 The brief cited the damage done to the federal 
courthouse and injuries federal court employees had suffered in the bombing.23 Tigar 
argued that Western District Court judges, prosecutors, and staff were themselves 
victims of the bombing, and, as such, their impartiality was brought into question. 
Magistrate Howland disagreed. He ruled that the motion had “no reasonable factual 
basis,” and he denied the motion.24 The issue was not dead though, and it would come 
before the court again in the fall of 1995.25 
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 Jones initially waivered on the change of venue issue, but by the end of May, he 
had come to the conclusion that the only way for McVeigh to receive a fair trial was to 
move the case out of Oklahoma.26 Jones claimed McVeigh could not receive a fair trial 
in Oklahoma due in large part to prejudicial pretrial publicity.27 
 Evidence to support Jones’s claim came on May 25, 1995, from the governor of 
Oklahoma – Frank Keating. Prior to entering elected politics, Keating had been an 
F.B.I. agent, a lawyer, a former United States Attorney, an Assistant United States 
Attorney General, and a nominee for the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.28 His legal 
background and his position as the sitting governor made his comments at the May 25 
press conference all the more important for the McVeigh and Nichols defense teams in 
their quest for a change of venue. 
At the May 25 press conference, the governor answered reporters’ questions 
about his opinion of the bombing investigation and the trial that would follow. Keating 
responded by saying, “They got the first creep that did it. It looks like they’re moving in 
on the rest, if they don’t have some of them already in their sights, and I think it’s 
great.”29 Keating said he was confident that, “...the very best law enforcement people 
would find those responsible and they would be prosecuted and hopefully executed.”30 
Also, during the press conference, Keating said he thought Oklahomans would be able 
to keep an open mind about the case and could sit in judgment of the accused. The 
Oklahoman article about the press conference closed with the following sentence: 
“When a reporter asked with a chuckle if Keating could give ‘that creep’ a fair trial, the 
governor said with a smile, ‘In my life I gave a lot of creeps a fair trial.’”31 Oklahoman 
reporter Paul English wrote that Keating’s comments bore similarities to President 
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Richard Nixon’s public statements proclaiming his belief that Charles Manson was 
guilty of the Tate/LaBianca murders while the case was at trial in 1970.32 Jones did not 
respond to the governor’s remarks immediately, but he would use them in later 
hearings.33 
The question of whether the defendants could get a fair trial in Oklahoma was 
something the press and much of the public were considering in May 1995. The 
governor of Oklahoma claimed he thought a fair trial could be had in the state, but in 
making that statement, he had used language that could be considered highly 
prejudicial. The episode illustrated the intense emotions surrounding the bombing one 
month after the crime, even at the highest levels of state government. The defense teams 
would make much of this in their attempts to have the trial moved. 
 In June 1995, Jones made another attempt to get the trial moved. He wrote to 
prosecutors telling them that he planned to seek a change of venue if the grand jury 
indicted McVeigh. Jones extended an offer to the prosecution to negotiate the new 
venue.34 In his letter, Jones referenced pretrial publicity and wrote, “To ask citizens of 
central Oklahoma to sit in judgment with a fair and open mind in view of this 
unprecedented catastrophic event is asking too much of them.”35 The government 
rebuffed Jones’s offer. The Oklahoman quoted Western District U.S. Attorney Patrick 
Ryan as saying, “While we have seen unprecedented levels of media coverage, that is 
not tantamount to saying these particular defendants could not get a fair trial before 
Oklahomans.”36  
Prosecutors stood fast in resistance to any talk of a change of venue. At his 
swearing-in ceremony on June 26, 1995, Ryan said: 
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Oklahoma did not ask for Oklahoma City or the Murrah Building to be the site 
of this monstrous crime. Others did, and these folks should be brought to trial in 
Oklahoma City or at least in the Western District of Oklahoma.37 
Ryan also stated that the Western District had a population of a 1.5 million people, 
which, in his opinion, could provide an impartial jury. Ryan said he was of the opinion 
that a change of venue should not be considered until all avenues of seating a jury had 
been exhausted.38 According to Ryan, moving the trial out of the Western District 
would impose an undue hardship on victims, which was something he particularly 
wanted to avoid.39 Ryan made it clear that he did not see the massive publicity 
surrounding the bombing as a detriment to the defendants’ rights to a fair trial. Also, he 
cited a responsibility for making the trial accessible to victims, and he indicated he 
would only consider a change of venue once it was proven a fair trial in the Western 
District was not possible. Ryan had brought a new perspective to the ongoing debate 
over a possible change of venue – the rights of the bombing victims. As the change of 
venue issue began to build momentum later in the year, the effects such a move might 
have on the victims became an issue of greater importance. Victims’ rights to have 
access to court proceedings would be a major factor in the government’s opposition to a 
change of venue, and it would be the primary factor in later calls for a closed-circuit 
broadcast of the trial. 
 Though Jones had not been successful with prosecutors or the court in his 
requests for a change of venue, he was making attempts to improve his client’s image in 
the court of public opinion. Jones would take McVeigh to the press and let the 
defendant speak for himself.40 Jones’s attempts to counter what he perceived as 
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prejudicial pretrial publicity would become the next fair trial/free press issue in the case, 
and it would become a recurring issue until the beginning of the McVeigh trial.  
In June 1995, Jones arranged the first of several meetings between McVeigh and 
journalists.41 Since he first took over the case, Jones had complained that the public was 
getting a “false impression” of McVeigh.42 Jones said the public image of McVeigh was 
that of a stone-faced, shackled inmate being led out of the Noble County Courthouse in 
Perry, Oklahoma, just before his initial appearance on April 21, 1995. Jones said this 
was due to the frequency with which television reports about McVeigh relied on the 
short video clip of the Noble County walkout.43 In his writings, Jones has often referred 
to the video and photographs of McVeigh leaving the Noble County courthouse as 
perhaps the single most damaging instance of prejudicial pretrial publicity.44 In an 
interview for this study, Jones reiterated that opinion of the Noble County walkout: 
On a scale of one to ten, with ten being the worst, I’d say it was a fifteen. It was 
a staged, timed presentation, as I recall, to coincide with the evening news with 
high drama effects – let the crowd gather. The truth of the matter is that that just 
wasn’t Tim McVeigh. I almost sometimes think it was another person because 
McVeigh really didn’t look like that. All you have to do is contrast the video we 
took of him five weeks after that. I mean, that’s just not Tim McVeigh. But there 
was just something about the way that he looked, and so forth, that gave this 
horrendous impression, and of course that was constantly and still is the video 
used of Tim McVeigh, and I think that’s what formed people’s minds. That was 
the impression that they had. It was very skillfully done. It didn’t happen 
inadvertently.45 
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 The images of that scene were very much in people’s minds in June 1995, when 
Jones first decided to fight back with his own media campaign. Jones claimed the public 
was hearing and seeing nothing about the true person of McVeigh. Jones often made 
mention of McVeigh’s exemplary military service, including the fact that he had 
received the Bronze Star during the Persian Gulf War.46 McVeigh’s military service 
would serve as the impetus for his first arranged meeting with reporters. 
 The first published interview with McVeigh appeared in the magazine 
Newsweek on July 3, 1995.47 The authors of the article were David Hackworth and Peter 
Annin. Annin was the Newsweek reporter assigned to cover the Oklahoma City 
bombing. David Hackworth was a decorated, retired U.S. Army colonel and author, 
who was then a contributing editor for Newsweek specializing in military issues.48 Jones 
has written that Timothy McVeigh himself suggested the interview. Jones wrote that 
during a meeting with McVeigh at the El Reno Federal Prison in El Reno, Oklahoma, 
McVeigh showed him a letter from Col. Hackworth. The colonel had written McVeigh 
at the prison asking to speak with him. McVeigh said that he felt he could talk to the 
colonel as one army man to another. Jones agreed that Col. Hackworth would be a good 
candidate for the first interview, and he made arrangements to have Hackworth and 
Annin meet McVeigh at the El Reno prison. The interview took place on June 22, 
1995.49 
 The resulting article that appeared in July 1995 did provide a softer image of 
McVeigh than any prior press reports. Hackworth and Annin described McVeigh as, “... 
a lot more like a typical Gen-Xer than a deranged loner, much less a terrorist” and “... a 
more subtle and intriguing figure, at once more clever and ingenuous than his tabloid 
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personality.”50 The article detailed McVeigh’s early years, describing him as an average 
American youth growing up in upstate New York. Hackworth and Annin also explained 
McVeigh’s military service in detail, including the combat events through which he 
earned the Bronze Star.51 The journalists did not, however, shy away from the key 
question: Did Timothy McVeigh bomb the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building? 
McVeigh evaded the question by telling Hackworth and Annin, “The only way we can 
really answer that is that we are going to plead not guilty.”52 
 The Newsweek issue featuring the McVeigh interview went on sale on Monday, 
June 26, 1995.53 On the Sunday before the Newsweek release, Jones conducted what 
The Dallas Morning News called a “public relations offensive.”54 Jones held a press 
conference at his Enid, Oklahoma, office during which he discussed the forthcoming 
Newsweek story and during which he released more information in an effort to reshape 
the public image of McVeigh. The materials given to reporters that day included 
photographs of McVeigh talking with his attorneys in a meeting room at the El Reno 
prison. These photos were taken by a photographer hired by the defense. Reporters also 
received approximately five minutes of videotape without audio that showed a similar 
meeting at the prison. Other information released during the press conference included 
copies of McVeigh’s military records with reviews from superiors and 
commendations.55 In explaining his release of the photos, videotape, and military 
records, Jones told The Oklahoman: 
I am hopeful that by releasing this material … and by certain motions that we 
will file in court that the Niagara Falls of information coming from anonymous 
sources will be cut off and we can proceed to the prosecution, investigation and  
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the defense of this case in the manner contemplated by law.56 
 Jones defended himself against accusations that he was trying to influence jurors by 
saying, “If I were trying to influence potential jurors, I could say a lot more.”57 
 Prosecutors provided minimal comment on the Newsweek article and the Jones 
press conference. Western District U.S. Attorney Patrick Ryan was quoted in The 
Oklahoman as saying, “It’s an interesting tactic.”58 Western District spokesman Steve 
Mullins told The Dallas Morning News, “We won’t try the case in the press. We’re 
going to try the case in the courtroom.”59 
 The Newsweek article was the first of several meetings between McVeigh and 
the press. Jones looked to the law and standards of professional ethics in deciding to 
take McVeigh to the press. Jones claimed that his client had a First Amendment right to 
speak publicly and that such statements were needed to counteract other press reports 
that presented McVeigh negatively. For his part, Jones claimed he had a duty as 
McVeigh’s attorney to defend McVeigh in court and in the press.60 Looking back on the 
Newsweek interview, Jones explained his reasons for reaching out to the magazine in 
the following way: 
The Newsweek interview was a public relations effort on our part, which was 
negotiated with Newsweek. That was our first effort to present Mr. McVeigh as 
something other than this demon that people had seen walking out of the Noble 
County courthouse.61 
How Jones and McVeigh went about dealing with the press in subsequent journalist 
meetings and interviews with McVeigh would become another fair trial/free press issue 
raised prior to the trial. 
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Post-indictment Period 
 McVeigh and Nichols were finally indicted in August 1995. Once the suspects 
were indicted and arraigned, the case officially had standing in the Western District of 
Oklahoma. The posturing of the pre-indictment period turned to action following the 
indictments. This period would see defense attorneys attempt to both move the trial out 
of Oklahoma and attempt to remove all Western District judges from the case. 
Prejudicial pretrial publicity was a significant element in their motions, and the 
decisions on those motions would have major implications for the future management 
of the case. Also during this period, the press would enter the picture, seeking access to 
court records about the case. The press would claim a First Amendment right and a 
common law right of access to court documents. How the court resolved this issue 
would have an effect on the future of sealed documents in the case, and it would spawn 
an ongoing debate over these documents. 
On August 10, 1995, grand jury indictments were returned for McVeigh, 
Nichols, and Michael Fortier.62 Fortier, a friend of McVeigh’s and Nichols’s from their 
time in the U.S. Army, pleaded guilty to four felony counts in exchange for testifying 
for the prosecution.63 Fortier admitted to knowing about the bombing plot in advance 
and failing to report it to authorities. He admitted to lying to investigators and hiding 
evidence from them, and he admitted to transporting stolen guns used to finance the 
bombing. Fortier immediately went to prison after entering his plea before Judge David 
Russell. Fortier and his wife, Lori, would both testify against McVeigh and Nichols at 
their later trials as part of their agreements with the government. The government gave 
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Lori Fortier immunity for her testimony, but Michael Fortier would spend almost ten 
years in federal prison before his release in January 2006.64 
 Following the announcement of the indictments, Stephen Jones and Michael 
Tigar held press conferences. The attorneys’ conduct at this post-indictment press 
conference was an illustration in miniature of their contrasting views regarding the fair 
trial/free press issue of how attorneys should deal with journalists in highly publicized 
cases. 
 At the August 10, 1995, press conference, Jones presented reporters with 
documents he said showed evidence of a broader conspiracy involving suspects as yet 
unknown to investigators. Jones gave reporters packets of documents suggesting an 
unidentified informant had warned federal officials five months before the bombing that 
an attack on a federal courthouse in the Tenth Circuit’s jurisdiction was imminent.65 In 
an interview for this study, Jones described his relationship with the press during the 
McVeigh case as symbiotic to a degree.66 Jones said the defense lacked the massive 
investigative resources of the federal government.67 It was Jones’s hope that by 
releasing bits of information to the press about the defense theory of the case, the press 
would investigate those claims and perhaps turn up more information useful to the 
defense.68 In this sense, the press could serve as surrogate investigators for the 
defense.69 At the same time, any stories done that might reflect positively on McVeigh’s 
background and character would also help defense efforts to rehabilitate McVeigh’s 
image before the public.70 For these reasons, Jones made himself available to the press 
often, and he bartered information with the press often.71 Jones claimed this quid pro 
quo 
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stories before they were published.72 Jones recalled one such incident involving 
privileged defense information he claimed had been inadvertently released to The Fort 
Worth Star-Telegram. Jones claimed he found out the paper planned to run a story 
based on the information, prompting him to call the editor. Jones offered his account of 
the conversation: 
The editor came on the line, a woman as I recall, very nice, very professional, 
and I recited the incident with her. I said, “I’m tired of this, what I consider to 
be, highly unethical conduct, and I’m not going to tolerate it. So I’m just going 
to tell you in clear, most unmistakable terms that if you run with this story, you 
print one word of this, your phone calls will never be returned … never talk 
again.” And I said, “In fact, I’ve been a pretty good source for you all. Certainly 
in checking things.” And they didn’t run the story. They stayed away from it, 
and I used that three or four times with media that I thought were absolutely 
irresponsible. Now, had I never been available to the media, then that would not 
have had the effect that it did.73 
 Michael Tigar’s statements on August 10, 1995, illustrated a different strategy. 
Tigar had generally avoided commenting in the press up to that point, but after the 
indictment, he spoke with great animation. At the press conference, Tigar emphatically 
proclaimed his client’s innocence. “Terry Nichols is not guilty of the offenses with 
which he is charged,” was one quote attributed to Tigar.74 Tigar claimed Nichols was 
not in Oklahoma City at the time of the bombing, and he was not present for other 
major events prosecutors claimed led up to the bombing. To emphasize his points at the 
press conference, Tigar held up hand-printed signs. One read, “Terry Nichols Wasn’t 
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There” and two more that read, “What do we want?” “A Fair Trial in a Fair Forum.”75 
In an interview for this study, Tigar explained how the dramatic post-indictment press 
conference fit within his general policy of saying little, if anything, to the press about 
Nichols: 
We did not want to be nibbled to death by ducks. We wanted to make one 
statement to all the media – common ground – we wanted to do it under 
circumstances where people weren’t shouting questions at us, and we had no 
control, and we did have a statement to make. Having made our statement, we 
could also make clear that we weren’t likely to be trying our case in public now. 
This was the indictment. This was our client. This was the basic theory of our 
defense. All of those things we were entitled to say, and that was it, you know, it 
was a one time deal. You didn’t see us do it again.76 
 One thing Jones and Tigar did agree on at the post-indictment press conference 
was the desire to have separate trials for their clients and the desire to have those trials 
take place somewhere other than in Oklahoma. Jones indicated he would like 
McVeigh’s trial moved to Fort Smith, Arkansas. Tigar, for the first time, said he too 
would like to see Nichols’s trial moved out of state – preferably to Denver, Colorado.77 
Tigar said widespread publicity about the case influenced his opinion that the trial must 
be moved. Tigar claimed the Nichols defense team had collected more than 1,700 
newspaper stories about the bombing published nationwide in slightly more than three 
months since the blast. He also claimed more than 1,000 of those stories came from 
Oklahoma newspapers. “In the face of that … media saturation, we would say it is 
impossible to believe the case could be tried in Oklahoma,” Tigar told The 
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Oklahoman.78 The defense teams would later present evidence to support their claims in 
what some attorneys considered an unprecedented motion addressing fair trial/free press 
issues – specifically prejudicial pretrial publicity.79  
 After three months, McVeigh and Nichols had finally been indicted as 
conspirators in the Oklahoma City bombing. The indictments formally established the 
case in the Federal District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma. The defense 
teams were preparing to fight for a change of venue, and their primary evidence for 
granting a change of venue was pretrial publicity. But the defense teams also wanted to 
have all Western District judges removed from the case. These two issues were the legal 
battles that would occupy the court’s attention thorough the fall of 1995. How the court 
resolved these issues would have a significant impact on management of the case, and 
the decisions would also produce other fair trial/free press issues later on. 
 The defense teams first took aim at the new judge presiding over the case, U.S. 
District Judge Wayne Alley of the Western District of Oklahoma. In August, both 
defense teams filed motions seeking Judge Alley’s recusal. McVeigh’s attorneys filed 
the first motion on August 22, 1995, and Nichols’s attorneys followed with their recusal 
motion two days later.80 In support of their motions, the defense attorneys pointed out 
the extensive damage done to the courthouse. They cited injuries to courthouse 
personnel and the fact that a member of the court clerk’s staff had lost her daughter in 
the Alfred P. Murrah Building’s daycare center.81 The defense teams argued that the 
physical and emotional proximity of the bombing to the federal courthouse and court 
employees made it impossible to ensure a fair trial for the defendants. They asked Judge 
Alley to recognize this and to step down.82 
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 Prosecutors debated their position on recusal for more than two weeks. 
Newspaper reports during this period claimed Justice Department officials wanted to 
ask Alley to recuse, but Western District U.S. Attorney Patrick Ryan did not.83 Stephen 
Jones also claimed a rift existed between the Justice Department and Patrick Ryan 
regarding recusal.84 On September 8, 1995, the government weighed in with a brief 
calling for Alley’s recusal.85 Turning to precedent, the brief claimed there had recently 
been several successful appeals of cases in which the trial courts denied recusal 
motions. The Justice Department brief read, “There is too much at stake here to risk 
even an erroneous reversal, with all its attendant costs to the people of the United 
States, and, most importantly, to the victims of this terrible crime.”86 
 In September, Judge Alley denied the recusal motions. The Dallas Morning 
News quoted from the brief in which Judge Alley wrote, “I cannot merely ask another 
judge to shoulder the burden when the law does not require that.”87 Judge Alley did 
agree to move the case away from Oklahoma City, but not out of the Western District. 
His order established a trial date for May 17, 1996, at the federal courthouse in Lawton, 
Oklahoma. In his order Alley wrote: 
The United States Courthouse in Oklahoma City is too close to the bombing 
target, the Murrah Building. Jury selection from a pool in the Oklahoma City 
area would be chancy. I have come to agree with defense counsel on these 
points. Lawton is close enough to provide a trial setting appropriate for detached 
and dispassionate deliberation … I have tried cases in Lawton and from those 
experiences have formed a high regard for the qualities of jurors in that area ... 
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They have been solid and good people who undertook their juror responsibilities 
in the spirit of public duty soberly performed.88 
 Though Judge Alley’s order did not specifically reference press coverage, it did 
cite the potential difficulties in seating a jury in Oklahoma City – something the judge 
said would not be a problem by moving the case to Lawton. The defense teams would 
challenge this assumption. They would claim that pretrial publicity in Lawton was 
equally pervasive and that seating a jury there would be equally problematic.89 Finding 
out how pervasive press coverage was in Lawton was the focus of the next defense 
strategy – public opinion polling in advance of a change of venue motion and analysis 
of press coverage of the crime.90 
 While the defense teams were trying to get Western District judges off the case 
and to get the case moved out of the Western District, the press was trying to get into 
court files and to get access to dozens of documents filed under seal. The process of 
sealing documents would become the next fair trial/free press issue raised in the 
bombing case. It was also the first issue in which the press became a litigant, and it 
would become the longest running fair trial/free press issue in the case. 
The process of sealing documents had begun early on in the case. Some of the 
earliest documents the court sealed were the arrest warrant and accompanying affidavits 
for Terry Nichols. U.S. District Judge David Russell authorized sealing those 
documents just days after the bombing.91 Judge Russell and Magistrate Howland 
allowed for the sealing of dozens of documents during their management of the case 
through the spring and summer of 1995.92 The process continued under Judge Alley’s 
tenure.93 The docket sheet, a chronological index of pleadings filed, gave no 
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information about what the sealed documents were. The sealed items appeared on the 
docket sheet as “SEALED (IN VAULT)” along with a corresponding docket sheet 
number.94 
 On Thursday, September 28, 1995, Oklahoma City television station KOCO 
filed a motion with the court seeking access to 143 documents that had been filed under 
seal. KOCO’s attorneys claimed many of the sealed documents were search warrants 
and information on attorney fees. Since the defense teams were being paid with public 
money, KOCO claimed the public had a right to know how much money was being 
spent and what it was being spent on.95 Three days later, more news organizations 
joined the fight for access to the records. On Monday, October 2, 1995, Tulsa television 
station KJRH (NBC) and Oklahoma City television stations KFOR (NBC) and KWTV 
(CBS) along with The Oklahoman, The Tulsa World, the Oklahoma City and Tulsa 
chapters of the Society of Professional Journalists, and Oklahoma Freedom of 
Information Inc. joined the KOCO motion. The attorney representing these press 
organizations, Mike Minnis, said he feared the sealing of documents could become a 
standard procedure for the courts if it went unchallenged any longer.96 
 On Friday, November 3, 1995, Magistrate Howland unsealed nine sets of 
documents totaling more than one hundred pages related to the case.97 Included in these 
documents were the search warrant and affidavit for the search of the car McVeigh was 
driving when he was arrested shortly after the bombing.98 The documents also revealed 
the pamphlets and newspaper clippings McVeigh had in his car including the 
Declaration of Independence and several articles on the F.B.I. siege of the Branch 
Davidian compound in Waco, Texas two years earlier.99 
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 The press had won a small victory in gaining access to some of the sealed court 
documents. Press attorneys had expressed concern that not challenging the court’s 
procedures would allow those procedures to become entrenched. It would not be the last 
battle among the government, the defense, the courts, and the press over the fair 
trial/free press issue of access to court documents.100 
 November and December 1995 would mark key turning points in the Oklahoma 
City bombing case. In the last sixty days of the year, the defense teams would file 
motions for a change of venue, implicating the press in their arguments. Judge Alley 
would be removed from the case, and the press would focus renewed attention on the 
judge just prior to his recusal. The new judge taking over the case would also come to 
make fair trial/free press issues his first order of business. 
 By November 1995, the defense teams had completed their public opinion 
polling, and they had prepared their motions for a change of venue. The motions 
claimed pervasive pretrial publicity had made it impossible for McVeigh and Nichols to 
receive a fair trial in Lawton, and they argued that the court should move the case out of 
state.101 In support of their arguments, defense attorneys produced a massive amount of 
evidence in the form of press clippings and broadcast transcripts. One of McVeigh’s 
attorneys called the motions and their supplementary materials one of the largest legal 
motions ever filed in the United States.102 The McVeigh motion had so many boxes of 
supplementary documents that attorneys had to bring it to the courthouse using hand 
trucks.103 An article in the New York Times said the boxes contained, “... 1,087 full 
pages of the Daily Oklahoman, 926 pages of broadcast transcripts, 319 pages of the 
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Lawton Constitution and 313 pages of the Tulsa World.”104 Government prosecutors, 
meanwhile, said that they saw no reason to move the trial.105 
The defense motions for a change of venue revealed some of the polling data, 
which the court had agreed to fund in September 1995.106 Stephen Jones hired 
professors Kent Tedin and Richard Murray from the University of Houston to poll 400 
registered voters in four cities within the Tenth Circuit.107 As registered voters, the 
respondents were also potential jurors. The cities where the defense experts conducted 
polling were Lawton, Oklahoma; Denver, Colorado; Albuquerque, New Mexico, and 
Kansas City, Kansas. The defense teams said the research showed that as much as 90% 
of those surveyed had already formed an opinion about the case or said they believed 
McVeigh and Nichols were in fact guilty.108 In the Lawton sample, 44% said they had 
formed opinions about McVeigh, and 30% said they had formed opinions about 
Nichols. Also, 96% of Lawton respondents who claimed to have formed opinions about 
the case said they thought McVeigh was guilty, and 90% said the same of Nichols.109 
The survey of Lawton area voters found that more than two-thirds of the Lawton area 
respondents had “made a financial or personal contribution to the victims of the 
bombing, or knew, or had family or friends who knew someone killed or injured in the 
bombing.”110 The defense teams were attempting to show that pretrial publicity made 
finding an impartial jury a daunting task anywhere, but particularly so in Lawton, where 
the trial was then set to begin in six months.111 
As the defense teams were hauling their massive motions into the federal 
courthouse in Oklahoma City, an article appeared in the The Oklahoman that would 
send Michael Tigar dashing off a motion to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.112 Tigar 
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had appealed Judge Alley’s denial of the recusal motion, and a decision was expected 
soon.113 The “new” story was actually a revival of an old story – a story that appeared in 
an Oregon newspaper the day after the bombing.114 However, in light of the pending 
issue regarding who should try the case and where the case should be tried, the old story 
took on new importance. 
 The story in question appeared in the Portland, Oregon, newspaper The 
Oregonian on April 20, 1995.115 Oregonian reporter Dave Hogan had discovered that 
Judge Alley had grown up in Oregon and had begun his law career there. The reporter 
called Judge Alley just after the bombing and interviewed him by phone.116 At this time, 
Judge Alley had no role in the case. The Oregonian story included several quotes from 
Judge Alley’s interview. Judge Alley told Hogan that a few weeks prior to the bombing, 
court security personnel had warned court employees to be on the lookout for 
suspicious activity. He said they were told to watch for “people casing homes or 
wandering about the courthouse who aren’t supposed to be there, letter bombs. There 
has been an increased vigilance.”117 The judge also said, “My subjective impression was 
there was a reason for the dissemination of these concerns.”118 Hogan wrote that Judge 
Alley also mentioned that his son and daughter-in-law had once considered placing their 
child – Judge Alley’s grandchild – in the daycare center housed in the Alfred P. Murrah 
Federal Building. The Oregonian quoted Judge Alley as saying, “The thought that our 
grandchild might have been in there was the thing that was most chilling about all of 
this.”119 
Michael Tigar responded to the Oklahoman article three days later. Tigar told 
The Dallas Morning News, “The concerns he [Alley] expressed show that he has an 
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interest in the case.”120 On November 29, 1995, Tigar filed a copy of the article with the 
Tenth Circuit as a supplement to his motion. Tigar told The Tulsa World, “I think it is 
fair to say it made our position to the Tenth Circuit better.”121 Reflecting on the 
incident, Tigar said it is difficult to determine the impact the Oregonian story may have 
had: 
I have no idea whether it was or was not a factor. You know, you don’t know 
what moves judges to make the decisions they do. The fact that his chambers 
had suffered great damage … the other objective facts … that was all a part of 
the mix.122 
The Case Changes Hands 
 In December 1995, the case would pass to the Chief Judge for the District of 
Colorado, Richard Matsch. Judge Matsch would immediately face critical fair trial/free 
press decisions including how to handle the future sealing of documents and whether or 
not to move the trial away from Lawton. In making these decisions, the judge would 
look to precedent and evidence of prejudicial pretrial publicity. His decisions would 
affect the future process for sealing documents in the case and where the trial would 
ultimately be heard. These decisions would have further ramifications including how 
the press would cover the trial and how victims would be able to view the trial. 
 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision regarding Tigar’s request to 
remove Judge Alley came on December 1, 1995.123 It was a victory for the defendants, 
and it would have a significant impact on the future of the case in the Western District. 
The appeals court granted Nichols a writ of mandamus ordering Judge Alley to remove 
himself from the case. The decision, however, made no mention of the interview Judge 
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Alley had given The Oregonian. Regarding Judge Alley, the ruling read, “[Judge 
Alley’s] actual state of mind, purity of heart, incorruptibility, or lack of partiality are not 
the issue.”124 Instead, the justices determined the bombing’s physical and emotional 
impact on the Oklahoma City United States Courthouse and its staff were undeniable; 
furthermore, the justices wrote that there was no other case like the Oklahoma City 
bombing to look to for precedent.125 Finally, the justices wrote, “We conclude based on 
the extraordinary circumstances of this case that a ‘reasonable person,’ knowing all the 
relevant facts, would harbor doubt about the judge’s impartiality.”126 Thus, the appeals 
court decided the extraordinary case required an extraordinary decision – to order the 
judge’s recusal. 
 On December 4, 1995, Judge Alley issued his two-page recusal order. The judge 
pointed out that the Tenth Circuit decision addressed only the Nichols team’s motion; 
however, he removed himself from the case for both defendants. Judge Alley wrote, 
“The judge who succeeds to this case will have to bear a dreadful burden, and I wish 
him or her well.”127 
 The judge who would shoulder the burden of the case was U.S. District Judge 
Richard Matsch, Chief Judge for the District of Colorado.128 Judge Matsch had a 
reputation as a firm but fair judge. He was known for being a stickler for rules and 
procedure, and he was also known for having little patience with attorneys who were 
not prepared for court or who attempted to grandstand in his courtroom.129  
 Reporters wanted to find out all they could about the judge who would see the 
case through to trial. Soon after the announcement, several stories appeared about Judge 
Matsch’s background. Many of the stories held Judge Matsch and his courtroom 
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management style in contrast to California District Court Judge Lance Ito and his 
management of the O.J. Simpson murder trial that had concluded just two months 
earlier. Denver attorney Fred Winner told The Rocky Mountain News, “Had Dick 
Matsch tried O.J. Simpson, it would have been over in three weeks. Dick rules his 
courtroom. When he rules, he rules.”130 Judge Matsch’s brother, Charles Matsch, told 
the Associated Press, “It [the Oklahoma City bombing trial] won’t be like the O.J. trial, 
that’s for sure.  He’s noted for laying out attorneys who play those games and go after 
each other by stalling.”131 Charles Matsch also said, “His [Judge Matsch’s] motivation 
isn’t to seek the limelight. He feels the judicial system needs some dignity restored 
following the O.J. Simpson trial and believes he can contribute.”132 The judge himself 
showed some humility and a sense of duty when he told The Dallas Morning News 
shortly after his appointment, “It isn’t a matter of wanting it [the case] or not ... I was 
assigned, and I understand the responsibility of that.”133 Morning News reporter Pete 
Slover also wrote that when asked to elaborate on his judicial philosophy and his 
experience on the bench, the judge declined and said, “It’s not that I’m anti-press ... I’m 
just guarded.”134 
 Stephen Jones and Michael Tigar have both said they hold Judge Matsch in high 
regard. Reflecting on Judge Matsch, Jones said the judge’s dedication to duty and 
justice, along with his rugged individualist persona, were some of Matsch’s more 
admirable traits: 
Judge Matsch, is, in my opinion, such a unique judge and human being. He’s a 
kind of Gary Cooper type figure. He’s just like a figure of the Old West, and so 
  
 
122 
you sort of knew what he was thinking before he spoke, and you could kind of 
figure the framework with which he addressed issues.135 
Tigar also praised the judge for the firm control he kept over the case and 
focused on Judge Matsch’s professionalism in his assessment: 
He’s an experienced trial judge who cares about the adversary system. And we’d 
had the spectacle or the example of the O.J. trial and Judge Ito’s lack of control 
of the process regardless of what you think about the outcome. And I think that 
everybody was focused on seeing what’s Judge Matsch going to do. Well, the 
fact is that he understood what his job was, and he did it. So, I think he gets an A 
on his paper.136 
When asked whether criticism of the legal system following the O.J. Simpson 
trial influenced the Oklahoma City bombing trials, both attorneys said the specter of 
O.J. was present in the bombing case, but its effects were minimal. “We weren’t 
interested in battling the image of O.J. or anything cosmic like that,” Tigar said.137 
Jones said, “Judge Matsch himself on two or three occasions, in meetings we had that 
were closed, made reference [to the Simpson trial]. He didn’t dwell on it, but you could 
just tell.”138 
Judge Matsch flew to Oklahoma City on December 12, 1995, to take the bench 
for the first time in the bombing case, and fair trial/free press issues would occupy much 
of his first court sessions. At a private conference with prosecutors and the defense 
teams on December 12, Judge Matsch cautioned the attorneys that they should be 
careful in their dealings with the press. Following the meeting, Tigar told reporters the 
judge had “asked counsel to be responsible with respect to our comments to the media. 
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And you can understand that that is an admonition that we intend to take extremely 
seriously.”139 Also, during the private meeting, Judge Matsch told the attorneys that he 
was canceling the May trial date.140 Whether or not the trial would eventually take place 
in Lawton was an issue yet to be decided, as there were pending change of venue 
motions to be heard.141  
Judge Matsch next turned his attention to the issue of sealed court documents.  
He kept a December 13, 1995, hearing date originally scheduled by Magistrate 
Howland to establish a process for filing documents under seal. Judge Matsch, not 
Magistrate Howland, would decide how much access the press would have to 
documents through the remainder of the case.  
The hearing drew much public and press attention partly because it was the first 
opportunity for the public and press to see Judge Matsch work in the courtroom. It was 
also the first time McVeigh and Nichols appeared in a courtroom together since their 
arrests.142 At the hearing, Judge Matsch said his first inclination was to leave the 
documents in question sealed until the trial was over. One report on the hearing quoted 
the judge as saying, “I’m not accepting the presumption of openness for this matter.”143 
 The press motion before Judge Matsch was a combined motion that compiled 
and consolidated individual motions made previously by multiple media 
organizations.144 The petitioners included newspapers, magazines, broadcast stations, 
and broadcast networks, cable networks, and journalism professional organizations. 
Newspapers represented in the motion included The Oklahoman, The Dallas Morning 
News, The Philadelphia Inquirer, The Philadelphia Daily News, The Providence 
Journal-Bulletin, The San Francisco Chronicle, The Seattle Times, and The Tulsa 
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World. The New York Times Company, Washington Post Inc., and Time Inc. joined as 
corporations. Broadcast stations represented in the motion included Oklahoma 
television stations KFOR-TV, KJRH-TV, KOCO-TV, and KWTV-TV. Other local 
broadcasters included KASA-TV (Albuquerque, New Mexico), KGW-TV (Portland, 
Oregon), KHNL-TV (Honolulu, Hawaii), KING-TV (Seattle, Washington), KMSB-TV 
(Tucson, Arizona), KREM-TV (Spokane, Washington), KTVB-TV (Boise, Idaho), 
WCNC-TV (Charlotte, North Carolina), and WHAS-TV (Louisville, Kentucky). 
Broadcast and cable networks joining the motion were ABC, CBS, CNN, FOX News, 
and NBC. Journalism professional organizations included in the motion were Freedom 
of Information Oklahoma Inc., the Society of Professional Journalists Oklahoma City 
Chapter, and the Society of Professional Journalists Eastern Oklahoma Chapter. The 
Associated Press was also a party to the motion.145 
 The purpose of the press motion was to unseal all documents the court had 
previously allowed to be submitted under seal and to establish procedures for filing 
sealed documents in the future.146 Press attorneys looked to precedent in preparing their 
arguments for access to the documents. The press claimed a common law right – 
established by case law – to the documents and a First Amendment right to the 
documents by extension of “the qualified First Amendment right of access to court 
proceedings.”147 Also, the press maintained that the court had not followed the law in its 
process of sealing documents since the beginning of the case. The motion called the 
process the court had used to allow documents to be filed under seal up to that point 
“constitutionally deficient.”148 
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 The press motion used the Supreme Court cases Press-Enterprise I and Press-
Enterprise II as the foundation for its argument, calling the cases, “…the seminal 
judicial law on this issue.”149 Press attorneys claimed that in Press-Enterprise I, the 
Supreme Court found a California judge erred in barring the press and the public from 
jury voir dire and in sealing the transcripts of the voir dire. The Court ruled that such 
actions could only be taken “… based on findings that closure is essential to preserve 
higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.”150 Also, the Court said the 
press must be allowed to challenge any closure orders. The press motion claimed that in 
Press-Enterprise I, the Court determined preserving openness in the criminal justice 
process is vital to preserving public confidence in the system.151 
 Turning to Press-Enterprise II, the press claimed that courts must show how a 
defendant’s right to a fair trial would be threatened before issuing a closure order. 
Press-Enterprise II was another California case in which a trial judge closed a pretrial 
hearing and sealed transcripts over press objections, saying the publicity of the 
proceedings would deny the defendant the right to a fair trial. The Supreme Court, 
however, ruled that the trial court did not sufficiently demonstrate a threat to the 
defendant’s rights.152 
 Citing precedent, the press attorneys claimed the standards established by these 
cases allowed for closure only when the court could show a compelling interest in 
closure, the closure was necessary to protect that interest, and there were no other 
means less severe than closure that could protect the interest.153 
 While Press-Enterprise I and Press-Enterprise II primarily focused on a right of 
access to court proceedings, the press motion claimed that subsequent lower court 
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decisions created a common law precedent of access to court documents and extended 
the provisions of these Supreme Court cases to include documents. Press attorneys 
wrote: 
Every Circuit Court of Appeals which has addressed the issue has held that the 
First Amendment right of public access to criminal proceedings also applies to 
documents submitted in connection with those proceedings. The First 
Amendment qualified right of access applies generally to documents and records 
in all criminal proceedings, specifically including [among other things] 
documents relating to pretrial detention (bail) proceedings, documents relating 
to criminal pretrial suppression proceedings, documents relating to plea 
agreements, records of plea and sentencing hearings, documents relating to the 
trial judge’s decision to recuse, or relating to disqualification, documents 
supporting issuance of search warrants, and to a motion to reduce sentence and 
related documents.154 
Press attorneys argued that the public, including reporters, had a right of access to court 
documents. Should any party wish to seal documents, the press argued, the court must 
notify the public of that request and allow for a hearing on the issue.155 Press attorneys 
claimed the public had a right and a need to know what happened in criminal 
prosecutions, particularly the Oklahoma City bombing prosecution. The motion stated: 
This proceeding involves prosecution of the persons charged with what has been 
referred to as the most egregious act of terrorism ever committed in the United 
States. The public’s interest in asserting the constitutional right of access could 
not be more heightened.156 
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 The defendants responded to the press motion by recognizing a common law 
right to court documents but rejecting the press claims that the Supreme Court and 
appellate court decisions established a constitutional right of access to documents. The 
defense position was that unsealing such documents could reveal evidence that may not 
be admissible at trial, and such information could expose trial strategy, thus 
jeopardizing the defendants’ right to a fair trial.157 The defense maintained that the 
documents had been sealed to protect the defendant’s rights to a fair trial, and, to that 
end, those documents should remain sealed.158 McVeigh’s attorneys expressed 
particular concern with the press’s interest in unsealing documents related to attorney 
payment. Stephen Jones said that these documents made up a majority of the documents 
the court had sealed up to that point and that the press had specifically expressed an 
interest in those documents.159 
 As indigent capital defendants, unable to pay for their own defense, McVeigh 
and Nichols received payment for attorney services through the federal government as 
provided by the Criminal Justice Act.160 Due to the fact that public money was funding 
the defense, the press argued that the public had a right to know how much public 
money the defense teams were spending.161 Under the Criminal Justice Act, defendants 
filed schedule forms for payment that detailed what types of services they sought and 
how much those services cost. Services could include, but were not limited to, travel, 
hiring analysts and consultants, and conducting tests.162 Both the McVeigh and Nichols 
teams argued that these documents were “attorney work product” and thus they were 
outside the scope of what should be considered publicly accessible court documents.163 
Furthermore, the defendants argued that the Criminal Justice Act included provisions 
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specific to capital defendants to maintain the confidentiality of these documents. Jones 
wrote, “Unsealing these documents would not only divulge attorney work product but 
also give a ‘blueprint’ of the defense strategy.”164  
Along with a concern about revealing strategy, the defense teams had a concern 
that publication of the overall cost of the defense could inflame public sentiment against 
them and have a further negative impact on the defendants’ rights to a fair trial.165 The 
press motion conceded that revealing specifics about what types of activities the defense 
sought payment for could expose defense strategy.166 Still, press attorneys argued they 
should be able to learn how much was being spent in the aggregate, even if specifics of 
what the funds were used for were still kept under seal.167 Judge Matsch took oral 
arguments from the hearing and related motions under advisement and said he would 
issue his ruling in January.168 
The fair trial/free press issue of sealed documents, first addressed in November 
1995, had reemerged in December 1995. Press attorneys turned to precedent to assert a 
right of access to the documents then held under seal. Defense attorneys rejected this 
argument. They claimed federal statue protected the documents journalists were most 
interested in –documents related to attorney’s fees. The defense teams also claimed that 
giving the press access to such documents would have a negative impact on the 
defendants’ Sixth Amendment rights to a fair trial. Here the First Amendment rights of 
the press and the Sixth Amendment rights of the defendants were in clear conflict. It 
would not be the last time the court would consider the issue. 
 The change of venue issue was the next fair trial/free press matter to be 
addressed before Judge Matsch. On Thursday, December 21, 1995, the government 
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filed its response to defense motions for a change of venue. Like the defense teams, 
prosecutors included hundreds of newspaper clippings related to the bombing, but 
unlike the defense teams, prosecutors claimed their evidence showed a fair trial in 
Oklahoma was possible.169 True to their earlier position, prosecutors claimed the trials 
should take place in Oklahoma to accommodate victims and their families. The 
government also offered a new location as an alternate should Lawton prove 
impractical; that new city was Tulsa, Oklahoma.170 
 As Oklahoma’s second largest city, Tulsa had capabilities for a large trial that no 
other city outside of Oklahoma City could offer. Tulsa had two federal courthouses. In 
1995, the older of the two courthouses had just reopened after a remodeling project, 
which included prisoner-holding cells with showers and a courtroom expansion that 
made the largest courtroom capable of holding 200 spectators. The old Tulsa federal 
courthouse also had several vacant rooms that could be utilized in a variety of ways, 
including attorney offices, court staff offices, or media workspace.171 Furthermore, 
prosecutors claimed Tulsa offered greater access for victims and witnesses.172 
Prosecutors pointed out that the defense polling research had not included polling in 
Tulsa. The prosecution questioned the validity of the defense research because Tulsa 
was not taken into consideration.173 
 As 1996 began, the Oklahoma City bombing case had a new judge with two 
major fair trial/free press issues before him – deciding how to handle sealed court 
documents and whether or not to move the trial to another venue. These two issues 
would occupy the court’s attention through the month of January. The court dealt with 
the sealed documents issue first. 
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 On January 24, 1996, the judge made his decision on the sealed documents issue 
by issuing an order that would guide the future of sealed documents throughout the rest 
of the proceedings.174 In his written opinion and order, Judge Matsch ruled that attorney 
fee records would remain closed, and he established procedures for future documents to 
be filed under seal. He also set forth a classification system that would allow for brief 
descriptions of sealed documents on the docket sheet, so as to give an indication of what 
was contained in the documents, while still protecting the information under seal.175 In 
this order, the court recognized the fair trial/free press issue of sealed documents. The 
court turned to precedent to resolve the issue, and how the court resolved the issue 
would establish procedures for managing sealed documents through the remainder of 
the case. 
 The judge wrote that the Supreme Court had recognized a common law right of 
press and public access to court records. However, he also wrote that the Court 
recognized the authority of trial courts to exercise discretion in determining whether or 
not to make records public when questions arose about whether release of those records 
might impact a case or participants in the case.176 The judge looked to precedent for his 
order, and found it in Press-Enterprise II – one of the cases press attorneys had used to 
vociferously argue for access to the documents. Specifically, Judge Matsch referred to 
the “experience and logic” test articulated by Chief Justice Burger in his Press-
Enterprise II majority opinion: 
These considerations of experience and logic are, of course, related, for history 
and experience shape the functioning of governmental processes. If the 
particular proceeding in question passes the tests of experience and logic, a 
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qualified First Amendment right of public access attaches. But even when a 
right of access attaches, it is not absolute ... While open criminal proceedings 
give assurances of fairness to both the public and the accused, there are some 
limited circumstances in which the right of the accused to fair trial might be 
undermined by publicity. In such cases, the trial court must determine whether 
the situation is such that the rights of the accused override the qualified First 
Amendment right of access.177 
Judge Matsch claimed that the need to avoid prejudicial pretrial publicity was an 
important interest, but not the only interest the court should consider when deciding to 
seal documents. The judge wrote that protecting information about victims could be a 
legitimate cause for limiting public access to information. Also, Judge Matsch pointed 
out that the timing for the release of information must be considered. “The stage of the 
proceeding may determine the question of access,” the judge wrote.178 Finally, the judge 
rejected the press argument that appellate courts have recognized a right of access to a 
litany of document types and that sealing such documents must, in all cases, involve a 
showing of the need for such action. Judge Matsch wrote, “That suggested method of 
analysis is both an overstatement of the qualified right of access and an 
oversimplification of the manner of its application.”179 Specific to the documents 
regarding attorney fees, the judge wrote that such records had never been considered 
records to which the public had a right of access. Furthermore, he asserted that federal 
law and court rules specifically stated such records were to be protected from public 
scrutiny.180 
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 Judge Matsch then explained a five-part test that he would use to determine if 
documents then already sealed would be opened. The test would also serve as the 
procedure for handling sealed records for the duration of the case. The five questions 
posed in the test were: 
Does the matter involve activity within the tradition of free public access to 
information concerning criminal prosecutions? Will public access play a 
significant role in the activity and in the functioning of the process? Is there a 
substantial probability that some recognized interest of higher value than public 
access to information will be prejudiced or affected adversely by the disclosure? 
Does the need for protection of that interest override the qualified First 
Amendment right of access? Is the closure by the court essential to protect that 
interest, considering all reasonable alternatives?181 
 With his five-part test crafted from the experience and logic test established, the 
judge applied the test to the sealed document issues at hand, beginning with the issue of 
attorney fees. The judge wrote that the public interest in public funds spent on 
representing the defendants was legitimate and unquestioned; however, he wrote, 
“...there are important interests to be protected before the entry of final judgments in 
this case.”182 Judge Matsch claimed it would be inappropriate to release information 
that could reveal defense strategy. Along the same lines, he wrote there was a legitimate 
interest in protecting the identities of witnesses and experts who had talked to or were 
working with the defense. Another interest the judge cited was “the protection of 
counsel from vilification and accusations of improper motivations.”183 Judge Matsch 
wrote that professional standards and court rules prohibited attorneys from speaking on 
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some issues that would arise in a discussion of how the defense teams were using court 
approved funds. This would place the attorneys in a difficult position, and it might 
distract them from their primary task of focusing on the defense of their clients, the 
judge determined. He wrote that the alternative suggested by the press of revealing only 
aggregate amounts spent on the defense was not a viable option because without 
explanation of what the funds were used for, the aggregate amounts would lack context. 
Thus, Judge Matsch ruled that all documents related to attorney fees already under seal, 
and all future documents to be filed related to attorney fees, would be sealed until final 
judgment in the case.184 
 To address the concern about nondescript docket sheet entries, Judge Matsch 
ordered all attorney fee documentation to be entered with the defendant’s name and a 
brief, general description such as, “‘application for interim fees for counsel,’ 
‘application for travel,’ etc.”185 
 Judge Matsch ruled that in the future no other documents, other than attorney fee 
documents, would be “sealed automatically.”186 He ordered that any party wishing to 
file a document under seal would have to file a motion to that effect. The motion would 
be open to the public, but the documents in question would be under seal until the judge 
ruled on the motion. Except in the case of an emergency, the court would allow three 
days for objections to be filed regarding the request to seal, after which the court would 
consider the motion.187 
 Judge Matsch had addressed the fair trial/free press issue of public access to 
sealed court documents by crafting a procedure based on precedent. The press had 
raised the issue out of concern the court was acting arbitrarily in sealing documents, and 
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that posed a threat to First Amendment rights of access to public information. Using the 
precedent of the experience and logic test, the judge established a procedure all parties 
could understand for dealing with future issues. Judge Matsch claimed his procedure 
equally considered the press’s First Amendment rights to report on the case while 
protecting the defendants’ Sixth Amendment rights to receive a fair trial. The procedure 
would be used throughout the case, but it would not go unchallenged. The issue of 
sealed documents would be one of the longest-lived fair trial/free press issues in the 
case.188 
 Reflecting on Judge Matsch’s management of the sealed document issue, both 
Stephen Jones and Michael Tigar said Judge Matsch’s procedure was legally sound, and 
it rightly protected the most sensitive documents – those related to attorney fees. Jones 
said the judge’s decision averted what could have been a public relations nightmare for 
the defense: 
I think Judge Matsch was legitimately concerned that the amount of money the 
defense was spending would be demonized – to use one of his expressions – and 
the defense lawyers would be accused of lavish spending or unnecessary 
spending. That would not only damage them publicly, that is to say in the eyes 
of the potential jury, but also damage indirectly Mr. McVeigh. It might also 
have a morale effect on the defense, and, finally, might also discourage people 
from assisting the defense. By people, I mean experts and people that we would 
pay. He addressed those quite candidly.189 
In his assessment of the sealed documents order, Michael Tigar said Judge Matsch 
correctly applied precedent, and, in doing so, he came to a legally sound decision: 
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The law respecting the sealing of documents is pretty clear. First, the person 
seeking them has to show that there was a common law right of access to that 
kind of document. Which then if there is, leads to a presumptive First 
Amendment right of access. That’s the formula, and here of course these were 
largely, if not almost entirely, discovery documents, which the Supreme Court 
had held are not subject to a common law right of access.190 
 One week after Judge Matsch addressed the issue of sealed documents, the focus 
shifted to the fair trial/free press issue that had loomed over the case since McVeigh’s 
initial court appearance – the change of venue. Judge Matsch scheduled a hearing on the 
issue to begin Tuesday, January 30, 1996, at Oklahoma City’s federal courthouse.191 
The hearings attracted a large crowd of reporters and bombing victims. Some victims 
waited outside the courthouse before dawn to ensure they would get a seat in the 
courtroom.192 Judge Matsch had previously agreed to establish an audio feed to an 
adjacent courtroom in case some victims could not get a seat in the gallery.193 While the 
equipment for the audio feed was put in place, the auxiliary courtroom was not used 
during the change of venue hearings.194 
The hearings spanned four days and focused largely on public opinion polling 
and press coverage of the bombing.195 Both the government and the defense teams came 
prepared with research on the attitudes and opinions of potential jurors. Both sides also 
came prepared with hundreds of newspaper clippings and multiple videotaped broadcast 
reports on the bombing and its impact on the city and state. The four days of hearings 
played out in a courtroom filled with bombing victims and members of the defendants’ 
families.196 
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 The government took the position that the people of Oklahoma should be 
allowed to have the case tried in their state.197 Prosecutors knew the defense would seek 
to show that local sentiment for the bombing victims made all residents of the state 
victims of the bombing. U.S. Attorney Patrick Ryan challenged that position in his 
opening statement. Ryan said, “…the defendants have not, cannot and will not prove the 
State of Oklahoma can’t find 12 people and 6 alternates to make a fair and impartial 
jury.”198 Prosecutors also maintained that moving the trial outside of Oklahoma would 
place an undue hardship on victims, and it could violate their rights under federal crime 
victim statutes.199  
 The prosecution called the first witness in the hearings, Dr. Donald E. Vinson.200 
Dr. Vinson was the chairman of a jury consulting service called DecisionQuest based in 
Los Angeles, California. Under Vinson’s direction, DecisionQuest surveyed registered 
voters in Lawton, Oklahoma; Tulsa, Oklahoma; Albuquerque, New Mexico; Denver, 
Colorado; and Kansas City, Kansas to assess their attitudes and opinions about the 
bombing defendants and the crime itself.201 This study showed 40% of those polled in 
Tulsa said they believed McVeigh was guilty, 36% of those polled in Albuquerque and 
Kansas shared the same opinion, and 28% of those polled in Denver believed the 
same.202 
 Dr. Vinson’s firm, DecisionQuest, had consulted for other famous trials 
including the O.J. Simpson murder trial.203 Vinson testified at the venue hearing that 
Oklahomans asked about the Oklahoma City bombing case actually showed less bias 
against the defendants than Californians had shown toward O.J. Simpson prior to his 
trial.204 Vinson testified that approximately 60% of those surveyed in Lawton said they 
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were unbiased regarding Timothy McVeigh, and 73% of Lawton respondents said the 
same for Nichols.205 In the Tulsa sample, the number claiming to have no bias against 
McVeigh slipped to approximately 59%, but it rose to 75% regarding Nichols.206 
Vinson said all of those percentages were higher than the 42% of Los Angeles 
respondents who said they had no bias toward O.J. Simpson just before his murder trial 
began.207 
 During cross-examination, the defense teams questioned Vinson on what 
defense attorneys considered problems and inconsistencies in the data. During 
questioning, Vinson said his research showed that Lawton residents who said they 
thought McVeigh was guilty reported they held that belief “significantly more strongly” 
than respondents from the other cities studied.208 Defense attorneys and Judge Matsch 
both asked Vinson about apparently contradicting statistics showing that 85% of 
Lawton and Tulsa residents thought McVeigh and Nichols were presumed innocent, 
while 30% said the pair was guilty. Vinson responded by saying, “They’re [the 
statistics] inconsistent in that respect, and you have to be careful about that.”209 Still, 
Vinson said he thought both defendants could get a fair trial in Oklahoma whether the 
trial was held in Lawton or Tulsa, but he also said attorneys would have to take their 
time and be thorough when questioning potential jurors during jury selection. Vinson 
added that, in his opinion, attorneys would find potential jurors with strongly held 
opinions and emotions about the case, “‘irrespective of where this case is tried – 
whether it be in Lawton or Timbuktu.’”210 
 The McVeigh team had earlier commissioned research of its own. The McVeigh 
team’s polling, conducted by Drs. Richard Murray and Kent L. Tedin of the University 
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of Houston, claimed to show clear differences between prospective jurors in Oklahoma 
and other states.211 The McVeigh team’s thesis was that Oklahomans held stronger 
opinions about the case than people in other states due in large part to pervasive press 
coverage in the state. Also, both defense teams claimed press coverage was often biased 
against the defendants.212 
 The McVeigh team’s polling showed knowledge of the crime and knowledge of 
the two defendants was much higher in Lawton than in other Tenth Circuit cities 
included in the polling.213 More than 80% of the Lawton respondents could name the 
suspects without help, compared to fewer than 50% of respondents from outside 
Oklahoma.214 Oklahomans also appeared to follow news of the bombing more closely 
than people outside the state. Sixty-seven percent of people polled in Lawton said they 
paid “a ‘great deal’ of attention to news of the bombing.”215 No more than 46% of 
respondents from any other city reported paying a great deal of attention to news about 
the bombing. The defense also claimed that Oklahomans were more likely to be 
associated with the bombing victims or relief efforts than people in other states.216 
Finally, the defense study asked if respondents had already formed opinions about the 
guilt of the defendants. The research showed the Lawton sample had formed opinions 
about the defendants – particularly regarding McVeigh. In Lawton, 44% said they had 
formed an opinion about McVeigh’s guilt, and 96% of that group said they felt certain 
of McVeigh’s guilt. In Kansas City, 37% of those holding opinions about the case said 
they felt certain of McVeigh’s guilt.217 In Albuquerque, the number was slightly higher, 
39%, and in Denver that number was 40%.218 The defense claimed Oklahomans held 
such strong opinions about the case not just because of their physical and emotional 
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proximity to the crime, but also because the press in Oklahoma kept the case in the 
forefront of public consciousness, and, more often than not, with a bias against the 
defendants.219 
 The second focus of the defense teams during the hearing was to show the court 
what the defense claimed was evidence of pervasive press coverage from the Oklahoma 
press corps. The supplementary information filed with the original change of venue 
motions included hundreds of newspaper clippings and hours of video coverage of the 
bombing that spanned the time period from the day of the bombing through October 
1995.220 For expert testimony on press coverage, the Nichols team called Scott 
Armstrong, a former Washington Post reporter, author, and journalism professor.221 
Armstrong testified that the amount of press coverage of the bombing in Oklahoma far 
exceeded similar coverage offered by media outlets outside the state.222 Defense 
evidence showed Oklahoma media outlets produced bombing stories at a ratio of five-
to-one compared to Denver media outlets in April 1995, and the ratio had increased to 
seven-to-one by October 1995.223 Furthermore, the defense argued that the Oklahoma 
press reports were lengthier and focused more on victims and seeking justice for those 
victims compared to national press coverage and coverage by media outlets in other 
states.224 The Nichols team claimed the press helped create a sentiment among the 
people of Oklahoma that all residents of the state were victims through a shared sense 
of sympathy for the victims.  
Both defense teams argued that much of the press coverage concerning the 
bombing was plagued by inaccuracies and biased accounts that put the defendants in a 
bad light. Armstrong told the court that in his opinion, “more neutral coverage is almost 
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assured anywhere other than Oklahoma.”225 During part of the hearing, the court 
allowed several broadcast reports to be played. Reporters covering the hearing noted the 
emotional impact the videotapes had on victims attending the hearing. Several of them 
wept, and one report said, “One woman rushed from the courtroom in tears.”226 
 One piece of evidence Stephen Jones has singled out as being critical to the 
defense argument was a series of broadcast reports McVeigh attorneys put together 
featuring Oklahoma Governor Frank Keating, commenting on the bombing and the 
bombing defendants.227 The video compilation played in court included the governor’s 
May 25, 1995 comments from the press conference.228 Jones wrote that both defense 
teams recognized the importance of statements made by the highest ranking elected 
official in the state, and both defense teams agreed to begin their presentation of 
evidence with the videotape containing a compilation of the governor’s statements.229 
Jones wrote in retrospect, “I was confident, once we were done with the governor, that 
the game [change of venue] was done.”230 Jones reaffirmed his position that the 
governor’s comments were important evidence in an interview for this study: 
Governor Keating felt very strongly about the bombing. That was the very early 
part of his term, which was eight years, and I don’t think people had picked up 
on the idea that the governor was very volatile in his language and would talk 
before thinking what it sounded like. So, I think the right strategy was made. We 
made the point with the video that the governor was making statements that 
were highly damaging to get a trial there in Oklahoma.231 
The Nichols defense had its own evidence of alleged prejudicial pretrial 
publicity. Ironically, the publicity in question happened during the change of venue 
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hearing. For the first two days of the hearings, U.S. Marshals had allowed news 
photographers to take still pictures and video of McVeigh and Nichols exiting the jail 
and getting in the vehicles that drove them to the courthouse.232 On the second day of 
testimony, Michael Tigar began the hearing by voicing his objection to the 
photography. Pictures published in The Oklahoman that morning showed both 
defendants wearing bulletproof vests and handcuffs. The photographs appeared next to 
an article about the change of venue hearing.233 Tigar told Judge Matsch that previous 
courts had ruled pictures of defendants in handcuffs could be considered prejudicial, 
and he said he might later use the recent photos and video as evidence.234 Jones said 
revelations of the jail photo opportunity greatly upset Judge Matsch. “The judge 
absolutely just went ballistic when he found out,” Jones said.235 
 At the time of the hearing, The Oklahoman reported U.S. Deputy Marshal Jamie 
Hughes acknowledged the Marshal’s Service had arranged the photographer access as 
“… a compromise after reporters claimed that authorities could not block access to the 
public entryway.”236 After Tigar brought the matter to the court’s attention in the 
morning session, Judge Matsch spoke with U.S. Marshal Pat Wilkerson during the 
lunch break. Judge Matsch opened the afternoon session by saying the situation was 
resolved, and there would be no more photographs or video taken at the jail.237 
 As the hearing progressed, it appeared more likely that the trial would not be 
held in Lawton.238 During testimony on Wednesday, January 31, 1996, Judge Matsch 
stopped witness testimony and questioned attorneys after hearing evidence that the 
largest federal courtroom in Lawton would likely not provide enough room for 
prosecutors and both defense teams inside the courtroom, let alone the public and the 
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press who would want seats in the gallery.239 The judge showed further concern when 
prosecutors told him it could take as much as $1 million to make the courthouse ready 
for a trial with the size and complexity of the bombing trial.240 Judge Matsch said from 
the bench that it appeared the Lawton facilities had “obvious deficiencies,” and he 
added, “It seems to be a waste of a lot of people’s time and energy to make it [Lawton] 
available as a feasible trial site.”241 
 On Friday, February 2, 1996, prosecutors and defense attorneys made their final 
arguments on the venue issue before Judge Matsch. Prosecutors asked the judge to 
consider the victims and to keep the case in Oklahoma by moving the trial to Tulsa. 
Assistant U.S. Attorney Sean Connolly said, “Tulsa honors the victims’ rights in a way 
no out of state venue could.”242 U.S. Attorney Patrick Ryan continued the theme of 
compassion for victims and brought a measure of emotion to the proceedings. Press 
reports said Ryan choked back tears as he made a plea for the court to consider the 
children of bombing victims. Ryan said those children were already living without one 
parent, and if their surviving parent had to travel to an out-of-state trial, the stress on the 
family might be overwhelming.243 Ryan said, “There are literally thousands of children 
who lost a mother or a father … Those thousands of children don’t need their parents 
flying to Denver … They need their parents here.”244 
 The defense teams acknowledged the great emotional toll the bombing had 
taken on the victims, but they maintained the venue decision should be based on the 
law, and the court should equally consider the rights of the defendants. Michael Tigar 
told the court: 
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We neither discount nor deny the grief and anger of the victims or even their 
desire for vengeance … But when we bring Terry Nichols to the court to decide 
whether he will live or die, it is in our best interest to create a sanctuary in the 
jungle.245 
Stephen Jones also said Tulsa was not a viable venue. He returned to the defense 
position taken throughout the hearing that all Oklahomans were victims of the bombing. 
Jones told the court, “There is not an independent republic of Tulsa … for our people, 
April 19 in this state will be the equivalent of Pearl Harbor Day. It will be the event by 
which time is measured.”246 With that the hearing ended, Judge Matsch announced he 
would make his decision in February. 
Bombing victims were not waiting for the judge’s decision. They suspected the 
trial would likely be moved, and they suspected it would be moved to Denver. 
Anticipating the problems such a situation posed for victims wanting to watch the trial, 
a small group of victims decided to take action. They turned to an Oklahoma City 
attorney named Karen Howick and began devising plans to have the trial broadcast to 
Oklahoma City via television, if a change of venue were granted. This was the 
beginning of the most unique fair trial/free press aspect of the Oklahoma City bombing 
case – closed-circuit broadcasting. It was an unprecedented feature for a federal 
criminal trial, and it would become a major fair trial/free press issue before the court. 
The court’s decisions about closed-circuit broadcasts would have a direct impact on 
how it managed the case leading up to and through the trials. 
Karen Howick became involved in the bombing case through her secretary, 
Rhonda Bratlebaugh, whose sister had been killed in the bombing.247 Howick told The 
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Dallas Morning News that she saw an opportunity to help the victims and the people of 
Oklahoma by leading the effort to make the proceedings as accessible as possible for 
victims who could not go to Denver to see the trials first-hand.248 Howick had been 
exploring options for broadcasting the trials in some fashion even before the change of 
venue hearings. By February 1996, she claimed to be representing thirteen bombing 
victims in an effort to have the trial broadcast. She also claimed to have a commitment 
from Court TV to arrange a secure feed to Oklahoma City, and she claimed to have 
talked to Oklahoma United States Senator Don Nickles about options for federal 
legislative assistance in securing a closed-circuit broadcast.249 Should Judge Matsch 
decide to move the trial, Howick argued the court should accommodate victims with a 
closed-circuit broadcast. 
The Case Moves to Denver 
In late February 1996, Judge Matsch made his decision on the change of venue 
motions. The judge looked at the evidence and decided there was indeed a substantial 
amount of prejudicial pretrial publicity. Citing the evidence more than precedent, the 
judge made the decision to move the trial to Denver. This decision would have an effect 
on several fair trial/free press aspects of the case including how the press would cover 
the future trials and victim requests for closed-circuit broadcasts of the trial. 
On February 20, 1996, Judge Matsch filed his decision on the change of venue 
issue. The opinion relied not so much on precedent as it did the specific evidence 
presented at the hearings and the judge’s experience and discretion. In his decision, 
Judge Matsch granted the defense request for a change of venue writing, “...this court 
finds that there is so great a prejudice against these two defendants in the State of 
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Oklahoma that they cannot obtain a fair and impartial trial at any place ... in that 
state.”250 Judge Matsch wrote that the press had “demonized” the defendants.251 The 
opinion devoted considerable attention to evidence and testimony offered at the hearing 
regarding press coverage of the case. Of the thirty-three paragraphs in the sixteen-page 
order, fourteen paragraphs were devoted to discussion of pretrial publicity generated by 
the press.252  
 Judge Matsch pointed out significant differences between Oklahoma media and 
out-of-state news organizations in their coverage of the bombing and its aftermath, as 
testified to by Scott Armstrong. First, the judge wrote that the number of bombing 
stories produced nationally peaked and then declined in the weeks after the event, but in 
Oklahoma, the number of bombing related stories remained comparatively high from 
April 1995 through the fall of 1995.253 He wrote that this was understandable because 
Oklahomans had a greater need for information about the crime and its impact. 
However, Judge Matsch determined that the Oklahoma press had focused a great deal of 
attention on the victims of the crime and the impact the bombing had on the people of 
Oklahoma.254 This, the judge wrote, produced a sense of kinship between the victims 
and other Oklahomans. Judge Matsch wrote, “Indeed, the ‘Oklahoma Family’ has been 
a common theme in the Oklahoma media coverage, with numerous reports of how the 
explosion shook the entire state, and how the state has pulled together in response.”255 
 Judge Matsch determined that the theme of Oklahoma press coverage contrasted 
greatly between the victims and the defendants. While stories about victims emphasized 
their innocence, the judge claimed stories about McVeigh and Nichols did the 
opposite.256 Judge Matsch referenced repeated stories in which video of militia training 
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exercises accompanied stories about the defendants, suggesting a link between 
McVeigh and Nichols and right-wing extremist groups.257 The judge also mentioned the 
video and photographs taken of McVeigh and Nichols being transported to the venue 
hearings as an example of possible prejudicial press coverage. The judge made 
particular note of the video of McVeigh leaving the courthouse in Perry, Oklahoma, 
writing that the video had been, “... used regularly in almost all of the television news 
reports of developments in this case.”258 
 Judge Matsch was dismissive of the opinion polls conducted by both the 
government and the defense teams. He wrote: 
The possible prejudicial impact of this type of publicity is not something 
measurable by any objective standards ... surveys are but crude measures of 
opinion at the time of the interviews. Human behavior is far less knowable and 
predictable than chemical reactions or other subjects of study by scientific 
methodology. There is no laboratory experiment that can come close to 
duplicating the trial of criminal charges. There are so many variables involved 
that no two trials can be compared regardless of apparent similarities. That is the 
very genius of the American jury trial.259 
Judge Matsch’s strongest criticism of the polling research was based on the fact 
that it did not take into account the complexities of a capital case.260 He was specifically 
addressing the two-phase process of capital trials and the tasks placed before jurors in 
each phase. In the first phase, jurors must decide if the evidence presented is sufficient 
to convict the defendant of the capital offense. Here, jurors make their decision based 
on rational and impartial consideration of the evidence and the law. If the accused is 
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found guilty, the trial moves to the second phase, which is the punishment phase. In the 
punishment phase, jurors must consider evidence of aggravating factors and mitigating 
factors to reach a moral judgment regarding whether or not the defendant should receive 
the death penalty. Judge Matsch determined that the polling research focused on 
questions of “fairness and impartiality” – questions perhaps sufficient for the task 
before jurors in the first phase, but insufficient for the task before jurors in the second 
phase.261 Because the death penalty was a possibility in the case, the judge wrote that 
the court had to consider “the predilection [in Oklahoma] toward that penalty.”262 The 
judge cited the press in assessing sentiments about punishment for anyone convicted of 
the bombing. Matsch wrote:  
Most interesting in this regard is the frequency of the opinions expressed in 
recent televised interviews of citizens of Oklahoma emphasizing the importance 
of assuring certainty in a verdict of guilty with an evident implication that upon 
such verdict death is the appropriate punishment.263 
 In regard to the victims, Judge Matsch wrote that he recognized the difficulties 
they would face with a trial held in Denver, Colorado. The judge claimed the 
government met the requirements of federal crime victims’ statues by providing victims 
with information about developments in the case though the Victim Assistant Unit of 
the Western District U.S. Attorney’s Office.264 In conclusion, Judge Matsch wrote, “The 
interests of the victims being able to attend this trial in Oklahoma are outweighed by the 
court’s obligation to assure that the trial be conducted with fundamental fairness and 
with due regard for all constitutional requirements.”265 
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 Judge Matsch had decided to grant the change of venue requests, and the press 
played a significant role in his decision. The judge found pretrial publicity in Oklahoma 
was prejudicial, so much so that the defendants’ rights to a fair trial had been damaged. 
Based on the evidence, he concluded that the pretrial publicity in Oklahoma was 
different than in other media markets. Oklahoma coverage focused more on the victims, 
their emotions, and the impact of the crime. Because of this, Judge Matsch claimed that 
the people of Oklahoma had become galvanized in their support for the victims and that 
the defendants had become “demonized” in the eyes of the public.266 
 Reflecting on the change of venue order, both Michael Tigar and Stephen Jones 
said it was the correct decision in their opinions. Both attorneys also said they thought 
the jail photo opportunity incident was a critical factor in that decision. In explaining 
the decision, Michael Tigar said testimony about the press given in court and the actions 
of the press outside court were both critical factors: 
Two main things it seems to me did it. One was the testimony of Scott 
Armstrong that Judge Matsch spent a lot of time discussing, which analyzed 
media coverage … and the second thing was when the local Oklahoma 
authorities [with the cooperation of U.S. Marshals] permitted Terry to be 
photographed in handcuffs and chains.267 
Stephen Jones agreed with Tigar’s assessment that the jail photo opportunity was a 
deciding factor: 
I’m not so sure that the judge was neutral or fifty-fifty on the change of venue 
and that alone [the jail photos] didn’t change his mind – that he just saw this as 
going to be a media circus. When you saw that, what you thought of was Jack 
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Ruby and Lee Harvey Oswald. That was the worst public relations blunder the 
government could have made.268 
Change of Venue Effects 
 The fair trial/free press issue of pretrial publicity had played a significant role in 
the change of venue decision, and in late February 1996, the Oklahoma City bombing 
case was headed to Denver. The move accelerated efforts to establish a closed-circuit 
broadcast of the future trials. The closed-circuit issue would dominate the headlines for 
the next month, and it would come to be another fair trial/free press issue in the case. 
The move to Denver also meant dozens of news organizations would soon send dozens 
of reporters to cover the proceedings. The expected press invasion of Denver raised 
more fair trial/free press issues that would impact management of the case. Meanwhile, 
the McVeigh Defense team was reaching out to the press again on the eve of the first 
anniversary of the bombing. McVeigh’s media access also would raise fair trial/free 
press issues as the case progressed.  
The day after Judge Matsch issued his change of venue order, federal lawmakers 
got involved in the closed-circuit broadcast debate.269 Oklahoma Senators Don Nickles 
and Jim Inhofe along with Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Orin Hatch sent a 
letter to Attorney General Janet Reno asking for her help in securing a closed-circuit 
broadcast. The Oklahoman published excerpts of the letter that read: 
We understand and respect the court’s decision in this matter, but recognize as 
well the hardship this change in venue will have on survivors and victims’ 
families. We have been in touch with many of those affected by this tragedy and 
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want to ensure that every option is pursued to afford each survivor and family 
member an opportunity to observe this trial.270  
Attorney General Reno addressed this issue at her next weekly news conference. Ms. 
Reno said the Justice Department was considering assisting the victims: 
We are exploring all possibilities because I think it is so very important … that 
victims and survivors of victims have the chance to watch the process in action 
… We’re looking at the law. We’re looking at the court rules. We’re looking at 
everything we can possibly do.271 
 Both defense teams and Judge Matsch said they did not want cameras in the 
courtroom even in the context of a closed-circuit broadcast.272 Stephen Jones said any 
attempt to broadcast the trial would result in a “media circus.”273 Prosecutors stopped 
short of publicly endorsing the idea of a closed-circuit broadcast.274 But privately, 
prosecutors asked Judge Matsch to remain open to the possibility.275 The judge made 
his feelings clear to attorneys in a private meeting shortly after the change of venue 
order. Press reports about the meeting claimed Judge Matsch told both prosecutors and 
defense attorneys that federal court rules banned cameras of any type from federal 
criminal courts, and he saw nothing in the near future to change that.276 The judge had 
earlier expressed the same opinion to reporters. The reporters caught up to Judge 
Matsch at Will Rogers World Airport in Oklahoma City while he was traveling for 
hearings in the case in late February 1996. When asked by reporters if he thought there 
would be any chance of getting cameras into his courtroom, he replied, “No, the rules 
do not allow cameras in the courtroom.”277 Karen Howick told The Oklahoman she was 
not surprised by the judge’s comments. Howick told the newspaper:  
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He’s going to shift the burden over to Congress to make it allowable, and I think 
then Congress will act very quickly … I think that gives us a clear indication of 
what he wants us to do – which is change the law and he’ll do it … I think 
Congress will make a special exception.278 
 In early March 1996, Congress did take action. It was the beginning of 
legislative actions that would result in the Oklahoma City bombing trials becoming the 
first federal criminal trials with any type of live camera presence. In March 1996, 
Oklahoma Representative Frank Lucas approached Illinois Representative Henry Hyde 
about adding closed-circuit provision to Hyde’s Effective Death Penalty and Public 
Safety Act of 1996 – what would become the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act of 1996. Lucas did not approach Hyde alone. The Oklahoman reported 
Representatives Hyde and Lucas held a news conference in early March about plans for 
the legislation, and they were joined by nearly twenty bombing survivors and victims.279 
On March 13, 1996, Mr. Hyde introduced the first draft of closed-circuit legislation 
known as Section 808 Closed Circuit Televised Court Proceedings for Victims of Crime 
as part of his Effective Death Penalty and Public Safety bill.280 The Congressional 
Record entry for introduction of the measure read: 
(a) In General.--Notwithstanding any provision of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure to the contrary, in order to permit victims of crime to watch criminal 
trial proceedings in cases where the venue of the trial is changed – (1) out of the 
state in which the case was initially brought; and (2) more than 350 miles from 
the location in which those proceedings originally would have taken place; the 
courts involved shall, if donations under subsection (b) will defray the entire 
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cost of doing so, order closed circuit televising of the proceedings to that 
location, for viewing by such persons the courts determine have a compelling 
interest in doing so and are otherwise unable to do so by reason of the 
inconvenience and expense caused by the change of venue. 
(b) No Rebroadcast. – No rebroadcast of the proceedings shall be made.  
(c) Limited Access. – 
(1) Generally. – No other person, other than official court and security 
personnel, or other persons specifically designated by the courts, shall be 
permitted to view the closed televising of the proceedings. 
(2) Exception. – The courts shall not designate a person under paragraph (1) if 
the presiding judge at the trial determines that testimony by that person would 
be materially affected if that person heard other testimony at the trial. 
(d) Donations. – The Administrative Office of the United States Courts may 
accept donations to enable the courts to carry out subsection (a). No 
appropriated money shall be used to carry out such subsection. 
(e) Definition. – As used in this section, the term ``State'' includes the District of 
Columbia and any other possession or territory of the United States.281 
Oklahoma Representative Ernest Istook spoke on the house floor immediately after the 
reading of the closed-circuit language. Mr. Istook praised the measure, and he made 
specific mention that the legislation was designed for victims – not for the press. Mr. 
Istook said: 
The language has safeguards. The proceedings are not to be rebroadcast 
elsewhere. They are not available for Court TV or CNN or anyone else … 
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because we want to minimize the disruptive effect that some might fear would 
otherwise occur.282 
 As support for the house bill was growing on Capitol Hill, support from the 
Justice Department was waning. The day before the reading of the house measure, the 
Justice Department announced it would not go any further in researching or supporting 
a closed-circuit viewing option for the bombing trial.283 Prosecutors were concerned 
that if they became involved in advocating for closed-circuit broadcasts, while at the 
same time being responsible for prosecuting the case, it could be grounds for 
overturning a conviction on appeal.284 Meanwhile, Judge Matsch and the Judicial 
Conference of the United States both made statements suggesting they might at least 
consider the closed-circuit possibility should Congress move forward with the measure. 
Judge Matsch said he would consider a closed-circuit request provided it came in the 
form of a motion from either prosecutors or defense attorneys.285 Also in the same 
week, the Judicial Conference of the United States – the rule-making body of the 
federal courts – sent word to Congress that it should allow federal funds to be used to 
pay for any type of proposed closed-circuit trial broadcast. The Judicial Conference did 
not endorse the legislation, but the justices said it might be appropriate for the 
Oklahoma City bombing trial. The Judicial Conference justices said that if the 
legislation were limited in scope and provided discretion for judges, they did not fear it 
would set a precedent that conflicted with the Rule 53 broadcasting ban. However, the 
Judicial Conference stopped short of endorsing the legislation.286  
The House measure passed on March 14, 1996 and went to a conference 
committee to be reconciled with legislation from the Senate, which also addressed 
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terrorism and federal death penalty statutes.287 The measure returned to the House as 
Senate Bill 735, Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. The closed-
circuit provisions of the bill, Section 235, read: 
 (a) In General --Notwithstanding any provision of the Federal Rules  
of Criminal Procedure to the contrary, in order to permit victims of  
crime to watch criminal trial proceedings in cases where the venue of  
the trial is changed-- 
            (1) out of the State in which the case was initially  
        brought; and 
            (2) more than 350 miles from the location in which those  
proceedings originally would have taken place; the trial court shall order 
closed circuit televising of the proceedings to that location, for viewing by 
such persons the court determines have a compelling interest in doing so 
and are otherwise unable to do so by reason of the inconvenience and  
expense caused by the change of venue. 
(b) Limited Access.-- 
            (1) Generally.--No other person, other than official court  
        and security personnel, or other persons specifically designated  
        by the court, shall be permitted to view the closed circuit  
        televising of the proceedings. 
            (2) Exception.--The court shall not designate a person under  
        paragraph (1) if the presiding judge at the trial determines  
        that testimony by that person would be materially affected if  
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        that person heard other testimony at the trial. 
(c) Restrictions.-- 
            (1) The signal transmitted pursuant to subsection (a) shall  
        be under the control of the court at all times and shall only be  
        transmitted subject to the terms and conditions imposed by the  
        court. 
            (2) No public broadcast or dissemination shall be made of  
        the signal transmitted pursuant to subsection (a). In the event  
        any tapes are produced in carrying out subsection (a), such  
        tapes shall be the property of the court and kept under seal. 
            (3) Any violations of this subsection, or any rule or order  
        made pursuant to this section, shall be punishable as contempt  
        of court as described in section 402 of title 18, United States  
        Code. 
(d) Donations.--The Administrative Office of the United States  
Courts may accept donations to enable the courts to carry out subsection  
(e) Construction.-- 
            (1) Nothing in this section shall be construed-- 
                    (i) to create in favor of any person a cause of  
                action against the United States or any officer or  
                employees thereof, or 
                    (ii) to provide any person with a defense in any  
                action in which application of this section is made. 
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(f) Definition.--As used in this section, the term ``State'' means  
any State, the District of Columbia, or any possession or territory of  
the United States. 
(g) Rules.--The Judicial Conference of the United States, pursuant  
to its rule making authority under section 331 of title 28, United  
States Code, may promulgate and issue rules, or amend 
existing rules, to effectuate the policy addressed by this  
section. Upon the implementation of such  
rules, this section shall cease to be effective. 
(h) Effective Date.--This section shall only apply to cases filed  
after January 1, 1995.288 
The bill came to a vote before the House on April 18, 1996 – the eve of the first 
anniversary of the Oklahoma City bombing. Prior to the vote, Representative Lucas 
spoke on the floor and said:  
[T]he measure provides for closed-circuit broadcasting of court proceedings in 
cases where a trial has been moved out of state more than 350 miles from the 
location in which the proceedings would have taken place. This provision is 
timely in light of the upcoming bombing trial. I believe all Americans who must 
endure such a tragedy, like the people of Oklahoma, deserve the opportunity to 
view the trial in their state. This measure provides the best way to ensure that 
those impacted by this tragedy will have access to the court proceedings of those 
accused in this case.289 
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 The Antiterrorism Act passed in the house on April 19, 1996 – the first 
anniversary of the Oklahoma City bombing.290 President Bill Clinton signed the act on 
April 24, 1996.291 Several bombing victims attended the White House signing ceremony 
where the President Clinton said, “This bill recognizes that victims have a compelling 
interest in the trials of those accused of committing crimes against them and requires 
closed-circuit television coverage when federal trials are moved far away.”292 The 
victims had the law they wanted, but, despite some favorable signs from Judge Matsch 
and the Judicial Conference, there was no guarantee the court would consent to the 
closed-circuit provisions in the law. 
 While Congress was drafting and debating the legislation that would bring 
cameras into the bombing case, McVeigh was making on-camera appearances of his 
own. Stephen Jones began arranging meetings between McVeigh and journalists with 
the Newsweek story in June 1995, and as the first anniversary of the bombing 
approached, Jones stepped up his efforts. 
 McVeigh talked to reporters from the magazine Media Bypass in February 1996, 
and he talked to reporters from Time and the Times of London for articles that were 
published near the first anniversary of the bombing in April 1996.293 Jones also 
arranged for NBC’s Tom Brokaw and CBS’s Scott Pelley to videotape meetings with 
McVeigh that were broadcast on the respective networks’ nightly news programs on 
April 18, 1996.294 The networks agreed not to show McVeigh in handcuffs and not to 
ask him questions about the facts of the case in exchange for the opportunity to obtain a 
short clip with both audio and video of McVeigh.295 Scott Pelley told the Denver Post 
that the highly-structured meeting with McVeigh was “…one of the most frustrating 
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experiences of my life, sitting across from McVeigh, both of us with microphones on, 
the camera rolling and not being allowed to ask questions.”296 A spokeswoman for NBC 
Nightly News told the Post that Tom Brokaw’s conversation with McVeigh was limited 
to questions about how he was being treated in prison and his health, but Brokaw was 
not allowed to ask any questions about the bombing case.297  
 Jones arranged other meetings between McVeigh and reporters in early 1996 
that did not result in print articles or broadcast reports. Jones wrote that these meetings 
were arranged after the press organizations agreed to the stipulations that the meetings 
were: 
... off-the-record, not for publication, not for attribution, that Mr. McVeigh could 
not discuss the facts of the case or his strategy, and that Mr. McVeigh would 
neither be tape recorded nor filmed, and no reference could even be made 
publicly to the fact that the reporter had met with Mr. McVeigh.298 
Jones wrote that reporters and press organizations that had met with McVeigh under 
these stipulations included: 
The Associated Press, The Dallas Morning News, Channel 4, 5, and 9 in 
Oklahoma City, Jack Bowen for Fox Television [Oklahoma City affiliate], 
Barbara Walters, Diane Sawyer, Harry Smith of CBS Morning News, Dick 
Reavis, a well-known author, the Washington Post, the Los Angeles Times and 
the Wall Street Journal.299 
Reflecting on these meetings, Jones described them as mutually beneficial for the press 
and the defense. Jones explained the meetings were opportunities for the McVeigh team 
to explore future options for getting their message before the public: 
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There was a lot of interest in the press – reporters, newspaper, magazines, 
certainly television, [and] some radio – in interviewing Mr. McVeigh. From our 
standpoint, there was an interest in encouraging that, assuming that we had the 
right ground rules and assuming we had the cooperation of Mr. McVeigh. So, as 
kind of a test run, we let members of the media, which the court knew about, 
come in and interview Mr. McVeigh with the understanding that it was all off-
record – they couldn’t use any of it.300 
In a New York Times article about Jones’s dealings with McVeigh and the press 
during this period, Jones described the off-the-record meetings as “get acquainted” 
meetings for the reporters, while an unnamed print reporter called the hour long 
meetings “auditions.”301 Those assessments foreshadowed a detailed media access plan 
for McVeigh that would become a fair trial/free press issue before the court later in the 
year – a media access plan for Timothy McVeigh. 
 The press corps was engaged in planning of its own in early 1996 that would 
impact the court’s management of the bombing case. Dozens of reporters were expected 
to descend on Denver when the first court proceedings began in April 1996.302 Denver 
city officials expected that number to grow to hundreds once the case entered the trial 
stage.303 Both the court and Denver city officials made it explicitly clear they did not 
want Denver to be plagued with the traffic and pedestrian congestion caused in 
downtown Los Angeles by reporters and newsgathering equipment outside the 
courthouse at the O.J. Simpson trial.304 The solution was a media consortium designed 
to accommodate the needs of the press while working in concert with the City of 
Denver and the court.305 The formation of the consortium was a direct result of Judge 
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Matsch’s decision to move the trial to Denver, and it was evidence of how the change of 
venue order affected the court’s management of the case. 
The consortium, known as the Oklahoma City Bombing Trial Media 
Consortium, was an umbrella organization covering two other press groups – one for 
print media and the other for broadcast media.306 The print group took the title 
Colorado-Oklahoma Print Media Group.307 Associated Press Denver Bureau Chief Joe 
McGowan served as chairman for the print group.308 In court documents, the print 
group claimed to represent the “The Associated Press and daily and weekly newspapers 
that have requested credentials to cover the trial.”309 The broadcast group took the title 
Colorado-Oklahoma Trial Group.310 NBC Bureau Chief Roger O’Neil served as 
chairman of the broadcast group.311 In court documents, the broadcast group claimed to 
represent “national television networks, television stations in the Oklahoma City and 
Denver markets, national radio networks, [and] radio stations in the Denver and 
Oklahoma City markets.”312  
The two groups came together to form the consortium as a means of 
coordinating all press logistics for trial coverage. Consortium members hired network 
television producer Wayne Wicks to serve as their coordinator. Wicks had previous 
experience as a broadcast producer and logician for large-scale media events such as the 
1993 Papal visit to Denver and the 1996 Summer Olympics in Atlanta, Georgia.313 
Wicks became the link between the press, the court, and the City of Denver. 
Collectively these entities worked together to make downtown Denver capable of 
accommodating large numbers of reporters without interrupting the operations of the 
court or business in the city’s center.314 
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 Everyone associated with the trial knew it would be a large-scale media event, 
bringing potentially hundreds of journalists to converge on the courthouse in Denver. In 
an attempt to establish and maintain order outside the courthouse, the court and the 
consortium developed systems and rules for the press corps. The consortium obtained 
the court’s permission to construct a press-only area on the courthouse plaza. The 
fenced-off area became known as the “bullpen.”315 The bullpen area was ready for the 
first proceedings in Denver in April 1996. The area had risers for broadcast reporters to 
stand on while performing their live broadcasts. It also had a podium with a multiple-
line audio distribution box so attorneys and other trial participants who wished to talk to 
the press could do so without being swarmed by reporters.316 Rules established for 
consortium members warned reporters that following trial participants outside the 
bullpen could result in the loss of credentials.317 Still, several scenes from Luft’s 
documentary about press coverage of the trial show multiple instances of reporters and 
camera crews swarming around attorneys on sidewalks outside the bullpen.318 Stephen 
Jones recalled regularly being surrounded by crowds of reporters.319 Michael Tigar 
remembered similar situations outside the courthouse.320 Even so, city officials would 
later call the bullpen a success in maintaining order around the courthouse.321 Overall, 
Jones and Tigar also considered the efforts to maintain order in the press corps 
successful. “In and around the courthouse and the perimeter, security for us, I have no 
complaints. My impression was that all of that was handled very professionally,” Jones 
said.322 Michael Tigar said, “By and large, from our perspective, it worked. And I 
thought the media thought it was a fair way to do things too.”323 
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 The consortium helped coordinate a variety of other logistical matters including 
credentialing reporters, establishing parking areas for broadcast satellite trucks, and 
establishing a pressroom in an office building across the street from the courthouse.324 
Besides logistics, the consortium also coordinated legal actions on behalf of consortium 
members.325 Denver attorney Thomas Kelley represented the respective trial groups and 
individual consortium members in most of the press motions brought before the court 
during the case.326 
 The consortium was a unique fair trial/free press aspect of the bombing case, 
and it was an example of how the move to Denver affected the court’s management of 
the case. Press coverage of the consortium indicated that such detailed coordinated 
efforts to cover a trial had not been attempted prior to the Oklahoma City bombing 
case.327 The court, the city, and the press all recognized the potential for conflict and 
chaos with a large number of journalists coming to cover the trial. Instead of meeting in 
the fair trial/free press arena as adversaries, the parties met as allies. Together they 
established policies, procedures, and lines of communication that would allow the press 
to report on the case, allow the court to manage the case, and allow the city to maintain 
order in downtown. The system worked well enough that city officials in Sacramento, 
California, would contact Denver city leaders for advice prior to the 1998 trial of 
bombing suspect Theodore Kaczynski, known as the “Unabomber.”328 
Pretrial Issues in Denver 
 Once the case was established in Denver, there were still multiple fair trial/free 
press issues to be resolved. These issues included press access to audiotapes and audio 
feeds, attorney statements to the press, McVeigh’s access to the press, and the issue of 
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closed-circuit coverage of the trials. In many of the cases, such as the audio issues and 
the issue of attorney statements, the court had precedent to guide its decisions. 
However, the push for closed-circuit coverage was unprecedented. In making a decision 
on this issue, the court would have to chart its own legal path. How the court resolved 
these issues would affect several aspects of case management. It would affect how 
attorneys conducted themselves with the press. It would affect McVeigh’s future access 
to the press. It would also affect how much access the press had to courtroom audio and 
whether or not closed-circuit broadcasts would relay courtroom proceedings back to 
Oklahoma City. 
 The first Oklahoma City bombing case event held in Denver occurred on 
Wednesday, April 3, 1996, and it addressed fair trial/free press issues. It was a meeting 
between Judge Matsch and 150 reporters during which the judge explained how he 
would accommodate press interests during proceedings.329 
 Judge Matsch said he would reserve thirty-seven seats in the courtroom for 
reporters from specific press organizations and five seats for sketch artists. The 
remainder of the seats would go to the public.330 To accommodate reporters who would 
not get courtroom seats, Judge Matsch said he would establish a listening room in a 
nearby courtroom with a live audio feed.331 Court Clerk James Manspeaker said the 
main courtroom could seat 130 people and the listening courtroom could seat an 
additional 130 people, bringing the total number of the gallery to 260.332 
 Judge Matsch also announced that he would allow the press to purchase 
audiotapes of each day’s proceedings through the court clerk’s office following each 
day in court.333 The practice of taping court proceedings and making those tapes 
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publicly available for a fee was a practice Judge Matsch had used in his court for a 
decade before the bombing trial.334 The recording of federal court proceedings and the 
public sale of those recordings were allowed under rules adopted by the Judicial 
Conference of the United States in 1984.335  
Judge Matsch’s policy was to release audiotape copies of the day’s testimony 
after each day’s court session ended. Each ninety-minute tape could be copied through 
the court clerk’s office for a fee of fifteen dollars.336 The first tapes of the bombing case 
were offered for sale following the first court appearance of McVeigh and Nichols in 
the Denver court on April 9, 1996. The press’s use of the tapes almost immediately 
ignited a fair trial/free press controversy.337 
  At the April 9, 1996, proceedings, court staff made copies of courtroom 
recordings and sold them to press organizations in accordance with the court’s policy. 
The controversy arose from the fact that some broadcast press organizations used 
portions of the actual recordings in news reports broadcast the next day, April 10, 
1996.338 This was apparently something the court had not anticipated but something that 
drew a strong reaction from the Nichols defense team. The Nichols team responded two 
weeks later with a motion to stop the sale of courtroom recordings.339 
 Between Friday, April 26, and Wednesday, May 1, 1996, fair trial/free press 
issues would occupy all of the court’s attention. Terry Nichols’s attorneys would ask the 
court to stop the sale of audiotapes and to reject a press request to extend the live audio 
feed outside the courthouse.340 The Nichols team and the government would both ask 
Judge Matsch to impose a gag order in an effort to quell information leaks to the press. 
Also, the government would approach the court with the long-anticipated request to 
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provide closed-circuit broadcasts of the trial in compliance with the Antiterrorism 
Act.341 The case had just begun in Judge Matsch’s own courthouse, and just like his first 
hearings in Oklahoma City, the focus would be on fair trial/free press issues. 
On April 26, Terry Nichols’s attorneys filed a motion with the court detailing 
their complaints about the broadcast of the audiotapes and asking the court to stop 
distribution of the tapes. The motion to stop the sale of audiotapes included an affidavit 
from Reid Neureiter, one of Nichols’s attorneys. Neureiter wrote that he flew back to 
Washington, D.C. on April 9, 1996, following the first hearings in Denver. The next day 
he claimed he heard several news reports on the radio and saw reports on television that 
included audio excerpts of “the actual spoken words of counsel as delivered in the 
Court.”342 According to Neureiter, three of these reports included the voice of 
prosecutor Beth Wilkinson saying, “[The government] has no information showing 
anyone but Mr. Nichols and Mr. McVeigh were the masterminds of this bombing.”343 
Nichols’s attorneys called the broadcasting of Wilkinson’s statement 
“prejudicial and inflammatory.”344 The motion acknowledged that federal rules did 
allow for the recording of courtroom proceedings and the sale of the tapes, but the 
motion pointed out that other federal courts in Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, 
California, Maryland, Missouri, and Ohio had included provisions in their local court 
rules that barred broadcasting of the tapes. Nichols’s attorneys claimed that without 
such rules in place for the District of Colorado, it was likely more broadcasting of the 
tapes would occur. The motion read: 
Unlike the standard case, it is a certainty that the press, given the opportunity, 
will edit and broadcast select portions of the proceedings. The notoriety of the 
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allegations ensures that particularly inflammatory statements will be played over 
and over again. The practice of distributing tapes, while perhaps appropriate for 
a standard civil case, which is of interest only to the parties involved, should not 
be continued in this case.345 
The Nichols team claimed broadcasts of the tapes violated Rule 53, the federal 
prohibition of broadcasting federal criminal court proceedings. The motion also claimed 
tapes could have detrimental effects inside and outside the courtroom.346 Nichols’s 
attorneys alleged that if attorneys and witnesses knew their words would be broadcast to 
a national audience, it could affect their courtroom conduct. Specifically, the motion 
referenced the O.J. Simpson trial that had concluded just six-months earlier in which, 
“Lawyers and witnesses, and perhaps the judge and jury, played to the microphones and 
the nationwide audience rather than conducting the task at hand.”347 Nichols’s attorneys 
looked to precedent and wrote that concerns about trials becoming theater due to the 
broadcasting of proceedings were a major component in the Estes v. Texas Supreme 
Court decision. In that case, the Supreme Court overturned a conviction, saying the 
presence of broadcasting equipment in the courtroom disrupted the trial process, 
denying the defendant his right to a fair trial and his right to due process.348 
Nichols’s attorneys argued that broadcasting recordings of courtroom 
proceedings could also threaten the process of selecting an impartial jury. The attorneys 
wrote, “The court must assume that repetitive broadcasts of inflammatory statements 
made by counsel, frequently taken out of context, and edited for maximum tabloid 
television impact, will be heard time and time again by members of the prospective jury 
pool.”349 Again turning to precedent, the motion acknowledged that the Supreme 
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Court’s Chandler v. Florida decision determined that broadcasting trials was not 
unconstitutional, but the Court also said judges should exercise caution so that 
broadcasting did not taint the process, especially in high-profile cases.350 
Finally, Nichols’s attorneys claimed that the press could not show a legitimate 
need for access to the tapes. Members of the press had access to both the main 
courtroom and the auxiliary listening courtroom, plus they had access to written 
transcripts that the court clerk made available to them on a daily basis.351 The motion 
claimed that the press had multiple means of observing courtroom proceedings and 
checking notes against the court record. Without showing a need met only through 
access to the audiotapes, Nichols’s attorneys argued that the press should not be allowed 
to purchase the tapes any longer.352 
The McVeigh team did not object to the sale of audiotapes initially, but when 
the issue came before the court for a hearing on May 1, 1996, they joined the Nichols 
team in seeking to have the sale of the tapes stopped.353 Like Nichols’s attorneys, 
McVeigh’s attorneys claimed the sale of the tapes violated Rule 53, since it was the 
functional equivalent of broadcasting courtroom proceedings. McVeigh’s attorneys also 
expressed concerns that broadcasts of the tapes could infringe on McVeigh’s right to a 
fair trial.354 In retrospect, Stephen Jones said that he believed the court did not anticipate 
that the press would use actual audio from the tapes in broadcasts. “Judge Matsch is a 
very private individual, and I don’t think that he saw the ramifications of what he was 
doing. Once he did, it very quickly came to his attention and then he acted to stop it,” 
Jones said.355 
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The government also objected to the sale of the audiotapes.356 Like the defense 
teams, prosecutors claimed selling the tapes was the equivalent of broadcasting, and that 
was a violation of Rule 53. Prosecutors said they feared the tapes could influence 
witnesses who might alter their testimony, knowing that their statements would be 
broadcast. Prosecutors also said the broadcast of witness testimony could taint the 
testimony of other witnesses who heard broadcasts before they had an opportunity to 
testify themselves.357 
Press attorneys entered the fray next with a brief asking the court to continue the 
sale of audiotapes. Consortium attorney Thomas Kelley claimed the defendants had not 
produced any evidence showing the sale of audiotapes had implicated their rights to a 
fair trial.358 In his motion, Kelley attempted to draw a parallel between broadcast and 
print media in arguing for continued sale of the tapes. The Oklahoman quoted from 
Kelley’s motion: 
Defendants’ conjectural concerns about “soundbyte” reporting cannot, at this 
stage, stand in the way of the First Amendment right of the press, and public to 
access information … there has been no showing that the media’s selection of 
“soundbytes” will affect the venue any different than its selection of 
“wordbytes.”359 
The press had perhaps anticipated the Nichols team’s motion and sought a 
preemptive measure. On April 17, 1996, press attorneys petitioned the court to extend 
the live audio feed to a pressroom established by the consortium across the street from 
the courthouse.360 Press attorneys wrote that a feed to the pressroom would save the 
court clerk’s office additional work created by having to make multiple copies of tapes 
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on a daily basis. The motion included an offer to make all journalists working in the 
pressroom agree that neither the live feed nor any recordings made from it would be 
broadcast.361 To give further control to the court, the motion suggested that the court 
construct the audio system so that Judge Matsch could turn the feed on and off, thereby 
giving the court the ability to stop the feed if the judge felt the need to do so during 
proceedings. With access to the feed in the pressroom, the press attorneys claimed there 
would be fewer reporters going through security, fewer reporters going in and out of the 
courtrooms, and fewer reporters taking up seats in the auxiliary courtroom. The motion 
claimed that courtroom audio gave a more accurate reflection of what actually happened 
in the courtroom compared to the written transcript by allowing reporters to hear the 
emotion and tone in the voices of trial participants. In this respect, the press attorneys 
argued the live audio feed would help the press fulfill its role of providing accurate 
reports to the public. Press attorneys asked the court to establish the feed to the 
pressroom or to continue the process of offering audiotapes for sale.362 
Terry Nichols’s attorneys objected to the suggestion of sending a live audio feed 
to the pressroom. Nichols’s attorneys claimed the live feed, like the audiotapes, would 
be the same as broadcasting the proceedings, and it too would be a violation of Rule 53. 
Furthermore, the Nichols team claimed that asking Judge Matsch to be responsible for 
turning the feed on and off would place an undue burden on the court, and it would be 
an unnecessary distraction in the courtroom.363 Neither the McVeigh team nor the 
government objected to the pressroom feed, with the provision that the press would 
agree not to broadcast the feed or any tapes made from the feed.364 
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The first court actions in Denver had unexpectedly produced a fair trial/free 
press controversy. The court had apparently not anticipated that some members of the 
press would use the sale of audiotapes as an opportunity to broadcast those tapes. When 
that happened, the defendants and the government viewed the action as a violation of 
Rule 53’s prohibition of broadcasting federal criminal trials. On top of that, the press 
was asking to extend the audio feed outside the courthouse. Judge Matsch faced a fair 
trial/free press decision about what to do with audiotapes and audio feeds, and his 
decision would have an impact on the future management of the trial. 
While the court was considering the future of audiotapes and audio feeds, 
another fair trial/free press issue with a long history finally came to a head – 
information leaks and attorney statements to the press. The controversy would lead to 
calls for a gag order in the case. Judge Matsch held in camera (private) meetings with 
prosecutors and defense attorneys about the problem of information leaks on April 30 
and May 1, 1996.365 
 From the beginning of the case, all parties had concerns about information leaks. 
It was a particular concern of the defense teams.366 They feared news stories generated 
by the leaked information would result in prejudicial pretrial publicity.367 On multiple 
occasions, attorneys complained about reading or hearing press reports that included 
sensitive information, usually attributing that information to unnamed sources.368 
Defense attorneys complained that news reports based on leaks placed them in a 
tenuous position. They had to choose between responding to the reports or staying 
silent.369 Responding to the reports meant they might violate local court rules and 
professional ethics rules and risk running afoul of the court. However, not responding to 
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the reports meant the objectionable information would circulate publicly without 
challenge.370  
The defense teams generally took different approaches. Stephen Jones often 
talked to reporters and defended McVeigh’s interests in stories based on leaks.371 
Michael Tigar, however, most often gave no interviews regarding stories based on 
leaks.372 Talking to the press was one of the first issues Judge Matsch addressed when 
he met with attorneys privately soon after taking over the case. The judge had 
admonished all parties to be extremely careful about their public statements.373 
 Even with the judge’s admonition, both the prosecution and the defense accused 
each other of leaking discovery information to the press.374 Discovery is a pretrial 
process in which the prosecution and the defense exchange information regarding 
evidence and witnesses they plan to use at the trial. Discovery is intended to allow 
prosecutors and defense attorneys the opportunity to prepare their respective case, and 
the process is a preventative measure to keep either side from being surprised by a piece 
of evidence or a witness once the trial begins.375 There is no requirement to file pretrial 
discovery documents with court, and they are thus not public records.376 
In August 1995, Judge Wayne Alley issued a protective order specifying that 
prosecutors and defense attorneys were not to release any discovery documents to 
anyone other than attorneys working the case and agents working for those attorneys.377 
The order only allowed for limited disclosure of discovery documents at hearings, or in 
motions to the court, and in the event attorneys needed to disclose information to 
witnesses while interviewing them.378 Discovery documents associated with motions 
were also allowed to be sealed under Judge Matsch’s procedures for sealed documents 
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established in January 1996.379 Despite these orders, the parties continued to accuse 
each other of leaking information. The situation reached a critical point in April 1996 
when Michael Tigar asked Judge Matsch to step in and investigate the problem.380 
 Tigar told the court that on the eve of the first anniversary of the bombing, he 
received a phone call from a network television producer asking for information about 
evidence involving Terry Nichols’s alleged use of a long distance calling card.381 Tigar 
said the producer claimed the information about the evidence had come from the 
government. Tigar also said his staff had learned that The Dallas Morning News and 
New York Times also had the phone record evidence along with F.B.I. reports that 
should not have been released to reporters or the public.382 The Nichols team claimed 
leaks had been a persistent problem, but press reports based on leaked information had 
increased significantly during the week preceding the first anniversary of the bombing 
in April 1996.383 On April 26, 1996, Tigar asked the judge to conduct an investigation 
of the leaks and to impose a gag order as a preventative measure.384 
 On April 30, 1996, the government made its own plea for a gag order, and the 
government also accused McVeigh’s lead counsel, Stephen Jones, of courting media 
attention and leaking information to the press.385 Lead prosecutor Joseph Hartzler told 
the court that Jones’s appearances in the press posed a threat to a fair trial. “The blitz of 
interviews that Mr. Jones has conducted with national and local news programs, 
national weekly magazines and national and local newspapers has helped create 
publicity,” Hartzler said.386 Hartzler also said he had talked to an Oklahoma City 
reporter, who claimed to have received discovery materials that did not come from the 
government. Though Hartzler did not say where the Oklahoma City reporter got the 
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information, the implication was that it came from one of the defense teams.387 
Addressing the issue in general terms, Hartzler told the court, “After discovery 
materials are produced to the defense, selected portions of the materials become the 
subject of broadcast or print news stories,” implying again that the defense might be to 
blame for the leaks.388 Hartzler, however, agreed with Tigar that Judge Matsch should 
investigate the source of the leaks.389 
 The McVeigh team was equally frustrated by press reports based on leaks. 
Stephen Jones had characterized the government as a “Niagara Falls” of leaks since he 
first took over as McVeigh’s chief counsel in May 1995.390 Still, Jones expressed little 
confidence that a court investigation would solve the problem. Jones told the court, “[A] 
witch hunt for the source of the leaks in this case would be fruitless and would divert all 
parties from their principal responsibility – preparing for the trial.”391 Unlike the other 
parties, Jones objected to the April 1996 requests for a gag order. Jones said such an 
order would be difficult to enforce, especially against the government. He pointed out 
that the government’s investigation and prosecution of the case placed a vast number of 
people in positions to have access to information. This meant leaked information could 
come from any number of human sources, and tracking down which ones might have 
leaked that information would be impractical. In comparison, the defense teams were 
small, and information passed through fewer hands. Jones’s point was that a gag order 
would be a tool most likely to muzzle the defense, less so than the prosecution.392 Jones 
defended his appearances in the press, saying it was his duty to defend McVeigh against 
the prevailing public perception that McVeigh was guilty.393 As for Hartzler’s 
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suggestion that the defense was leaking information, Jones said it was illogical to 
suggest the defense teams would leak information that would hurt their clients.394 
 Judge Matsch faced two decisions related to information leaks and their fair 
trial/free press implications. He would have to decide whether to conduct an 
investigation to find the source of the leaks. He would also have to decide whether a 
gag order was the best means of dealing with leaks for the remainder of the case. An 
investigation of leaks would take time and resources away from court and potentially 
delay bringing the case to trial. Imposing a gag order could lead to objections from the 
press and the McVeigh team, further frustrating the court’s progress. 
 Amidst the swirl of fair trial/free press issues surrounding the court in late April 
and early May 1996 – audiotapes, audio feeds, leaks, and gag order requests – the 
government approached the court on May 1, 1996 with its request for closed-circuit 
broadcasts of the trial.395 In the motion, prosecutors asked the court to allow a closed-
circuit broadcast for victims, and they also offered suggestions for how to implement 
such a broadcast. The government claimed that allowing the broadcast would conform 
to the new antiterrorism law without setting a dangerous precedent to existing court 
rules barring cameras. Also, the government argued the broadcasts could be done 
without violating the defendants’ Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial.396 
 In the motion, prosecutors first dealt with Rule 53, the federal court prohibition 
of cameras and broadcasting from federal courtrooms. Prosecutors claimed Section 235 
of the Antiterrorism Act was designed to override Rule 53 in special cases, and the 
Oklahoma City bombing trial was a special case. The motion pointed out that the 
Denver court’s own local rules allowed court employees to use recording devices and 
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cameras in the courthouse when acting in their official duties. The motion drew a 
parallel between the local rule and Section 235, suggesting closed-circuit broadcasting 
was an “official duty” of the court.397 
 The government next argued that the intent of the law was to accommodate 
victims who had been inconvenienced by the change of venue. Here the government 
pointed out that the court had discretion in determining who could get in to view the 
closed-circuit broadcast wherever it might be held. Prosecutors suggested a process 
through which victims could apply for admission to the viewing site through the Victim 
Assistance Unit of the Western District of Oklahoma. At that time, the Victim 
Assistance Unit was already in regular contact with more than 1,000 people who had 
registered with the office as victims of the bombing.398 By limiting the audience to 
bombing victims, prosecutors argued that one of the primary criticisms of cameras in 
the courts would be eliminated – the criticism that cameras encouraged attorneys and 
trial participants to play to an audience. Prosecutors wrote: 
The closed circuit broadcast will not vastly expand the trial audience; it will 
simply extend the courtroom to people who would have observed the trial in 
person had the venue not been changed. The incentives for the participants in the 
trial should not appreciably change as a result of such an extension.399 
 In implementing the closed-circuit provisions of Section 235, prosecutors argued 
that the court should have total control over the purchase of equipment, establishing a 
secure audio/video feed, and establishing the rules of viewing. Prosecutors suggested 
that the court should pay for all equipment and services associated with the closed-
circuit broadcast. This, they argued, would prevent any outside supplier of equipment or 
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services from claiming a right of access to the broadcast. Prosecutors extended an offer 
from the Department of Justice to cover any costs that the court could not cover. 
Prosecutors claimed a one-way digital transmission line would cost approximately 
$1,500 per month, and cameras and television monitors for transmission and viewing 
would cost approximately $175,000. The motion also suggested establishing rules of 
conduct inside the viewing room that would be the same as rules of conduct for the 
courtroom, including supervision provided by U.S. Marshals and other court appointed 
personnel. To ensure there would be no chance of a rebroadcast of the feed, prosecutors 
suggested the court prohibit any recording of the feed – only live, direct transmission to 
the viewing site.400 
 Finally, prosecutors addressed the issue of the defendants’ rights to a fair trial. 
Prosecutors claimed Section 235 did not adversely affect the defendants’ Sixth 
Amendment rights. The motion claimed the court would have total control over what 
cameras could show in the courtroom and remote viewers would not have any greater 
view of courtroom proceedings than those actually present in the Denver courtroom. 
Prosecutors wrote that the court could also extend the rule of witness sequestration to 
the viewing site, meaning witnesses could not attend the viewing if they were to be 
called to testify in the case. In conclusion, the motion read, “As long as the Court 
implements this statute in the very limited manner contemplated by Congress, the 
interests of the victims will be substantially furthered while the rights of the defendants 
remain unaffected.”401 In crafting the closed-circuit motion, the government had no 
direct precedent to look to as a guide since such a motion was unprecedented. With 
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respect to the interests of the victims, the government addressed those interests using 
the framework of existing victims’ rights statutes.402  
The next day, May 30, 1996, Terry Nichols’s attorneys responded in opposition 
to the government’s motion. The Nichols team offered three reasons for opposition. 
First, Nichols’s attorneys claimed Section 235, by its definition, did not apply to the 
Oklahoma City bombing case. Second, they claimed the government had not made a 
showing for why it deemed Section 235 applicable to the case. Third, they claimed 
Section 235 violated “separation of powers and … denies due process and equal 
protection of the laws.”403 
 In arguing that Section 235 was not applicable to the bombing case, the Nichols 
team pointed to the definitions of the words “venue” and “location” used in the 
language of Section 235.404 The motion claimed that the wording of Section 235 
showed the law applied in cases where a change of venue moved the case out of the 
state where charges were originally filed and at a distance of more than 350 miles from 
the location where the trial would have taken place. Nichols’s attorneys argued that the 
District of Colorado consisted of the entire state of Colorado. This made the new venue 
the entire state of Colorado. They argued that either of the possible trial venues in 
Oklahoma, Oklahoma City or Lawton, was less than 300 miles from the Colorado state 
line, thus, by its own definition, the statue was not applicable to the bombing case.405 
 Nichols’s attorneys again turned to the language of Section 235, claiming the 
government had not made a threshold showing for individuals with a “compelling 
interest” or for individuals who would be “unable [to attend the trial] by reason of the 
inconvenience and expense caused by the change of venue.”406 The attorneys argued 
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that the court should establish criteria for determining who had a compelling interest 
and/or suffered an inconvenience, and that the criteria should be subject to a hearing 
before the court. Nichols’s attorneys also argued that had the trial taken place in 
Oklahoma City or Lawton, there still would have been victims unable to attend due to 
family commitments, work commitments, or limited courtroom seating, and such 
factors would not have been the result of a change of venue.407 
 The Nichols team’s motion also claimed Section 235 violated the separation of 
powers doctrine. Nichols’s attorneys wrote, “Congress cannot tell this Court – nor any 
Court – how to decide a specific issue in a pending case. An attempt to do so violates 
the most fundamental principles of separation of powers enshrined in the 
Constitution.”408 They claimed the intrusion was made more problematic due to the fact 
that the Department of Justice had advocated for passage of the law, while at the same 
time being in charge of prosecuting the case. Nichols’s attorneys asserted that numerous 
prior cases had illustrated the dangers of broadcasting trials and concluded: 
In the face of such evidence, and at the urging of special interests, this case 
alone among all other federal cases is singled out, and this Court told to 
disregard the dangers. One defies the government to come up with another case 
to which the statute would apply.409 
 Nichols’s attorneys expressed concerns about threats to due process and equal 
protection related to Section 235’s provisions for witness exclusion. The law stated the 
court could bar a person from viewing if, “… the presiding judge … determines that 
testimony by that person would be materially affected if that person heard other 
testimony at the trial.”410 The Nichols team claimed that some victims might be allowed 
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to testify in the second stage if the trial resulted in a conviction, and such persons 
should not be allowed to view the trial in any fashion before being called to testify. The 
motion read: 
A defendant confronting victim impact testimony at trial should not have to face 
testimony that has been magnified or otherwise affected … by the trial. Witness 
testimony should be limited to reflect events, experiences, and emotions 
stemming from the crime, not emotions aroused by the extraneous additional 
stimulus of the televised trial.411 
 Finally, Nichols’s attorneys claimed the presence of cameras and microphones 
in the courtroom would disrupt the trial. They claimed the court should not have to bear 
the additional burden and potential distractions of turning equipment on and off and 
deciding which persons and evidence the cameras should be focused on during the trial. 
Furthermore, they claimed the presence of the cameras would be a constant reminder 
for jurors that the victims of the crime were watching, and this could be prejudicial to 
the defendants.412 Michael Tigar has since said that he was also concerned that trial 
participants would feel compelled to perform for the cameras. “I believe that when 
witnesses, and even some lawyers, know that when they’re going to be or can be on 
national television, they behave differently. And they behave in ways that are 
inconsistent with the orderly search for truth,” Tigar said.413 
 McVeigh’s attorneys also objected to the government’s request for closed-
circuit broadcasts.414 Like Nichols’s attorneys, McVeigh’s attorneys claimed Section 
235 was an unconstitutional violation of the separation of powers doctrine. 
Furthermore, the attorneys claimed Section 235 violated McVeigh’s Sixth Amendment 
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right to a fair trial and it denied McVeigh due process and equal protection required by 
the Fifth Amendment.415 
 McVeigh’s attorneys claimed Section 235 allowed the legislative branch to 
usurp the judicial branch and its Rule 53 prohibition of cameras by imposing closed-
circuit broadcasts on the court. McVeigh’s attorneys wrote: 
Even if this Court decided that a closed-circuit broadcast of this trial would 
violate Mr. McVeigh’s rights to due process and a fair trial, Section 235 leaves 
the Court powerless to protect those rights. It is for this reason that Section 235 
unconstitutionally interferes with the Court’s inherent authority under Article III 
of the United States Constitution to assure that the trial be conducted with 
fundamental fairness and within constitutional guidelines.416 
 McVeigh’s attorneys next argued that the presence of the cameras would deny 
McVeigh his Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial by influencing several aspects of the 
trial. The attorneys claimed cameras would influence jurors by serving as a constant 
reminder that the victims were watching with specific expectations. Even if the cameras 
did not show jurors, the motion claimed the presence of cameras would suggest, “… a 
large, faceless group of grievously injured persons are depending on the jury to return 
the only verdict (guilty) and sentence (death) this group will find acceptable.”417  
McVeigh’s attorneys argued the cameras would create a stressful and tension-
filled environment for witnesses. The motion alleged this tension could have a negative 
impact on testimony by, “... caus[ing] the witness to become forgetful, evasive, cocky, 
distracted or even flagrantly dishonest.”418 The motion alleged cameras would put 
undue stress on the defendant as well. It claimed McVeigh would have to keep vigil 
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over his emotions for fear of how viewers might interpret his reactions and expressions. 
The motion read, “Mr. McVeigh will not be able to react, respond or speak with his 
attorney without the camera reporting his every nuance and gesture to untold legions of 
victims.”419 
 The closed-circuit broadcast could also create a conflict of interest for the court, 
McVeigh’s attorneys claimed. The lawyers wrote that prosecutors had argued for the 
broadcast, in part, as a means to aid in the recovery of the victims. McVeigh’s attorneys 
claimed the court had no responsibility to assist in the victims’ recovery. The McVeigh 
team posed the question, “How is a Court expected to assist actively in the victims’ 
recovery while remaining absolutely fair to the person presumed by most of those 
victims to be guilty and deserving of death?”420 
 The broadcast might cause attorneys to alter their strategies, according to the 
McVeigh motion. McVeigh’s lawyers feared victims watching in Oklahoma City would 
speak to the press about what they saw and heard, and this information could get back 
to jurors in Denver. The motion argued that this could taint the jury and put undue stress 
on attorneys.421 McVeigh’s attorneys also argued that there was no guarantee the signal 
would not be “pirated” and rebroadcast to a national audience.422 If the court did allow 
taping of the proceedings, the McVeigh team said it was possible those tapes could be 
leaked.423  
 Finally, the McVeigh team claimed that the disruptions and distractions cameras 
could cause in the courtroom would deny McVeigh his Fifth Amendment right to due 
process of law. The motion read: 
  
 
182 
Due process can flourish only if each trial participant properly performs his or 
her job. If courtroom cameras cause any of the trial participants to consciously 
or subconsciously alter their behavior or testimony, the camera has adversely 
impacted the proceedings and has denied Mr. McVeigh due process of law.424 
McVeigh’s attorneys concluded that the court’s obligation to ensure a fair trial and due 
process for the defendant should override the victims’ desires to observe the trial by 
closed-circuit broadcast, and he asked to court to strike down Section 235 as 
unconstitutional.425 
 The final days of April and the first days of May 1996 had provided the court 
with a plethora of fair trial/free press issues. Those issues were the future of audiotape 
distribution and a sound feed to the pressroom, calls for investigating information leaks 
and the imposition of a gag order, and the government’s request to allow closed-circuit 
broadcasts of the trial. Judge Matsch would rule on them individually through the 
summer of 1996. His decisions would have effects on management of the trial including 
how journalists covered the trial, how attorneys conducted themselves with the press, 
and how victims would be allowed to view the trial. 
 On May 29, 1996, Judge Matsch issued his order on court provided audiotapes 
and the proposed live audio feed to the pressroom.426 The judge had suspended the sale 
of audiotapes following the April 10, 1996, broadcast incidents, and with his May 29 
order, he had decided not to renew the practice. Judge Matsch decided that the court 
would continue to record courtroom proceedings as a backup record for the written 
transcripts; however, he ordered the copy and sale of the tapes to stop. The judge wrote 
that the process of copying and selling the tapes had “resulted in the functional 
  
 
183 
equivalent of a broadcast of the court proceedings in violation of Rule 53.”427 The sale 
of audiotapes was over. The judge also denied the press motion to establish a live audio 
feed in the pressroom, but the issue would come up again later in the year.428 
 In his decision, the judge had employed precedent by looking to Rule 53. The 
rule specifically prohibited photography and broadcasting from the courtroom in federal 
criminal trials. While the tapes were not live broadcasts of the proceedings, the judge 
determined they were the “functional equivalent.”429 As such, the broadcasts of the 
recordings negatively affected the defendants’ rights to a fair trial in the same fashion as 
live broadcasts, the judge wrote.430  
 On June 13, 1996, Judge Matsch issued his order on the request for an 
investigation of leaks and the requests for gag orders. He declined to conduct an 
investigation of the leaks for three primary reasons.431 First, Judge Matsch claimed a 
thorough investigation was impractical. The number of documents involved and the 
number of people with access to those documents made it impossible to investigate 
every alleged leak. Second, he wrote that an investigation would likely require hearings, 
which would be open to the public. Since the hearings would focus on information that 
was supposed to be kept from the public, the judge determined the process would be 
counterproductive. Finally, he wrote that an investigation would take time and resources 
away from preparing for trial. This would not only slow the court down, but Judge 
Matsch claimed it could diminish public confidence in the court and the parties 
involved in the case.432  
Judge Matsch addressed the issue with a restrictive order on extrajudicial 
statements. The order limited attorney comments, but it stopped short of a true gag 
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order.433 The order offered specific guidelines for attorneys to follow when making 
public statements and when handling discovery information. The judge wrote, “... it is 
now necessary for the court to articulate the particular standards to be followed in this 
litigation in the form of this order for future guidance in all forms of extrajudicial 
statements about this litigation.”434  
Judge Matsch’s order had seven major provisions based on precedent found in 
the American Bar Association’s Model Rule and the bar/press guidelines. First, the 
order prohibited attorneys, and people working for them, from releasing information 
that could be published, “... if there is a reasonable likelihood that such disclosure will 
interfere with a fair trial of the pending charges or otherwise prejudice the due 
administration of justice.”435 Second, attorneys were required to “take reasonable 
precautions” to make sure their employees and others working for them did not disclose 
confidential information or release confidential documents.436 Third, attorneys, their 
employees, and those working for them were prohibited from making extrajudicial 
statements regarding: 
(1) The prior criminal record ... or character or reputation of the defendants. 
(2) The existence or contents of any statements given by the defendants to law 
enforcement personnel or the refusal or failure of the defendants to make any 
statements to law enforcement personnel. 
(3) The performance of any examinations or tests or any defendants’ refusal or 
failure to submit to any examination, or test. 
(4) The identity, testimony, or credibility of all prospective witnesses. 
(5) The possibility of a plea of guilty to the offenses charged or a lesser offense. 
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(6) Any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the defendants or as to the merits 
of the case or the quality or quantity of evidence as to any charge in the case.437 
 Fourth, Judge Matsch wrote that the order did not prevent attorneys or their staff from 
announcing the court schedule, asking for help in collecting evidence, or “announcing 
without further comment that the defendants deny all charges made against them.”438 
Fifth, the order prohibited attorneys and people under their supervision from making 
public statements or giving interviews in which they expressed their opinion about “the 
merits of the positions and arguments of any party or giving any predictions concerning 
the expected result [of the trial].”439 Sixth, the order extended the provisions to all 
persons under the court’s authority, including “court supporting personnel, including ... 
marshals, deputy marshals, court clerks, bailiffs, court reporters and employees or 
subcontractors retained by the court-appointed official reporters.”440 Seventh, the court 
asked attorneys to exercise caution when writing motions that included discovery 
information. The order also reiterated that motions containing discovery information 
should be filed under seal in accordance with the court’s previous orders for filing 
sealed documents.441 Attorneys and court personnel had not been prohibited from 
speaking about the case completely, but the order of June 13 clearly established the 
rules for comment, and Judge Matsch made it clear he expected everyone to follow his 
rules. 
 With his June 13 order on extrajudicial statements, Judge Matsch set the rules 
for all personnel under the court’s authority regarding public statements about the case. 
He employed precedent in the order by using the American Bar Association’s Model 
Rules and bar/press guidelines and tailoring them to meet the specifics of the bombing 
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case. The order did not prevent attorneys from speaking about the case, but it did 
provide a framework to help ensure such statements would not infringe on the 
defendants’ rights to a fair trial or threaten the pretrial process. This order would stand 
until the beginning of Timothy McVeigh’s trial.442  
While the court was drafting the order for extrajudicial statements, the press was 
appealing Judge Matsch’s ruling on audiotapes to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
On July 9, 1996, the appellate court unanimously denied the appeal.443 The opinion said 
Judge Matsch had “acted lawfully and within his discretion” when he decided to stop 
the sale of tapes.444 The press did not appeal the judge’s decision denying their request 
for an audio feed to the pressroom. That issue would come before the court again as the 
case neared trial. The issue of audiotapes, however, was decided. Judge Matsch had 
made his decision, and the decision would stand.445 
 Finally, on July 15, 1996, Judge Matsch made his decision on the closed-circuit 
broadcast at the close of a day-long hearing. Matsch determined that Section 235 was 
not unconstitutional.446 He said cameras would be unobtrusive and the court would take 
measures to protect against any potential influence the cameras might have on jurors 
and to protect against any disruption of the proceedings.447 Courtroom minutes of the 
hearing recorded the Judge’s oral order: 
There will be no visible camera – panorama view by camera of the court not to 
include the jury. The influence on jurors will be a subject in voir dire of the jury. 
There are many controls that will be handled by the court. The trial judge will 
have an off switch within his reach.448 
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Judge Matsch said he would prefer to have a camera mounted to a wall, so as to 
make it as unobtrusive as possible. He said the camera would have a panoramic view of 
the courtroom, giving those at the remote viewing site a view of the courtroom similar 
to what spectators in the courtroom would see. The judge admitted there were still 
technical details to be worked out, and if it were not possible to have a secure 
transmission, the closed-circuit broadcast might not happen after all. Even so, the judge 
planned to move forward in compliance with Section 235 unless or until it proved 
impractical.449 
In the closed-circuit decision, the court had no direct precedent to guide it. Judge 
Matsch would be the first federal judge to manage a federal criminal trial with closed-
circuit broadcasting – a new and unique fair trial/free press issue. In August 1996, the 
press decided to explore this uncharted legal territory and approached the court with a 
request for access to the closed-circuit viewing. 
The press petition for access to the closed-circuit broadcast came from a group 
of small Oklahoma newspapers and broadcast stations represented collectively as the 
Oklahoma Media Group. Members of the Oklahoma Media Group claimed that as small 
press organization, they were prohibited from covering the trial in Denver by limited 
budgets and small news staffs. As a remedy, these press organizations were petitioning 
the court for access to the closed-circuit broadcast.450 
The Oklahoma Media Group tried to persuade the court that Section 235 had 
both extended the courtroom and created a new public space. The media group claimed 
the press and public should have access. First, the motion defined the viewing location 
as “…a technological enhancement of the courtroom.”451 From this “enhanced 
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courtroom” position, the media group argued that the presumption of openness of the 
courtroom established in Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia should apply. Furthermore, 
the media group argued that the government could not cite a compelling interest in 
closing the viewing as established by Globe Newspapers v. Superior Court and Press-
Enterprise I.452 But the media group followed this argument with the claim that “The 
closed-circuit broadcast in Oklahoma City is not merely a technological enlargement of 
the Denver courtroom, but a new and different public space where the American system 
of justice has center stage.”453 From this “public space” position, the media group 
argued that the press should have unfettered access. The motion quoted from Craig v. 
Harney, “A trial is a public event. What transpires in the courtroom is public 
property.”454 Finally, the media group suggested the court should move this “unique 
public space” out of the Western District Federal Courthouse and hold the viewing in a 
larger public setting that provided access to the press and the public.455 The motion 
mentioned a then-recent court martial trial that had taken place at Tinker Air Force Base 
in Midwest City, Oklahoma, at which the press and public were allowed to watch a 
closed-circuit feed at a temporary auditorium set up in a warehouse. Media group 
attorneys claimed there were no court officials present, but decorum was maintained by 
military police who monitored the audience, and the judge in the actual courtroom had 
the ability to stop the broadcast when he deemed it necessary.456 
Terry Nichols’s attorneys responded to the Oklahoma Media Group petition on 
the grounds it misrepresented the intent of Section 235 and on the grounds that the press 
had ample access to the proceedings through their presence in the Denver courtroom.457 
Nichols argued that there was no question that the intent of Congress when drafting 
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Section 235 was to provide viewing access only to the victims of the bombing. The 
Nichols team also argued that the members of the Oklahoma Media Group could not 
draw an equivalent between their inconvenience and the inconvenience imposed on 
victims. The motion claimed that numerous press organizations regularly attended 
hearings in Denver and that often the Oklahoma journalists outnumbered the local 
Denver journalists. Finally, Nichols’s attorneys called the assertion that denying the 
press access to the closed-circuit broadcast would violate the constitution “absurd.”458 
The Nichols team argued that the constitutional rights of access asserted by the press 
applied only to the Denver courtroom. Also, Nichols’s attorneys argued that the court 
had allowed for reserved media seating in the courtroom, ensuring press attendance at 
every open proceeding.459 
McVeigh’s attorneys responded to the Oklahoma Media Group petition, saying 
it was, “utterly unsupported by law or logic and should be denied.”460 Like the Nichols 
team, McVeigh’s attorneys claimed that the intent of Section 235 was an 
accommodation for victims only and that no other group had been considered in the 
drafting of the legislation.461 They also argued that the court had taken extraordinary 
measures to accommodate the press at the trial site in Denver. These accommodations 
included reserved seating that took up almost half of the gallery, a listening room in an 
adjacent courtroom, and a working pressroom in a building across the street from the 
courthouse.462 McVeigh’s attorneys called the media group’s argument that smaller 
press organizations did not have the resources to attend the trial in Denver 
“specious.”463 Finally, McVeigh’s attorneys objected to the media group’s proposal for 
moving the viewing to a larger venue outside the courthouse. The motion read, “At the 
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worst, the media group’s proposal invites anarchy. At best, the proposal contemplates a 
proceeding with all the solemnity and dignity of a University of Oklahoma Sooners 
home football game.”464 The McVeigh team concluded that the media group petition 
should be denied. 
The government, likewise, objected to the media group petition.465 Prosecutors, 
like the defense teams, maintained that Section 235 was written with the exclusive 
intent of accommodating victims. The prosecution motion disregarded the claim that the 
smaller press organizations lacked the ability to attend proceedings in Denver.466 The 
government took the position that the closed-circuit viewing site would be an extension 
of the Denver courtroom, and if the press had access to the actual courtroom in Denver, 
that access alone was sufficient. The government concluded that the media group “had 
no statutory or constitutional right to attend the closed-circuit broadcast,” and the 
government asked the court to deny the petition.467 Judge Matsch would reserve his 
decision until January 1997.468 
While the press was seeking access to the closed-circuit broadcast in August 
1996, McVeigh was seeking access to the press. The June order restricting extrajudicial 
statements put a stop to McVeigh’s meetings with the press. This presented a problem 
for Stephen Jones, who wanted to continue his efforts to improve McVeigh’s public 
image. In August 1996, Stephen Jones approached the court with a plan he conceived 
and drafted himself, which he claimed would allow for more meetings between 
McVeigh and journalists, while working within the guidelines issued by the court.469 In 
describing the intent of the plan, Jones said, “I wasn’t trying to persuade anybody we 
were innocent. I was simply trying to neutralize what I thought was a very biased 
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picture of McVeigh as an individual.”470 Timothy McVeigh’s media access proposal 
was the next fair trial/free press issue to come before the court.471 
McVeigh’s media access plan was a twenty-one-page motion that included a 
detailed plan for McVeigh to meet with a range of journalists from local Oklahoma City 
and Denver reporters, to national network broadcast correspondents, to the British 
Broadcasting Corporation. McVeigh’s attorneys wrote, “If Mr. McVeigh is to receive a 
fair trial, one of the things that must be done is to present information that will begin to 
counter the false view that he is a demon.”472 The McVeigh team claimed the 
government and the press presented McVeigh as a dangerous, anti-social, anti-
government zealot who was without a doubt guilty of the bombing. Also, the motion 
pointed out that in its change of venue order, the court had acknowledged the 
detrimental effects of press reports regarding McVeigh’s background and character. 
What the McVeigh team wanted was a way to fight what defense attorneys viewed as 
prejudicial pretrial publicity. Following the June 1996 order setting forth guidelines for 
extrajudicial statements, the McVeigh team reasoned it should seek the court’s approval 
for future contact between McVeigh and the press.473 
 The motion asked for approval to conduct a series of interviews with media 
organizations ranging from the British Broadcasting Corporation to Denver, Colorado, 
newspapers and television stations. It was the McVeigh team’s plan that these 
interviews would result in: 
1. A documentary to be shown to a British audience; 
2. One national American television broadcast limited to no more than 30 
minutes commercial air time …; 
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3. One print interview in Denver; 
4. One national print interview with a newspaper; 
5. One national print interview with a wire service; 
6. One Oklahoma print interview; 
7. One 15 minute Oklahoma City television interview (with the understanding 
that the interview could not be shown in Denver); and 
8. One Denver, Colorado, television interview of 15 minutes.474 
 Jones wrote that the BBC had approached him about its desire to produce a 
documentary on the case soon after he took over as chief counsel. Jones claimed that the 
BBC had a long history of producing high quality, even-handed documentaries on 
controversial subjects. Jones told the court the BBC would agree to follow the court’s 
guidelines on extrajudicial statements, and the BBC would agree not to release the 
documentary in America prior to the trial. Jones had asked the BBC to delay 
broadcasting any McVeigh documentary it might produce in the United Kingdom until 
after the trial, but the BBC would not make such a guarantee.475 
 As for United States media, the McVeigh team proposed letting McVeigh 
himself choose between one of several network television journalists to conduct a single 
half-hour nationally broadcast interview. Those to be considered included “Barbara 
Walters of ABC, Diane Sawyer of ABC, Susan Candiotti of CNN, Dan Rather of CBS, 
Tom Brokaw of NBC and Jack Bowen of Fox Television [Oklahoma City affiliate].”476  
 The McVeigh team sought national print coverage by proposing a single 
interview with “the Boston Globe, the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal or the 
Los Angeles Times.”477 
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  For regional print coverage in the Southwest, the McVeigh team proposed an 
interview with one of the following newspapers: The Dallas Morning News, The 
Oklahoma Gazette or The Tulsa World. The motion suggested letting McVeigh himself 
choose between the Associated Press, Reuters, or United Press International for a single 
wire service interview. The defense also requested an interview with The Rocky 
Mountain News to cover the Denver print media market. The Denver Post was not 
considered because “it would not submit to an off-the-record pre-interview meeting.”478 
 Local television coverage in the McVeigh plan asked for an interview with one 
television station in both the Denver and Oklahoma City television markets. Stations to 
be considered in Denver included KCNC (CBS), KMGH (ABC), and KUSA (NBC). 
Denver’s Tribune Broadcasting independent station, KWGN, had told the McVeigh 
team it did not wish to participate. Oklahoma City television stations to be considered 
included KFOR (NBC), KOCO (ABC), KWTV (CBS), and Oklahoma Educational 
Television (PBS).479 
 The McVeigh team motion asserted a First Amendment right held by McVeigh 
to speak on his own behalf while awaiting trial. The motion cited precedent set by 
Shepherd v. Maxwell and Irvin v. Dowd in which the Supreme Court pointed out the 
dangers of prejudicial pretrial publicity. McVeigh’s attorneys claimed they faced 
prejudicial pretrial publicity similar to the publicity referenced in Shepherd and Irvin. 
McVeigh’s attorneys further suggested their best method of counteracting such 
publicity was to allow McVeigh to present himself to a national audience. The motion 
cited Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada in which the defendant’s attorney went to the press 
and spoke publicly for the express purpose of combating what the attorney perceived to 
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be prejudicial press reports. Quoting from the Gentile decision, McVeigh’s attorneys 
wrote: 
Far from an admission that he sought to ‘materially prejudice an adjudicative 
proceeding’, petitioner sought only to stop a wave of publicity he perceived as 
prejudicing potential jurors against his client and injuring his client’s reputation 
in the community.480 
The motion concluded: 
There is absolutely nothing that Timothy McVeigh can do or say in an interview 
which would prejudice the fairness of this criminal proceeding. He does not 
intend nor will he say anything about the facts of the case nor will he make 
statements which violate any of the [Colorado District] Court’s directives 
concerning extrajudicial statements. What he might be able to do in some very 
limited sense would be to soften the less than human sculpture that the 
Government has chiseled into the consciousness of then nation. That would be 
completely consistent with Mr. McVeigh’s First Amendment rights and the 
Government does not have the right to comment upon it.481 
 The government did comment on the plan on August 29, 1996 by stating its 
unequivocal opposition to McVeigh’s media access plan. Prosecutors called the plan 
“An extraordinary attempt to manipulate the news media to produce a favorable impact 
on the potential jury pool.”482 Prosecutors claimed McVeigh’s attempt to draw a parallel 
with Gentile relied on the minority opinion written by Justice Kennedy and joined by 
three other justices describing an attorney’s professional obligations to defend the client 
against prejudicial publicity. Prosecutors, however, pointed to Justice Rehnquist’s 
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majority opinion in Gentile in which Rehnquist wrote, “… trials are not like elections, 
to be won through the use of the meeting-hall, the radio, and the newspaper.”483 
 The change of venue was another fact the prosecution claimed should diminish 
the McVeigh team’s argument. At the change of venue hearings, the defense teams had 
successfully argued that the amount of press coverage and the tone of press coverage 
outside of Oklahoma were different from coverage provided by the Oklahoma press. 
Prosecutors suggested that any action of the court to increase press attention given to 
the case prior to trial would be counterproductive, considering the purpose of moving 
the trial. Prosecutors concluded by writing that the best way to ensure a fair trial was to 
bring the case before a jury as soon as possible and not to encourage any more publicity 
in the interim.484 
 Nichols’s attorneys objected to the McVeigh media plan on the grounds that it 
could have a detrimental impact on their management of the case. In August 1996, the 
court was still planning to try both defendants together. Nichols’s attorneys argued that 
if tried jointly, the “relative culpability” of each defendant was something that jurors 
could consider.485 This was particularly problematic for Nichols because the federal 
death penalty statute required jurors to consider the culpability of each defendant when 
deciding whether or not to impose a death sentence. Nichols’s attorneys suggested a 
McVeigh press blitz could force them to take similar actions if McVeigh tried to 
implicate Nichols in the crime.486 Nichols’s attorneys also claimed that many of 
McVeigh’s previous attempts at rehabilitating his image through the press had achieved 
just to opposite results. Nichols’s attorneys wrote, “Hoist in part by his own media 
petard, Mr. McVeigh now seeks court approval for a bigger petard.”487 The Nichols 
  
 
196 
team’s motion concluded similarly to the prosecution’s motion, claiming that the 
remedy to pretrial publicity was to get to trial as soon as possible – preferably with 
separate trials for the two defendants.488 
 The McVeigh team responded to both the prosecution and the Nichols team in a 
reply brief. McVeigh’s attorneys called the prosecution’s response “… self-righteous 
hypocrisy which does not deserve the dignity of any detailed response.”489 The 
McVeigh response to the Nichols team’s brief described it as “… a preview of its 
Motion for Severance which is to be filed next week and should be regarded as such.”490 
 McVeigh’s attorneys followed up on the original motion in September 1996 
after a Dateline NBC television magazine episode broadcast information the McVeigh 
team deemed detrimental to its case.491 The broadcast included interviews with two 
former federal prosecutors and a former FBI agent who expressed doubts that there 
were any unknown bombing suspects still outstanding.492 McVeigh’s attorneys claimed 
the report presented information that likely was funneled from the government to these 
former government employees in violation of the existing guidelines for extra judicial 
statements. The report did contain an on-camera statement from Stephen Jones, but 
Jones claimed that statement was recorded in January 1996, before the court’s 
guidelines on extrajudicial statements were issued. McVeigh’s attorneys wrote: 
Mr. McVeigh should not be required simply to sit back while the government 
continues to “produce” television programs which assume his guilt. He must be 
allowed, within the guidelines of this Court’s order, to attempt to stop the 
perverse efforts of the prosecution to poison the prospective jury pool.493 
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 In late September 1996, ABC, CBS, and NBC joined the fight for McVeigh’s 
media access play by filing an amici curiae memorandum of law in support of 
McVeigh’s motion. The press focused on the rules for press access to prisoners set by 
the Federal Bureau of Prisons and the First Amendment rights of both McVeigh and the 
press.494  
 The press claimed that nothing in the McVeigh team’s interview plan would 
violate the six criteria set forth by the Bureau of Prisons for inmate interviews. Those 
criteria prohibited inmate interviews when: (1) The press organization declined to 
follow the bureau’s rules; (2) The inmate is mentally or physically unable to take part in 
the interview; (3) The warden of the facility believes the interview poses a risk to the 
reporter, the inmate or safe operations of the prison facility; (4) The inmate is a 
juvenile; (5) The court has issued an order prohibiting interviews; (6) The inmate is in 
protective custody and the interview could threaten his/her safety by possibly revealing 
his/her location. The press recognized the guidelines for extrajudicial statements in 
place at the time, but the memorandum pointed out that the guidelines were directed at 
attorneys and court personnel, and they did not specifically address either of the 
defendants personally.495  
 The press memorandum offered rulings in two cases as support for its argument 
asserting a First Amendment right of the defendant. The first case, United States v. Fort, 
was a highly publicized federal prosecution in the Northern District of Illinois decided 
in 1987. In this case, four members of a Chicago street gang faced trial on domestic 
terrorism charges, and they sought access to the press prior to trial. The press 
memorandum claimed the Illinois court allowed the defendants to speak to the press, 
  
 
198 
citing the defendants’ First Amendment rights of free speech and the absence of any 
evidence the interviews would threaten a fair trial.496 The press memorandum also 
quoted a 1994 Ohio Court of Common Pleas decision, Accord, Ohio v. Barker, in which 
the court determined that before trial the defendant “‘has the right to talk to whoever he 
pleases to talk to … The Court can’t control that.’”497 
 Press attorneys asserted a First Amendment right for the public and the press to 
gather information for dissemination and to receive information. Press attorneys argued 
that Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. 
established the right to receive information and that Branzburg v. Hayes established a 
right for journalists to gather information.498 
 The press memorandum cited two cases that addressed restrictions on the First 
Amendment right of prisoners and did allow for the denial of interview requests in light 
of compelling state interests. The first case was Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., decided 
by the Supreme Court in 1974. In this case, the Court ruled that wardens could bar 
prisoners from talking to reporters if access to members of the public was also barred.499 
In Pell v. Procunier, also decided in 1974, the Court determined wardens could prevent 
inmates from speaking with reporters if such actions would interfere with the goals of 
the mission of the penal system. These goals could include security and rehabilitation. 
However, the Court determined that unless such compelling state interests were 
implicated, the prisoner retained the First Amendment right of free speech.500 The press 
attorneys concluded: 
None of those state interests is present here. Since McVeigh has not been 
convicted, the government has no interest in deterrence of rehabilitation that 
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might be adversely affected by granting the interview sought … Nor, unlike in 
Saxbe and Pell, does any law or regulation furthering any such state interests 
apply here. Just the opposite: the regulations applicable here, the Bureau’s 
Media Access Rules – which were promulgated in 1979, five years after Saxbe 
and Pell – specifically authorize news media interviews of individual inmates, 
subject only to this Court’s authorization.501 
 As to concerns that the interviews might impact either defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment right to a fair trial, the press memorandum said such issues could be 
avoided. First, the press noted the Nichols team’s pending motion for severance in 
which Nichols’s attorneys were seeking to have their case severed from McVeigh’s so 
each defendant could be tried individually. Were the motion granted, the press claimed 
any potential negative impact on Nichols would be mitigated. Second, the press claimed 
Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart held that pretrial publicity was not in and of itself 
detrimental to the goal of having a fair trial. Third, the press claimed successful 
prosecutions of high profile criminal cases such as the Watergate trials and the Abscam 
trials showed that thorough voir dire could produce impartial juries, even in cases that 
had generated extensive national pretrial publicity. Based on the case law offered in the 
memorandum and the argument made from those cases, the press asked the court to 
approve McVeigh’s media plan.502 
 McVeigh’s media access plan was a fair trial/free press issue created by another 
such issue – the order restricting extrajudicial statements. The press joined the McVeigh 
team in its attempt to continue contact with the press. The government and the Nichols 
team, however, claimed that giving McVeigh national and international press access 
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could taint the potential jury pool and that it contradicted the purpose in moving the trial 
to Denver – seating a fair jury who could give the defendants a fair trial. 
 The pending motions for severance led to another fair trial/free press concern in 
September 1996. Judge Matsch had allowed the severance motions to be filed under his 
earlier established procedures for sealed documents.503 The documents in question were 
the severance motions submitted of both McVeigh’s and Nichols’s attorneys; Terry 
Nichols’s statements made to the F.B.I. in April 1995 (entered as Exhibit 72); and the 
“Motion to Suppress Unlawfully Obtained Evidence” along with supporting exhibits 
submitted by Nichols’s attorneys.504 Judge Matsch did release documents related to the 
motions, but they were heavily redacted. The press wanted access to the documents in 
their entirety.505 The press, led by The Dallas Morning News, filed objections with 
Judge Matsch, who denied those objections. In October 1996, The Dallas Morning 
News and a group of other press organizations appealed Judge Matsch’s ruling to the 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. The government joined the press in the appeal, citing a 
Department of Justice policy to oppose sealed documents unless unsealing those 
documents would threaten a person’s right to a fair trial.506 The appellate court would 
not hear the appeal until May 1997, and it would not issue a decision until July 1997.507 
 While the press was appealing the sealing and redaction of the severance 
motions, Judge Matsch was reaching a decision on the McVeigh team’s media access 
proposal. Judge Matsch ruled on the McVeigh media plan with an oral order on October 
4, 1996. The judge denied the plan in the interest of preserving the integrity of the 
proceedings.508 In his oral order, Judge Matsch posed what appeared to be a rhetorical 
question:  “Isn’t this really putting on character evidence to the public as a whole in the 
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hopes of influencing the jury?”509 The judge determined that anything McVeigh might 
say about his character would be evidence and that it would constitute evidence 
presented before the trial. For this reason, Judge Matsch denied the McVeigh team’s 
motion for media access.510 McVeigh’s attorneys did not appeal Judge Matsch’s order 
nor did they present another media access plan. In retrospect, Stephen Jones said 
questions about the media plan should not have focused on if McVeigh’s appearances 
would influence the jury, rather those questions should have focused on how the media 
plan might influence jurors: 
I think it would be more accurate to say that, yes, we were trying to influence 
the jury perception that McVeigh did not have two horns and a pointed tail, 
which is not the same thing as saying he was not guilty because certainly very 
good people can commit crimes or people that are seemingly good. But what we 
were trying to say is, “Judge, we need at least a fifty-fifty chance in how the 
public understands our client.”511 
The denial of McVeigh’s media access plan meant he would not have any 
further meetings with reporters prior to trial. Judge Matsch determined the integrity of 
the legal process was of paramount concern, and even interviews restricted to 
discussions of McVeigh’s character and background could be prejudicial. 
 In December 1996, the press approached Judge Matsch again, asking him to 
reconsider extending the live audio feed serving the listening courtroom to the 
pressroom across the street from the courthouse. Roger O’Neil, chairman of the 
consortium’s broadcast group, sent a letter to Judge Matsch asking him to reconsider his 
earlier decision denying the live audio feed to the pressroom.512 O’Neil’s letter restated 
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what the press saw as benefits of the live feed including fewer reporters taking seats in 
the auxiliary courtroom, fewer disruptions caused by reporters going through security 
checkpoints, and fewer reporters going in and out of the courtrooms.513 O’Neil wrote 
that reporters could benefit from the feed by being able to hear testimony while at their 
workstations. This would allow them to have the latest information at deadline, and they 
would have more accurate information by being able to hear exactly what happened in 
the courtroom.514 Finally, O’Neil assured the judge that the press would stipulate that no 
members of the press corps could record the feed or broadcast it live. All journalists in 
the courtroom would have to agree to use the feed for listening purposes only. O’Neil 
suggested that penalties for violating the rules against recording could include 
“...revocation of a reporter’s press credentials to the pressroom and/or courtroom, 
revocation of the same to that reporter’s news organization, fines, and even 
contempt.”515 O’Neil’s letter included a two-page report compiled by print group 
member Lee Hancock of The Dallas Morning News listing other recent high-profile 
trials in which courts had allowed for live audio feeds to press work areas during the 
trial. The list of trials included the 1993 Rodney King civil rights trial, the 1993 Randy 
Weaver trial, and the 1994 Branch Davidian trial.516 Judge Matsch agreed to consider 
the matter again and asked prosecutors and defense attorneys to respond.517 
 Nichols’s attorneys responded by renewing their earlier objections. Nichols’s 
attorneys also claimed that in the Rodney King case, some portions of testimony had 
been broadcast in violation of court rules. The Nichols team claimed the threat to a 
defendant’s right to a fair trial should be the court’s primary consideration. In the event 
a news organization did broadcast the feed, Nichols’s attorneys claimed that his rights 
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would be violated and that taking punitive action against the offending journalist would 
not restore his rights.518 The McVeigh team did not file a response.519 The government 
did not take a position on the new proposal. Prosecutors said it was a matter within the 
court’s discretion.520  
On January 29, 1997, Judge Matsch agreed to the pressroom audio feed with the 
provision that the press would agree not to broadcast the feed in any manner.521 The 
judge said any broadcast of the pressroom feed would result in termination of the feed 
for all reporters.522 The audio feed to the pressroom would last through both the trial of 
Timothy McVeigh and the later trial of Terry Nichols without any violations of the 
court’s rules for its use.523 
The same day Judge Matsch announced his decision on the audio feed to the 
pressroom, he announced his decision on media access to the closed-circuit broadcast. 
Judge Matsch denied the Oklahoma Media Group’s petition, saying Section 235 applied 
only to victims and did not allow for press access to the viewing site.524 “Members of 
the media have no standing under the statute,” Judge Matsch said.525 He added that it 
was his desire to have the same rules and decorum in the closed-circuit viewing that he 
had in his courtroom.526 
Also at the hearing, Judge Matsch announced that the viewing location would be 
established at Oklahoma City’s Mike Monroney Aeronautical Center in the Federal 
Aviation Administration’s auditorium.527 Prior to this, the court had been considering 
the largest of the Western District Federal Courthouse in downtown Oklahoma City, 
which could seat approximately 145 people.528 The F.A.A auditorium, however, was a 
“movie-style auditorium” that could seat 330 people.529 The auditorium was also in a 
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fenced-off area adjacent to Oklahoma City’s Will Rogers World Airport, which allowed 
court personnel greater ability to control access and provide a secure environment for 
victims.530 
 In January 1997, the court resolved two pending fair trial/free press issues – 
extension of the audio feed to the pressroom and press access to the closed-circuit 
viewing. The court allowed the audio feed to the pressroom with the understanding that 
members of the press would police themselves and not allow the feed to be recorded or 
broadcast. The court placed its trust in the journalists that there would not be another 
episode like the broadcasting of the audiotapes and it would be the responsibility of the 
journalists to preserve that trust. However, the press would not be allowed to view the 
closed-circuit feed. Judge Matsch determined that the language and intent of Section 
235 only addressed victims of the bombing and that they would be the only audience for 
the broadcast.  
The Press Threatens the Trial 
Timothy McVeigh’s trial was set to begin on March 31, 1997.531 On February 
14, 1997, the District Court of Colorado sent out summonses to 700 prospective jurors 
spread across twenty-three Colorado counties. It was the largest summons ever issued in 
the Colorado Federal District.532 The summonses included a warning for prospective 
jurors to immediately avoid press coverage of the case and the defendants.533 Judge 
Matsch’s admonition would be tested two weeks later. 
 As the court was calling jurors to hear the case against McVeigh, the press 
would publish stories that threatened to derail the case. The issue of prejudicial pretrial 
publicity would come back before the court in the wake of several stories claiming 
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McVeigh admitted to taking part in the bombing. The McVeigh defense team would 
turn to precedent, citing other cases in which prejudicial pretrial publicity had denied 
defendants their rights to fair trials. Prosecutors would claim the case should go forward 
before more such stories came to light. The court would make a decision relying on 
judicial experience more than precedent. The result would be that the trial for Timothy 
McVeigh would go ahead as scheduled. 
 In his book Others Unknown, Stephen Jones recounted the events of February 
27 and 28, 1997, which led up to a monumental episode in the trial of Timothy 
McVeigh.534 Jones wrote that on the afternoon of Thursday, February 27, Dallas 
Morning News reporter Robert Hillsman came to Jones’s Denver office for an 
interview. Jones claimed the interview seemed secondary to the real reason for the visit 
– Hillsman wanted to know if Jones would be available the next afternoon to talk to 
Dallas Morning News reporter Pete Slover about an article he was working on.535 Jones 
wrote that the meeting with Hillsman raised his suspicions that the article Slover was 
preparing might be something important and possibly controversial.536 
 The following afternoon, February 28, 1997, Jones received the call he was 
expecting from Slover. Jones wrote that Slover informed him The Dallas Morning News 
was preparing a story based on legally obtained defense documents that showed 
Timothy McVeigh admitted to bombing the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building.537 
Jones wrote that he immediately began making phone calls to Dallas Morning News 
management and the newspaper’s attorneys trying to find out what information they 
were basing their article on and trying to stop publication of the story. When he realized 
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publication was imminent, Jones wrote that he notified the court in hopes of trying to 
get an injunction to stop or delay publication in the next day’s paper.538  
 The Dallas Morning News did not wait for the next morning’s edition. The paper 
published Slover’s article on its Internet site on Friday afternoon following the rounds 
of telephone calls with Jones.539 The article was also republished in the Saturday, March 
1, 1997 print edition of The Dallas Morning News.540 The confession story was also 
reprinted or extensively quoted in other newspapers on March 1, including The 
Oklahoman, The Denver Post, the New York Times, and The Rocky Mountain News.541 
Through the remainder of the weekend, the broadcast networks and cable networks 
picked up the story, blanketing the nation with news of McVeigh’s alleged 
confession.542 
 The Dallas Morning News article claimed to be based on summaries of 
interviews McVeigh conducted with members of his defense team during his 1995 
incarceration at the El Reno Federal Prison in El Reno, Oklahoma.543 Slover wrote that 
the documents showed McVeigh never denied his role in the bombing; instead he gave 
details about the planning and execution as well as the motive for the bombing. Slover’s 
article claimed McVeigh told the interviewers the bombing was carried out as a 
message to the United States government and that the bombing took place during 
business hours so that it would result in a high number of deaths.544 One of the more 
dramatic quotes attributed to McVeigh in the article was his alleged response to the 
initial question about why the bombing was not carried out after business hours. 
McVeigh reportedly replied, “That would not have gotten the point across to the 
government. We needed a body count to make our point.”545 The article further claimed 
  
 
207 
McVeigh told the interviewers that Terry Nichols was involved in the planning of the 
bombing, but there was no John Doe number two, which had been the subject of much 
debate throughout the case. Slover wrote that McVeigh claimed he alone drove the 
Ryder truck carrying the bomb to the Murrah Building.546 
 Steven Jones called Judge Matsch for an emergency meeting at 5:00 p.m. on the 
afternoon of Friday, February 28. Judge Matsch called prosecutors, so they could join 
the meeting by phone, as Jones sought a way to respond. Jones asked the judge to set 
aside the order on extrajudicial statements temporarily so he could respond freely to the 
article, and the judge agreed.547 Claiming to have no knowledge of what the documents 
were or where they came from, Jones told reporters at a press conference on the Denver 
courthouse steps Friday night that The Dallas Morning News may have been tricked 
with fake documents.548 Jones called the publishing of the article irresponsible, and he 
accused The Dallas Morning News of engaging in sensational journalism.549 Jones also 
suggested the newspaper may have obtained the documents illegally – a charge the 
attorney for the newspaper denied.550 
 Following the Dallas Morning News confession story, Stephen Jones conducted 
an internal investigation. He has written that the investigation revealed that the 
newspaper did receive internal defense documents through the actions of a McVeigh 
defense team member.551 Jones claimed the staff member admitted to him that in 
January 1997 the staff member had taken a laptop computer from the office and 
attended a lunch meeting at an Oklahoma City restaurant with Morning News reporters 
Arnold Hamilton and Pete Slover. Jones’s staff member said that following the meeting 
he and the two reporters went to the Dallas Morning News offices in Oklahoma City to 
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continue their conversation. The staff member told Jones that he received a cell phone 
call while at the newspaper office, and he walked out of the office to his car to speak in 
private. The man claimed that when he left the office, he left the laptop alone in the 
office with Pete Slover. When the staff member returned to the office, he claimed 
Slover got up and left immediately without saying anything. The staff member told 
Jones that Slover might have downloaded the files from the computer while he was out 
of the office.552 Similar details of the encounter were offered in McVeigh’s post 
conviction appeal.553 Following the publication of the confession story, however, The 
Dallas Morning News claimed that the documents were legally obtained.554 On Sunday, 
March 2, 1997, Dallas Morning News Executive Vice President and Editor Ralph 
Langer announced the newspaper would not publish any more articles based on the 
documents, saying future articles based on the information would not have the 
“overriding public significance” that the original article did. Langer said the documents 
would be turned over to the newspaper’s attorney, who would keep them secure.555 
Stephen Jones did not ask the court to delay the trial or take any other action following 
the Dallas Morning News episode, but there was another confession story yet to come. 
 On March 11, 1997, another confession article appeared. Again, it was first 
published via the Internet, but this time on the homepage of Playboy Magazine. The 
author of this article, Ben Fenwick, also claimed to have legally obtained internal 
defense documents, which included a “sixty-page chronology prepared by the defense 
recounting McVeigh’s story of how he had carried out the bombing.”556 Following the 
release of the article, Fenwick appeared on the ABC network’s news magazine Prime 
Time Live on March 12, 1997 as well as the ABC, CBS, and NBC morning news 
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programs on March 13, 1997.557 With two confession stories drawing national press 
attention and jury selection set to begin in slightly more than two weeks, Stephen Jones 
made an appeal to the court.558 
 On Friday, March 14, 1997, McVeigh’s attorneys filed a motion asking the court 
to dismiss the charges, to delay the trial, or to grant another change of venue.559 The 
motion claimed the intense press focus on The Dallas Morning News article and the 
Playboy article had spread reports of the alleged confession nationwide. The story had 
also been covered extensively in the Denver media market, and the attorneys argued 
that potential jurors had undoubtedly seen, heard, or read some of the reports. To 
support claims of widespread publicity in the Denver area, McVeigh’s attorneys 
supplemented the motion with copies of fifty-two articles that ran in newspapers serving 
the Denver area and eighty-two transcripts of broadcast stories that aired on stations 
serving the Denver area reporting on the confession stories.560 McVeigh’s attorneys 
claimed that under such circumstances, it would be impossible to ensure a fair trial set 
to begin in seventeen days.561 
 In presenting their argument, McVeigh’s attorneys looked to precedent, citing 
two cases that involved pretrial publicity and confessions that had both resulted in 
rulings favorable to the defendants. The two cases were the Supreme Court case Rideau 
V. Louisiana (1963) and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals case known as Coleman 
v. Kemp (1985). The McVeigh motion claimed these cases had similarities with the 
situation before the court in the McVeigh case, and the precedents set in these cases 
showed the McVeigh court should take action to remedy the problems presented by 
prejudicial pretrial publicity.562 
  
 
210 
 In Rideau v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court reversed the conviction of robbery 
and murder defendant Wilbert Rideau. Rideau had taken part in a bank robbery in 
which a bank employee was killed. He was arrested shortly after the crime, and the next 
day the Calcasieu Parish sheriff allowed a camera crew to film Rideau answering 
questions from the Sheriff at the jail. During the interview, Rideau did not have an 
attorney present, and he admitted to his role in the robbery and murder. The interview 
subsequently aired three separate times on local television stations. Based on the facts 
of the interview, Rideau’s attorneys sought a change of venue, but they were denied. 
Rideau was tried, convicted, and sentenced to death. Three of the jurors in the case later 
admitted to having seen Rideau’s statements on television.563 
 The Supreme Court determined that the most unusual circumstances in Rideau’s 
case tainted the jury and denied him his right to a fair trial. The Court wrote: 
The record shows that such a thing as this never took place before in Calcasieu 
Parish, Louisiana. Whether it has occurred elsewhere, we do not know. But we 
do not hesitate to hold, without pausing to examine a particularized transcript of 
the voir dire examination of the members of the jury, that due process of law in 
this case required a trial before a jury drawn from a community of people who 
had not seen and heard Rideau’s televised interview. “Due process of law, 
preserved for all by our Constitution, commands that no such practice as that 
disclosed by this record shall send any accused to his death” [Quoting from 
Chambers v. Florida].564 
McVeigh’s attorneys argued that the situation presented by The Dallas Morning News 
story was far more prejudicial than that of Wilbert Rideau. The Rideau interview was 
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broadcast only three times to a localized audience, but the stories of McVeigh’s alleged 
confession went to a much larger audience. The motion read: 
These reports have been relentlessly republicized by every media known to man. 
In sum, in this case, egregiously prejudicial and inflammatory pretrial publicity 
has saturated not only the Denver community where Mr. McVeigh’s trial is to be 
held, it has swept the nation.565 
 Coleman v. Kemp was a Georgia case reversed by the Eleventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals in 1985.566 The defendant, Wayne Coleman, and an accomplice were tried, 
convicted, and sentenced to death for murdering six members of a Donalsonville, 
Georgia, family. The case received extensive press coverage, and Coleman’s attorneys 
highlighted the fact that coverage routinely included law enforcement statements 
claiming Coleman was guilty of the crime. Regarding this pretrial publicity, the 
appellate court wrote: 
All of the foregoing was widely reported in all of the newspapers serving 
Seminole County, and in what the record discloses of the broadcast media. It 
was repeated time and again. The details of the testimony of Coleman’s own 
half-brother, Billy Issacs, describing explicitly the horrible manner in which 
Coleman and the others murdered the six Alday family members, were widely 
and repeatedly reported in Seminole County immediately prior to Coleman’s 
trial. In short, there was an overwhelming showing in the press of petitioner 
Coleman’s guilt before his trial ever began.567 
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McVeigh’s attorneys drew a parallel between the pervasive pretrial publicity in 
Coleman and the publicity generated by the Dallas Morning News article. McVeigh’s 
attorneys wrote: 
Here it is likewise inconceivable that Mr. McVeigh will receive an impartial 
assessment of his guilt or innocence based on the evidence adduced at trial. This 
court should heed the wisdom on the Coleman decision and avoid a travesty of 
justice.568 
 As a remedy for the situation, the McVeigh team proposed a continuance of the 
case, a change of venue or dismissal of the charges with prejudice – meaning the 
charges could not be filed again.569 McVeigh’s attorneys claimed moving forward with 
the case and attempting to screen out jurors who may have heard and been prejudiced 
by the news reports would be impractical. McVeigh’s attorneys wrote, “Questioning 
these prospective jurors during voir dire regarding what they have heard about this case 
and having them repeat what they have heard only brings the prejudicial facts to the 
forefront again.”570 If the court would not dismiss the charges, McVeigh’s attorneys 
asked for a delay of the trial for one year. If the court would not delay, McVeigh’s 
attorneys asked for a change of venue to “... the Districts of Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto 
Rico, the Virgin Islands, [or] Vermont.”571 
 The prosecution responded to McVeigh’s motion the same day. Prosecutors 
rejected McVeigh’s claim that some type of relief was required. Instead, prosecutors 
took the position that any damage done to the prospective jury pool could not possibly 
be known until voir dire began, thus the solution was to move forward with the trial as 
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soon as possible. Prosecutors wrote, “It is now the time to try the case in court rather 
than be held hostage to outside events that the Court cannot control.”572 
 Prosecutors claimed that the McVeigh team’s attempt to draw parallels with 
Rideau were specious. Prosecutors wrote that the Denver court had a much larger jury 
pool to draw from than the court in Rideau. Also, prosecutors claimed the Supreme 
Court had clarified since Rideau that publication of inadmissible and prejudicial 
evidence does not mean there is presumptive prejudice. Furthermore, prosecutors wrote 
that, unlike prosecutors in Rideau, the government “... has never lent credence to any 
notion that McVeigh confessed to the crime, and the reported details and circumstances 
of any communication between McVeigh and his defense team are murky at best.”573 
 The prosecution suggested that extensive and vigorous voir dire was the proper 
way to deal with any prospective juror opinions that might have been influenced by the 
confession stories. In making their point on this matter, prosecutors cited Stafford v. 
Saffle – the appeal of Oklahoma mass murderer Roger Dale Stafford. Stafford’s federal 
appellate attorney had been Stephen Jones.574 Prosecutors wrote: 
In Stafford v. Saffle ... publicity in an Oklahoma state death penalty case 
permeated a small community to the extent that all 36 potential jurors had prior 
knowledge of Stafford, or the Lorenz and Sirloin Stockade murders, and of the 
inadmissible fact that Stafford already had received the death penalty for the 
Sirloin Stockade murders. The Tenth Circuit nonetheless held that Stafford had 
not shown “that an irrepressibly hostile attitude pervaded [the] community” and 
the voir dire sufficed to remove any actual bias.575 
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Prosecutors argued that the court had taken more than adequate steps to ensure an 
impartial jury and that getting the case before the jury sooner rather than later was the 
best course of action.576 
 On March 17, 1997, Judge Matsch ruled on the McVeigh team’s motion. Judge 
Matsch denied the motion and ordered the case to proceed as scheduled. The judge 
wrote, “Past experience with jurors and a general awareness of public attitudes about 
pretrial publicity in criminal cases strongly suggests that these stories have had neither 
the wide exposure nor general acceptance that the defendant’s lawyers presume.”577 
Judge Matsch wrote that the confession stories were just the latest in a series of on-
going publications about the case and participants in the case. He also wrote that the 
court had gone to great lengths to ensure “foundational fairness” in the case.578 The 
judge claimed the court had afforded McVeigh foundational fairness throughout the 
proceedings and such would be the case in seating the jury. He wrote: 
The extensive voir dire to be conducted in this case will determine whether the 
persons summoned from 23 counties in Colorado include at least 18 people who 
can serve as jurors and alternates in the forthcoming trial. I have full confidence 
that a fair-minded jury can and will be impaneled and that those selected will 
return a just verdict based on the law and evidence presented to them.579 
With that decision, the trial of Timothy McVeigh went forward as scheduled, but it 
would move forward under a new and much more restrictive order regarding out-of-
court statements – a true gag order.580  
Judge Matsch claimed the new order was needed because the case had moved 
into its most crucial phase – jury selection and trial. Whereas the earlier order offered 
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attorneys some latitude in their comments for the purposes of defending their clients in 
the press and soliciting help in collecting evidence, Judge Matsch claimed those 
attorney roles were not relevant in the jury selection and trial phase. The judge wrote: 
The media attention given to the jury selection proceedings will be satisfied by 
the reportage being provided by news organizations and commentary from 
those members of the legal profession willing to provide it. There is no need for 
the trial participants to explain any aspects of the open trial.581 
The judge did not plan to sequester the jury, and he cited this fact as a main reason for 
toughening his stand on out-of-court statements. While prospective jurors had been 
warned in the summonses and would be warned when they appeared for voir dire not to 
read, watch, or listen to news about the case, Judge Matsch wanted to make sure that if 
any prospective jurors did inadvertently see, watch, or listen to a report, they would not 
be exposed to comments from an attorney or court official. The judge wrote: 
Any statements from the prosecutors, defense counsel, government officials 
and agents having official responsibilities relevant to this case, the defendant 
and court personnel may reasonably be expected to be perceived differently and 
carry a much greater threat of prejudice to fairness.582 
Based on that concern, Judge Matsch issued his order prohibiting anyone involved with 
the case in an official capacity from making “any comments or statements outside the 
courtroom, concerning any of the evidence, court rulings and opinions regarding the 
trial proceedings and anything concerning the jury.”583 
 The gag order faced a final challenge on the eve of opening statements in 
Timothy McVeigh’s trial. On April 23, 1997, McVeigh’s attorneys filed a motion 
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asking to set aside the April 16 gag order once the trial began. Press attorneys filed a 
companion petition also seeking to vacate the gag order. McVeigh’s attorneys and press 
attorneys argued that once the jury was seated and testimony began, the specter of 
public comments affecting potential jurors vanished, and the gag order would no longer 
be needed.584 On April 26, 1997, Judge Matsch held a hearing on the issue. The judge 
ruled that Nichols’s attorneys could be excused from the April 16, 1997 gag order 
because Nichols’s trial had not begun, but the Nichols team would still have to comply 
with the guidelines for extrajudicial statements established in the June 13, 1996 order. 
Judge Matsch reserved ruling as to McVeigh and the press, and he issued his written 
order on May 5, 1997.585 
 Judge Matsch denied the request from the McVeigh team and the press to set 
aside the gag order. The judge wrote that the beginning of testimony did not lessen the 
chance attorney comments could affect the jury, and concerns about jurors hearing 
extrajudicial statements were heightened by the fact that the jury was not sequestered. 
He wrote: 
All jurors have been instructed to avoid publicity about the case and they are 
given daily reminders of their obligation to decide solely on what they hear and 
see as evidence in the case. While the court has full confidence in these jurors 
and trusts them to follow these instructions, there is always the possibility that 
some headline or broadcast teaser will be seen or heard. The potential for 
prejudice from an inadvertent exposure to publicity can be greatly diminished 
by assurance that the news stories are not based on disclosures by counsel or 
those who are participating in the conduct of the trial of Timothy McVeigh. 
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That assurance can only be provided by an order as clear and direct as that 
entered on April 16, 1997.586 
Turning to the press, Judge Matsch wrote that the order did not impede 
journalists’ ability to report on the trial. The judge emphasized the fact that the press 
had received “special accommodations” including reserved courtroom seating, an audio 
feed to an auxiliary courtroom and the nearby pressroom, and reserved space outside the 
courthouse for broadcast reporters to present their reports.587 Judge Matsch concluded 
by writing that if a special circumstance required a trial participant to make a public 
response, he would consider such a request promptly. However, unless and until such a 
situation presented itself, the gag order would stand.588 
 Reflecting on the events of March and April 1997, Stephen Jones said he 
considered network television coverage of The Dallas Morning News and Playboy 
confession stories to be more damaging than the individual print stories. Jones also said 
the timing of those stories dealt the defense a blow from which it could not recover: 
So I think the media basically sunk – I shouldn’t say basically – they did sink 
any chance that McVeigh had for a fair trial. Now, even having said that, I 
believe that had the Dallas Morning News, Playboy, and Prime Time not 
occurred, and we could have gone into the trial without having that, that the 
playing field would have been fair. But after the Dallas Morning News – which 
came after the jury had received their summons, and they knew they were being 
summonsed for the McVeigh trial – the impact was devastating.589 
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Jones also said the decision to move forward with the trial following the confession 
stories was surprising to him considering the court’s consistently cautious approach to 
fair trial/free press issues, especially those concerning pretrial publicity: 
Up to a certain point, Judge Matsch took the position that all publicity was bad –  
gag orders, change of venue, protect the identity of the jurors and so forth. I 
mean, he waxed very eloquently about that. Then as we got to the trial and we 
had The Dallas Morning News debacle, and two or three other things that 
happened. Then Judge Matsch seemed to do a 180-degree swing. And so now, it 
didn’t make any difference what people read in the newspapers or saw on the 
television. Jurors when they take an oath, they leave all of that at the door, and 
they decide the case fairly. Well, obviously people change their minds, and he 
may have changed his mind. But I think that Judge Matsch, and certainly I’m on 
record with my respect for him, I think Judge Matsch was truly shocked at the 
toxic vitriol of the media and how it could enter into his courtroom. And it was 
the sort of 900-pound – not an 800 pound – a 900 pound gorilla that sat in the 
living room that nobody past a certain point – when I say nobody I mean the 
court – wanted to pay attention to it.590 
The Press Protests at McVeigh’s Jury Selection 
 The push to trial was moving forward in late March through April 1997, and the 
court was in the process of jury selection. Judge Matsch was concerned about keeping 
prospective jurors’ identities secret, and he put procedures in place to meet that goal. 
This raised new fair trial/free press concerns about the openness of the jury selection 
process. The court would deal with the issue based on judicial discretion, and that 
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decision would affect the trial by serving as a precedent for the later trial of Terry 
Nichols. 
As jury selection began, the press complained that the court was being too 
secretive about the process.591 The press first objected to a wall that had been 
constructed in front of the jury box that prevented people seated in some areas of the 
courtroom from seeing the jury box. The court had constructed the wall during a 
remodel of the courtroom in late 1996, in part, to accommodate the closed-circuit 
camera.592 The court claimed the wall would shield jurors from the camera’s view. It 
would also prevent jurors from seeing the camera’s location, and it would keep jurors 
from being distracted by the camera.593 The press objected, claiming the court could not 
produce evidence showing how cameras affected juror behavior. The press claimed that 
if the judge were worried about courtroom sketch artists drawing details of jurors’ faces, 
the court could establish rules regarding jurors.594 
 Both defense teams and prosecutors argued in favor of the jury wall. They 
claimed the court had a legitimate interest in protecting the jurors’ identities. The 
defense teams claimed the jury wall prevented spectators from watching juror reactions 
and possibly misinterpreting those reactions. Furthermore, they argued the court had a 
duty to protect jurors – especially jurors serving on a highly publicized, highly 
emotional case.595 Judge Matsch denied the objection of the press to the jury wall, and it 
would remain in the courtroom.596 
 The second fair trial/free press issue related to the jury was a press objection to 
the secrecy surrounding the identity of jurors. To protect juror identities, Judge Matsch 
assigned jurors numbers to use in place of their names. He ordered the transcripts of the 
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voir dire to be sealed until after the jury had been seated. Also, the judge heard attorney 
challenges to jurors in private instead of in open court.597 The prosecution and both 
defense teams moved in favor of the court’s procedures to protect jurors’ identities.598 
 Judge Matsch relied on judicial experience and discretion in denying the press 
motion and kept his procedures in place. The judge determined that opening transcripts 
and identifying jurors would not advance the interests of a fair trial. Furthermore the 
judge determined that identifying jurors could pose a threat to their safety.599 Also, the 
judge expressed concerns about the press speculating on jurors’ personal beliefs. In a 
hearing on the matter, The Rocky Mountain News quoted Matsch as saying: “People 
who serve on a jury do not consent to a strip search of their psyches.”600 The procedures 
for protecting jurors’ identities would continue through jury selection and through the 
trial of Timothy McVeigh.601 
 Judge Matsch considered the publication of juror names and personal 
information a threat to the defendant’s right to a fair trial and a threat to the jurors’ 
safety and wellbeing. The judge weighed the interests of the press against the interests 
of the court, the defendant, and the jurors. He came to the conclusion that the interests 
of the latter took precedent over the interests of the former. 
 When opening statements in the McVeigh trial began on April 24, 1997, the 
expected press invasion of Denver was in full effect.602 Reports about the consortium 
suggest that at the beginning of the McVeigh trial it had more than 130 member 
organizations, but, by the end of the trial, that number had fallen to approximately 
seventy.603 In all, the consortium would register more than 2,000 journalists for court 
credentials including foreign journalists from Brazil, Germany, Italy, and Japan.604 
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The consortium’s logistical plans would break new ground in newsgathering 
technology. News organizations covering the trials made extensive use of fiber optic 
lines. This made the Oklahoma City bombing trial coverage “one of the first major 
events in which about half the video coverage [was] carried over fiber optic lines 
(instead of by satellite).”605 Also, the consortium arranged for the establishment of a 
Web site that would serve as a clearinghouse of court information for journalists. 
Navidec, Inc. of Englewood, Colorado, donated the computer equipment and support 
for the project. The password-protected Web site allowed consortium members 
anywhere with Internet service to get access to daily trial summaries and other court 
documents posted on the site by the court clerk’s office. Consortium director Wayne 
Wicks claimed that the Oklahoma City bombing trials were the first trials to use the 
Internet in such a fashion.606 
On June 2, 1997, the Denver jury found McVeigh guilty on all counts.607 Two 
weeks later, on June 13, the jury reached a decision on punishment, recommending 
McVeigh should be sentenced to death for the Murrah Building bombing.608 The court’s 
focus then turned to Terry Nichols and preparations to bring his case to trial.  
Nichols Trial Preparation and Sealed Documents Appeal 
 With the McVeigh trial over, the court turned its attention to the case against 
Terry Nichols. In most respects, the trial for Nichols would follow the same pattern as 
the McVeigh trial. However, the press was not done with the fair trial/free press issue of 
sealed documents. The press had appealed Judge Matsch’s order to seal and redact 
portions of the severance documents. The Tenth Circuit Court would hear the appeal, 
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and it would cite precedent in its decision. The effect on the case was that Judge 
Matsch’s orders for sealed documents would stand through the Nichols trial. 
In late June 1997, Judge Matsch set the trial date for Nichols. The trial would 
begin on September 29, 1997.609 Michael Tigar would stay on as Nichols’s chief 
counsel, but the government brought in a new prosecutor for the case. Assistant U.S. 
Attorney Larry Mackey of Indiana would lead the government’s case against Nichols.610  
 As the court prepared to try Nichols, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals took up 
the press appeal of the sealed documents related to the severance motions for McVeigh 
and Nichols. In July 1997, the Tenth Circuit justices made their decision. They upheld 
Judge Matsch’s decision and his five-part test for sealing documents that had been used 
since he took over the case.611 
 In the appeal, the press came before the Tenth Circuit, claiming a First 
Amendment right, through Press-Enterprise II, and a common law right to the 
documents submitted in the severance proceedings. Press attorneys also said the nature 
of severance proceedings heighten the importance of making documents presented at 
those proceedings public. Press attorneys argued that the public needed to see the 
evidence submitted at severance hearings to fully understand the reasons the defendants 
were seeking separate trials.612 Press attorneys further claimed that documents 
submitted at severance hearings became public upon submission to the court and that 
concerns about prejudicial pretrial publicity caused by publication of these documents 
was not enough to warrant closure. If any parties did seek closure, the press argued that 
the court should follow its established procedures to prove the need for closure at a 
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hearing and to only allow closure if and when the court found other remedies did not 
exist.613 
 In their opinion, the Tenth Circuit justices wrote that they had not previously 
recognized a First Amendment right to court documents in any previous rulings and that 
they would not do so in the press appeal of Judge Matsch’s decision. However, the 
court recognized that other courts had used the standards of Press-Enterprise II, and 
those standards served as the foundation of Judge Matsch’s five-part test for sealing 
documents in the present case. Based on that premise, the court assumed the standards 
of Press-Enterprise II and its experience and logic test in consideration of the press 
appeal. Applying the experience and logic test to the documents in question, the court 
sought to determine “(1) whether the document is one which has historically been open 
to inspection by the press and the public; and (2) ‘whether public access plays a 
significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in question.’”614 The 
court made note of the special circumstance involved in a case such as the Oklahoma 
City bombing, saying the context of the case was an important consideration in reaching 
the decision. The justices wrote: 
In evaluating the district court’s orders regarding these particular documents, it 
is important to bear in mind the extraordinary context of this case as a whole. A 
high-profile case such as this imposes unique demands on the trial court, and 
requires the court to establish procedures for dealing effectively, efficiently and 
fairly with recurring issues such as whether documents should be placed under 
seal or redacted.615 
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 The Tenth Circuit decision first addressed the motions to suppress evidence. The 
justices found a tradition of openness to suppression hearings and suppression motions. 
The court stated that there was an important public interest in access to suppression 
hearings and motions, since they allowed public scrutiny of the investigation process. 
However, the court claimed that the right of access to suppression hearings and motions 
did not extend to the evidence that was deemed inadmissible through the hearing.616 The 
justices wrote, “Access to inadmissible evidence is not necessary to understand the 
suppression hearing, so long as the public is able to understand the circumstances that 
gave rise to the decision to suppress.”617 Furthermore, the court determined that making 
suppressed evidence public would present a risk of exposing potential jurors to evidence 
that would be inadmissible at trial. The court determined that by holding public 
suppression hearings and by releasing redacted motions, Judge Matsch had satisfied the 
common law right of access to suppression hearings and motions.618 
 Next, the court addressed Nichols’s statements to the F.B.I., referred to as 
Exhibit 72. The court ruled there was no tradition of access to such documents. The 
court also pointed out that Judge Matsch ruled the statements were inadmissible at the 
McVeigh trial and publicizing the statements could prove detrimental to the defendant’s 
rights to a fair trial. Finally, the justices determined that the public had access to the 
hearing where the statements were discussed and that by being present, the public was 
able to gain a general understanding of the issues before the court concerning Exhibit 
72. The court ruled Judge Matsch’s order to keep Exhibit 72 sealed should stand.619 
 Finally, the Tenth Circuit addressed the severance motions. Here the court 
refused to decide whether there was a First Amendment right of public access to the 
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motions. Instead, the court applied a balancing test that weighed the First Amendment 
interests of the press and public against the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a fair 
trial. The justices wrote that in making their cases for severance, the defendant’s 
attorneys had to demonstrate “that their defenses were mutually antagonistic.”620 To 
show the conflict between the defense strategies, the attorneys had to explain in detail 
various aspects of trial strategy. The court claimed that granting public access to 
documents explaining these strategies “would create a Hobson’s choice between the 
need to obtain severance and the need to protect the client’s interest in avoiding 
prejudicial pretrial publicity.”621 The justices wrote that Judge Matsch gave greater 
consideration to the defendant’s positions when he released redacted copies of the 
motion, and the appellate court “declin[ed] to second-guess the district court’s 
conclusion.”622 
 In the summer of 1997, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals made a decision on 
what had been one of the oldest fair trial/free press issues in the Oklahoma City 
bombing case – sealed documents. The court determined Judge Matsch’s five-part test 
based on the experience and logic test of Press-Enterprise II met constitutional 
standards. This ruling affirmed the court’s process that had been in place since January 
1996. That process would extend through the trial of Nichols, but there would still be 
one final attempt to overturn Judge Matsch’s sealed document procedures. 
 From July through September 1997, the court focused on preparing for the trial 
of Nichols. The court reissued the gag order issued before the McVeigh trial in an effort 
to prevent potentially prejudicial statements about press coverage.623 There would be 
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some familiar fair trial/free press issues that would come back before the court prior to 
the Nichols trial. The first of these was another motion for a change of venue. 
 One month before jury selection was to begin, fair trial/free press issues would 
be raised again when Nichols’s attorneys made a bid to have the trial moved. Again 
Nichols’s attorneys presented the court with a report from media analyst Scott 
Armstrong. Armstrong claimed press coverage of the McVeigh case had created a bond 
of sympathy between people in Oklahoma City and Denver, threatening Nichols’s 
chances for a fair trial in Denver. Armstrong’s analysis of newspaper coverage in 
Denver showed that Denver Post coverage of the case surpassed that of The Oklahoman 
by 152% between mid-February and mid-March 1997. Near the end of the McVeigh 
trial, Armstrong claimed the Post’s coverage exceeded the Oklahoman’s by 217%.624 
Nichols’s attorneys wrote, “Media coverage has now made it impossible for a jury in 
this district to make – if called upon – the reasoned moral response required by the 
cases.”625 Nichols’s lawyers asked the court to consider moving the trial to San 
Francisco, California. Prosecutors objected to the request, accusing the defense of 
seeking a trial in San Francisco because the city had a “reputation as a liberal, anti-
death-penalty jurisdiction.”626 
 Judge Matsch exercised his discretion and denied Nichols’s change of venue 
motion on August 15, 1997.627 The judge determined the Nichols team had not shown a 
“sufficient basis for presuming such community prejudice.”628 The judge said 
allegations of a bonding between the people of Denver and Oklahoma City were not 
supported by his experience with juries, and the case would continue as scheduled in 
Denver.629 
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 The Nichols team had approached the court with the same expert and the same 
argument that had persuaded Judge Matsch to move the case to Denver – prejudicial 
pretrial publicity. However, the argument was not as persuasive in August 1997 as it 
was in January 1996. Judge Matsch had seen the McVeigh case through with what he 
determined was a fair jury, and he indicated Nichols too could receive a fair trial before 
an impartial jury in Denver. 
 Like McVeigh, Nichols would face an incriminating press report based on 
confidential information just days before jury selection was to begin. This time the 
confidential information came in the form of an F.B.I. report Nichols’s attorneys 
claimed the government had leaked to The Oklahoman.630 Reporter Nolan Clay wrote 
that the information came from the transcript of Nichols’s April 21, 1995, statement 
given to the F.B.I. at the Herrington, Kansas, police station. Clay’s lead paragraph read, 
“Bombing defendant Terry Nichols told the FBI he had agreed that ‘possibly’ 
something should be done about the deaths of the Branch Davidians near Waco, Texas, 
when talk at gun shows turned to that tragedy.”631 The article appeared on the 
newspaper’s front-page on September 15, 1997.632 
 The report appeared to be based on Nichols’s statements to the F.B.I. (Exhibit 
72), which the Tenth Circuit had determined two months earlier had been legally sealed 
by Judge Matsch.633 The Oklahoman article read: 
Much of what Nichols said has been disclosed publicly since then [at pretrial 
hearings]. But a still-secret report of the interrogation shows that Nichols 
acknowledged taking part in discussions at gun shows about the ‘murder’ of the 
Davidians by federal agents.634  
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The article went on to claim that the document showed Nichols admitted to talking with 
McVeigh about bomb design and bomb building, but Nichols claimed he personally 
never made any bombs with McVeigh.635 The government denied leaking the sealed 
statements to the press.636 The record does not show the incrimination story about 
Nichols’s led to any action in the court, and the case moved forward with jury selection 
beginning on September 17, 1997.637 
 Press coverage of the Nichols trial would be less intense than coverage of the 
trial of McVeigh. The consortium remained intact, but membership dwindled prior to 
the Nichols trial.638 By September 1997, the consortium claimed sixty-six members, and 
only one hundred journalists covered the first days of jury selection in the Nichols trial. 
Twice as many had covered the first day of McVeigh’s jury selection.639 Consortium 
director Wayne Wicks attributed the low turnout to budget constraints.640 The 
consortium would operate through the Nichols trials under the same policies and 
procedures established during the McVeigh trial.641 
 The fair trial/free press issue of open juror challenges would be raised again in 
the Nichols trial. How the court resolved the issue would result in the most significant 
procedural change between the trials of McVeigh and Nichols. Once individual voir 
dire began on September 30, 1997, Michael Tigar asked the court to conduct challenges 
in open court.642 Tigar argued that open challenges brought transparency to the 
proceedings and instilled public confidence in the process.643 Reflecting on his 
reasoning, Tigar said: 
I believe that if a judge has to get on the bench in the presence of the media and 
the public and make his or her rulings in open court, that the judge is going to be 
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more careful about it. Not that the judge will particularly be aware of doing that, 
but it’s just a psychological thing about when we have to face the public. That’s 
a view I’ve held for a long time. That’s why we seek oral argument on motions. 
That’s why we seek oral argument in appeals. Because we, the lawyers, we want 
the judges to have to do it out in public, and I think the public is benefited by 
watching the justice system operate.644 
Judge Matsch agreed to the change on October 1, 1997, but he cautioned 
attorneys they would have to be careful not to reveal private information about potential 
jurors during challenges.645 Judge Matsch would continue to use numbers in place of 
juror names and the jury wall to protect jurors from the closed-circuit camera.646 
 On December 23, 1997, jurors found Terry Nichols guilty of conspiring to bomb 
the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building, but they did not find him guilty of murder. 
Instead the jury found Nichols guilty of involuntary manslaughter in the deaths of eight 
federal agents who died in the bombing.647 Nichols still faced the possibility of the 
death penalty following his conviction on the conspiracy charge, but on January 7, 
1998, jurors told Judge Matsch they were deadlocked in their punishment 
deliberations.648 It was left to Judge Matsch to determine Nichols’s fate, and that would 
not happen until June 1998. 
Final Disposition 
 Though testimony in the Nichols case was over, the debate over fair trial/free 
press issues in the case was not. Between Nichols’s conviction and sentencing, two 
more fair trial/free press issues would be raised regarding sealed documents and the 
closed-circuit broadcasts. 
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 Despite the Tenth Circuit’s ruling in July 1997, the press had not given up the 
fight seeking access to sealed documents. The Dallas Morning News and more than 
sixty other news organizations went to the United States Supreme Court with an appeal 
of the Tenth Circuit Court’s decision to uphold Judge Matsch’s procedures for sealing 
documents. On Monday, February 23, 1998, the Supreme Court declined to consider the 
case without comment.649 The fair trial/free press issue of sealed documents, which had 
led to such loud clamoring from press attorneys, prosecutors, and defense attorneys, 
ended with a hollow silence at the High Court. 
 In April 1998, the closed-circuit issue was raised again. Citing the interests of 
victims and the success of the closed-circuit broadcasts at trial, prosecutors asked the 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals to bring cameras into its courtroom for arguments on 
Timothy McVeigh’s appeal.650 In their motion, prosecutors wrote: 
Closed-circuit transmittal of trial court proceedings in this case has had . . . the 
very positive effect of allowing bombing victims to observe our justice system at 
work, with no adverse impact on the trial. The interests of justice likewise would 
be served by allowing those same victims the opportunity to view the appellate 
argument.651 
Appellate court rules did not permit cameras, but prosecutors claimed the appellate 
court was bound by Section 235 of the Antiterrorism Act that had led to closed-circuit 
coverage of the trials.652 The Tenth Circuit justices disagreed. On April 7, 1998, the 
appellate court denied the government’s motion without comment.653 
 Prosecutors considered the unprecedented closed-circuit broadcasts a success. 
So much so, that they sought to have the broadcasts extended to the appellate 
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proceedings. The lead defense attorneys reflected on the closed-circuit experience with 
differing opinions. Michael Tigar said the closed-circuit broadcasts did not have a 
negative impact on the Nichols trial, and he gave credit to the court’s protocols and 
procedures for the broadcasts: 
The law was very specific and, in the end, given the limitations that the statute 
and then [the limitations] that Judge Matsch imposed on the process … I don’t 
think that I could say that it had any adverse effect. By the way, let me add 
something to that. I think that one thing you might want to consider is that 
maybe the trial even should be videotaped and the videos sealed until after all of 
the appeals are over, and that’s so the public can see an iconic trial and see what 
happened. I have no objection. I have no objection to that, and I think it’s a good 
idea.654 
Stephen Jones said his concerns about the closed-circuit signal being pirated did not 
come to pass.655 He gave the court credit for maintaining security of the signal. Still, 
Jones said he thought the closed-circuit broadcasts ultimately had a negative effect on 
the McVeigh trial. Jones claimed that the broadcasts allowed victim viewers to become 
media commentators on the case: 
The effect of it though was to give people in Oklahoma City who saw it to go 
outside and make statements from the steps of where it was shown [the F.A.A. 
Center in Oklahoma City]. So it continually re-circulated all of the prejudicial 
comments, all of the cheerleading for the government that did not occur in 
Denver because there were very few people present [in Denver] that represented 
the victims or the survivors of the bombing. Most of the media’s attention in 
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Denver was focused mostly on the trial rather than scoring points for the 
government or for the defense. But the Oklahoma City group basically was a 
cheerleading squad or a high school pep squad for the government’s version of 
the case.656 
The final act in the Oklahoma City bombing federal trials came on Thursday, 
June 4, 1998. That day, Judge Matsch sentenced Terry Nichols to life in prison for his 
role in the bombing.657 McVeigh’s death sentence was carried out on June 11, 2001, 
when he was executed at the federal prison in Terre Haute, Indiana.658 Nichols later 
stood trial in Oklahoma for the deaths of the other 160 persons not covered by the 
federal indictment. On May 26, 2004, an Oklahoma jury found Nichols guilty of all 160 
counts of murder and other related charges.659 Like the federal jury, the Oklahoma jury 
could not reach a punishment decision, and on August 9, 2004, Oklahoma District 
Judge Steven Taylor sentenced Nichols to 161 consecutive life terms.660 Nichols will 
most likely never leave prison alive. Should the federal government ever release him 
from custody, the Oklahoma Department of Corrections would immediately take him 
into custody to begin serving his life terms in Oklahoma. 
Stephen Jones and Michael Tigar both said that fair trial/free press issues were 
some of the most important issues raised in the Oklahoma City bombing case and that 
the court’s handling of those issues had significant effects on management of the trials. 
Both attorneys also said that how the court and the individual participants managed 
those fair trial/free press issues might be the longest-lasting legacy of the case. 
 Tigar said the bombing case provides a model for all participants in highly 
publicized cases about the decisions they face in dealing with the press: 
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All of the participants have a job to do to be responsible. The first is that the 
prosecutors and the police have to control themselves. That means the 
prosecutors have to control the police, and in these federal cases they have to 
control the F.B.I. The second thing is that the judge has to take charge of things, 
and Judge Matsch did … There are other judges who have not and we’ve had 
bad effects. And the third thing is the defense counsel has to make a decision. 
And I tell lawyers I believe that, sure, Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada tells you 
what you have a First Amendment right to do, but you’d be a fool to do it. 
Because sound bite journalism – you know broadcast journalism – you’re 
working to a deadline. You’ve got to edit, and the lawyer is of course in no 
control over what’s decided to edit, so the lawyers have to restrain themselves 
there. As Thomas Jefferson said, “He who approaches the media takes a wolf by 
the ears.”661 
 Stephen Jones pointed out that despite appeals that went all the way to the 
Supreme Court, no court overturned any of Judge Matsch’s orders, protocols, or 
procedures addressing fair trial/free press issues: 
Matsch’s opinions and orders of that case are a handbook for federal judges, and 
for that matter, state judges that want to control the toxic vitriol of the media, 
and he showed them how to do it. And it came at a point probably in our history 
where a lot of judges and people in the system thought it had gone too far and 
that some restriction had to be made – this balancing between the Sixth 
Amendment, and the Fifth Amendment, and the First Amendment – was being 
tilted far too much to the media’s side.662 
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In conclusion Jones stated: 
I think twenty-five years after the case, as people begin to look at the effect of it 
since then, that that [fair trial/free press issues] may turn out to be the most 
lasting impression on American jurisprudence, rather than the trial itself and 
McVeigh and the bombing. It will be the impact on what might loosely be called 
the legal media framework. I certainly was not a fan of the First Amendment 
after the trial.663
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CHAPTER IV 
Discussion and Conclusions 
The findings of this study confirm that fair trial/free press issues were important 
aspects of the Oklahoma City bombing case. These fair trial/free press issues began to 
emerge with the initial court appearance for McVeigh in April 1995 and continued 
through the trials of both McVeigh and Nichols. Along the way, the courts resolved 
these issues, using precedent, and, in some cases, using judicial experience and judicial 
discretion. The decisions the courts made regarding fair trial/free press issues in the 
bombing case had a direct impact on the courts’ management of the case. This was 
perhaps most evident in the decision to move the case to Denver, Colorado. Fair 
trial/free press decisions also had consequences outside the courtroom including the 
formation of the press consortium and the Congressional action that led to closed-circuit 
viewing.  
 The closed-circuit broadcast of the trials was truly a unique feature of the 
Oklahoma City bombing trials. The court faced an unprecedented decision regarding 
whether to allow closed-circuit broadcasting. Once the court agreed to allow the 
broadcast, the procedures designed to provide the broadcasts had a further impact on 
how the case was managed. Fair trial/free press issues were such an integral part of the 
Oklahoma City bombing case that it is not possible to fully understand how the case 
moved through the legal system without an understanding of the fair trial/free press 
issues the courts faced. Despite the evidence that conflicts between the First 
Amendment and the Sixth Amendment were an important aspect of the Oklahoma City 
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bombing case, these issues have remained relatively unexplored by researchers prior to 
this study. 
This chapter will discuss the fair trial/free press issues of the Oklahoma City 
bombing case as revealed in the findings of the study. The discussion will examine each 
issue in respect to each of the study’s five research questions. The first three research 
questions asked: What were the fair trial/free press issues brought before the courts in 
the Oklahoma City bombing trials? How did the courts employ precedent and protocol 
to resolve the fair trial/free press issues present in the Oklahoma City bombing trials? 
How did the courts’ resolution of the fair trial/free press issues affect the courts’ 
management of the Oklahoma City bombing trials?  
The study also examined one of the most unique issues in the trials, which was 
the use of closed-circuit broadcasting. Two research questions explored this 
unprecedented aspect of the trials. Research questions #4 and #5 asked how the closed-
circuit viewing provisions became part of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act of 1996 and how the court implemented and managed the provisions. 
 Some of the fair trial/free press issues identified in the findings were unique to 
the Oklahoma City bombing case, and others were consistent with issues present in 
previous cases. In resolving the fair trial/free press issues in the bombing case, the 
courts sometimes looked to precedent and at other times relied on judicial experience 
and discretion. The resolution of almost every fair trial/free press issue in the case 
affected its management to some degree. This discussion will examine these findings 
and draw conclusions regarding how and why the courts resolved the fair trial/free press 
issues as they did. This will advance knowledge about the Oklahoma City bombing 
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case. It will also advance knowledge for legal and mass communication scholars 
examining conflicts between the First Amendment and the Sixth Amendment that the 
press and the courts face in all highly publicized trials. Understanding how those issues 
were resolved in the Oklahoma City bombing case will be of use to the courts and 
journalists in future cases. 
Pretrial Publicity 
 The first fair trial/free press issue to emerge in the case was the issue of pretrial 
publicity. McVeigh’s original attorneys, Susan Otto and John Coyle, were the first to 
suggest that pretrial publicity threatened McVeigh’s Sixth Amendment right to a fair 
trial. They recognized that the massive amount of press coverage given to the case, 
especially in Oklahoma, meant that it might not be possible to find jurors who had not 
formed opinions about the case and the defendants prior to trial. Stephen Jones and 
Michael Tigar expressed similar concerns once they took over as counsel for the 
defendants. Prosecutors, on the other hand, never expressed concerns over prejudicial 
pretrial publicity. They had little reason to be concerned. The findings show a majority 
of the pretrial publicity, much of it based on leaks, implied McVeigh and Nichols were 
indeed guilty of the crime. With the bulk of pretrial publicity advancing and supporting 
the prosecution’s theory of the case, prosecutors took the position that any possible 
prejudicial effects of pretrial publicity could not be known until attorneys began juror 
voir dire. Prosecutors also expressed the belief that thorough voir dire could screen out 
jurors who were biased against the defendants, ultimately leading to an impartial jury in 
the State of Oklahoma. 
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The findings show that the lengthy pre-indictment period created an 
environment in which pretrial publicity flourished. By the time the indictments were 
issued, three months had passed since the bombing. During that time, Tigar claimed to 
have collected more than 1,700 newspapers stories from across the country about the 
bombing with more than 1,000 of those stories appearing in Oklahoma newspapers. 
These newspaper stories along with more than 900 broadcast transcripts would be 
entered as evidence in the change of venue motions filed in November 1995. Other 
specific elements of pretrial publicity that emerged in the findings as important were the 
video and photographs of McVeigh being escorted from the Noble County jail prior to 
his first court appearance, Governor Keating’s statements to the press referring to 
McVeigh and Nichols as “creeps,” and the video and photographs of McVeigh and 
Nichols in chains leaving the Oklahoma County jail for the change of venue hearings. 
Previous research concluded that pretrial publicity and its potential to affect 
jurors has been a primary concern for courts handling highly publicized cases 
throughout American judicial history. As far back as the Aaron Burr trial of 1807, the 
courts recognized that the First Amendment right of the press to report on crimes and 
court cases could be prejudicial to a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to receive a 
fair trial. The literature shows that in the 1800s the solution to the problem was 
extensive voir dire to determine whether potential jurors exposed to pretrial publicity 
had formed firm opinions biased against defendants. This was the remedy established 
by the Aaron Burr case and the George Reynolds case.  
By the mid-twentieth century, the press coverage of infamous crimes had 
become more pervasive in America. Radio and television had joined newspapers and 
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magazines as means of distributing information. Scholars investigating the issue report 
that in the 1950s and 1960s, the Supreme Court became increasingly troubled about the 
impact all of this press coverage had on the judicial system. In Shepherd v. Florida, 
Justice Frankfurter called pretrial publicity “...one of the worst menaces to American 
justice.”1 In its Irvin v. Dowd decision, the Court specifically referenced the 
increasingly pervasive press and the effects such coverage might have on potential 
jurors. Still, none of the fair trial/free press cases of the 1950s and 1960s that 
established the foundational precedent for mitigating pretrial publicity took place in a 
media environment similar to that of the Oklahoma City bombing case. 
The Oklahoma City bombing case was like no other case seen before. The crime 
itself was an attack committed against the United States of America by citizens of the 
United States that resulted in the deaths of 168 victims. Like the important fair trial/free 
press cases of the 1950s and 1960s, the Oklahoma City bombing case was covered 
extensively by the press, but in the mid-1990s, the press included twenty-four-hour 
cable news programs and the burgeoning Internet. These aspects of an even more 
pervasive press made pretrial publicity much more of a concern in the bombing case 
than previous courts had seen. 
The findings show the primary precedent-setting case concerning pretrial 
publicity was Sheppard v. Maxwell. The Supreme Court decision in this case was the 
culmination of the Court’s frustrations that had built during the 1950s and early 1960s. 
Sheppard v. Maxwell established guidelines for judges to follow to preserve the 
possibility of a fair trial in cases that received intense press coverage. The guidelines 
included: (1) Courts have the ability to limit statements made by court personnel and 
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law enforcement, and the court should exercise this ability. (2) The court can delay the 
trial until media attention dies down. (3) The defense may ask for a change of venue. (4) 
Voir dire should be thorough, and it should focus on pretrial publicity in cases that have 
drawn intense media attention. (5) The court can sequester the jury to prevent jurors 
from being influenced by the media or others outside the case. These were the 
prescriptive measures available to the trial court in the Oklahoma City bombing case, 
and the court would utilize some of them in its management of the case. The court’s 
efforts to mitigate pretrial publicity utilizing the prescriptive measures of Sheppard v. 
Maxwell had multiple effects in the Oklahoma City bombing trials including a rare 
federal change of venue and two orders to limit the out-of-court statements. The 
findings show that pretrial publicity was the most significant fair trial/free press issue 
present in the bombing case. It was at the center of almost every other fair trial/free 
press issue raised in the case, and how the court dealt with this issue and related issues 
had an effect on management of the case. 
Defense Team Press Strategies 
 The findings show the defense teams had concerns about pretrial publicity. Both 
defense teams developed strategies for dealing with the press in light of these concerns, 
but the strategies they developed were quite different from each other. Michael Tigar’s 
strategy for the Nichols team was to avoid speaking to the press as a rule. Tigar wanted 
to exert as much control as possible over information that would come from the Nichols 
team and be reported in the press. For this reason, Tigar rarely did interviews with 
reporters. Tigar said his dramatic post-indictment press conference was a calculated 
move to make a clear statement about his client in a forum that would draw a large 
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number of reporters at a time such a statement was relevant and in a manner in which he 
would have control of the situation. The Nichols team employed this information 
control strategy throughout the life of the case. 
 Tigar had argued Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada before the Supreme Court, and 
the experience obviously influenced his press strategy for the bombing trial. Tigar’s 
decision to make a single public statement before the assembled press immediately after 
Nichols’s indictment was precisely the same strategy employed by Dominic Gentile in 
1987. At the press conference, Tigar stated the general nature of the defense (Terry 
Nichols wasn’t there) and he held up a sign stating the same for emphasis. Tigar may 
have pushed the boundaries of the A.B.A. Model Rules by claiming Nichols was 
innocent, but following the post-indictment press conference, he never actively sought 
an audience with the press to make proclamations about his client. Tigar said Gentile 
defined the boundaries of pretrial attorney speech, and he knew those boundaries as 
well as anyone, having argued the case before the Supreme Court. In the Oklahoma City 
bombing case, Tigar had the opportunity to put the lessons of Gentile into practice, and 
he did so with a very conservative strategy.  
 Stephen Jones employed a completely different press strategy. This was due to 
the fact that prosecutors and the press both focused more attention on McVeigh. 
Moreover, the McVeigh team also faced a pretrial publicity problem the Nichols team 
did not – the video and photos of McVeigh being escorted from the Noble County 
courthouse. Jones clearly believes the impact of the Noble County walkout was highly 
prejudicial, and the court would come to agree with that assessment as stated in the 
change of venue order issued in February 1996. Fighting the negative public image of 
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McVeigh would spur Jones to reach out to the press in an attempt to make press reports 
work in his favor. 
 Jones did not shield himself from the press as Tigar did. Instead, Jones made 
himself available to the press, and he also made McVeigh available to the press. Jones 
explained his strategy as having three components. The first component was a public 
relations campaign to try to improve McVeigh’s image in public consciousness. This 
was the motive behind McVeigh’s interviews with reporters and Jones’s release of 
McVeigh’s military records. The second component was the development of a quid pro 
quo relationship with the press through which the McVeigh team could barter 
information with individual journalists. This tactic could potentially further positive 
press about McVeigh, while also serving as an informal information collection tool for 
the McVeigh team. The third component was the leverage Jones claimed to gain with 
journalists through the quid pro quo tactic. Jones believed at the time that by making 
himself available to the press, he could develop relationships with reporters that would 
allow him to stop some reports that could be damaging to McVeigh, which he claimed 
he did on occasion. 
 The McVeigh team faced a tougher battle in the court of public opinion than the 
Nichols team. The investigation had identified McVeigh as the leader of the conspiracy 
and the person who actually detonated the bomb, and because of this, the press focused 
more attention on McVeigh. The Noble County walkout further solidified McVeigh’s 
image as the prime suspect. Jones claimed the negative publicity about McVeigh was 
fueled to a large degree by persistent and pervasive information leaks from the 
government. It was exactly this type of situation that Justice Kennedy and the minority 
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had envisioned in Gentile when they argued for lesser constraints on attorney pretrial 
speech. Like the Gentile minority, Jones believed he was obligated to aggressively 
defend McVeigh in the court of public opinion and to make attempts at stemming the 
tide of prejudicial publicity against McVeigh.  
The development of strategies for dealing with the press was not a unique aspect 
of the Oklahoma City bombing trial. Lawyers in any high profile case must consider 
how they will present themselves and their clients to the public. What is worthy of 
mention about the bombing trial is that it presented a highly publicized post-Gentile 
case in which two attorneys representing two different clients developed press strategies 
that mirrored the divided court in the Gentile decision. Tigar and the Nichols team took 
a conservative approach, staying well within the limits supported by the Rehnquist 
majority in Gentile. Jones and the McVeigh team took an aggressive approach similar to 
that proposed by the Kennedy minority in Gentile. The Oklahoma City bombing case 
was a practical application on a grand stage of the precedent established in Gentile v. 
State Bar of Nevada, and fair trial/free press scholars can learn much from viewing the 
case through the Gentile framework.  
Sealed Documents 
 The court’s practice of sealing large numbers of documents became a fair 
trial/free press issue early on in the Oklahoma City bombing case. The press and the 
public had a keen interest in documents related to the case, and the amount of 
documents was extensive due to the depth and complexity of the investigation. The 
findings show that the court was quite wary of allowing access to court documents from 
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the beginning of the case, and this set up a fair trial/free press conflict between the press 
and the courts. 
 From the beginning of the case, Western District judges allowed virtually 
blanket sealing of court documents. The press challenged this action as being 
“constitutionally deficient,” and they had precedent on their side. The Supreme Court 
had previously recognized a tradition of openness in the courts through a line of cases 
beginning with Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia and extending through Globe 
Newspaper Inc., Press-Enterprise I, and Press-Enterprise II. Through these cases, the 
Supreme Court consistently stated that the openness of the courts was essential to 
ensuring public confidence in the judicial system. The Court came to conclude that 
limiting access to the courts in some instances was not unconstitutional but that any 
limits on access must be based on an overriding state interest. The trial court must show 
that closure is the only means of meeting that interest. The closure order must be 
narrowly tailored to meet the interest, and the court must hold hearings on the record to 
prove the criteria for closure. 
 The findings show the linage of cases beginning with Richmond Newspapers 
and extending through Press-Enterprise II addressing access to the courts established a 
common law right of access to court documents. This would be the precedent used by 
the court in the Oklahoma City bombing case to address the fair trial/free press issue of 
access to court documents. The court would also look to federal statute regarding the 
Criminal Justice Act attorney fee documents, and it would employ judicial discretion in 
deciding the issue. 
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 Though the Western District judges had ultimately unsealed some documents, 
they did not establish a procedure for dealing with sealed documents before the case 
passed to Judge Matsch. Judge Matsch would ultimately decide how this fair trial/free 
press issue would be managed through the remainder of the case, and he found his 
guiding precedent in the experience and logic test of Press-Enterprise II. The 
experience and logic test recognized a qualified First Amendment right of access to the 
courts, but it also stated that right was “not absolute,” meaning judges could in some 
instances use their experience and judicial discretion in determining whether a 
defendant’s right to a fair trial took precedence over the press/public right of access.2 
The judge looked to precedent and exercised his discretion in crafting his five-question 
procedure for handling sealed documents for the remainder of the case. The findings 
show that the order met the standards established in Press-Enterprise II of establishing 
an overriding state interest, crafting an order narrowly tailored to meet those interests, 
and allowing for challenges prior to sealing documents. 
 Judge Matsch’s test asked if there was a tradition of access to the documents in 
question, whether making the documents public would further or hinder the court’s 
purpose, whether access to the documents would prejudice the public, whether access to 
the documents would negatively affect the defendant’s right to a fair trial, and whether 
the sealing of the documents in question was essential to preserving that right. The test 
provided a framework through which to examine sealed document requests. The order 
also established a process for handling sealed documents. Judge Matsch instructed 
attorneys to be careful not to reveal discovery information in motions filed with the 
court. Attorneys wanting to file a document under seal, other than attorney fee 
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documents, were required to file a motion requesting a seal order and allow three days 
for objections before the judge would consider the motion. 
 The judge determined that Criminal Justice Act documents related to attorney 
fees had no presumption of openness. In fact, Judge Matsch wrote that federal statute 
and court rules specified these documents should be sealed. However, the judge’s sealed 
documents order did establish a classification system for docket sheet entries of C.J.A. 
documents that would allow the press and public to know what type of service attorneys 
had requested, though specifics about the request and the dollar amount requested 
would not be disclosed. 
 The findings support the conclusion that Judge Matsch’s sealed documents order 
affected management of the case by putting an end to the practice of broad scale 
document sealing. The order also affected case management by providing clear rules 
and procedures for the handling of documents related to the case. Though press 
attorneys did not get access to the attorney fee documents they wanted, the order did 
result in removing some secrecy surrounding the documents. The order did give the 
press an opportunity to challenge requests to seal non-C.J.A. documents filed by 
prosecutors or defense attorneys. The press appealed the order as being too restrictive 
and too deferential to the defendants, but that appeal was not successful. 
 The high level of press interest in bombing case documents clashed with the 
court’s need to keep discovery and investigative information out of public discussion 
during the pretrial period. The Western District judges appeared to go too far in 
allowing almost blanket sealing of documents without allowing the public and the press 
to contest these seal orders. Judge Matsch recognized the problems of blanket sealing, 
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but he also recognized the threat posed by discovery information and attorney fee 
information going public. The judge’s sealed documents order was an attempt to 
balance the First Amendment rights of the press and public with the Sixth Amendment 
rights of the defendants; however, the order gave deference to the defendants’ rights. 
Judge Matsch’s sealed documents procedures withstood press appeals to the Tenth 
Circuit and the United States Supreme Court, which declined to hear the case. The 
judge crafted an order governing sealed documents in one of the most highly publicized 
criminal trials in American history. The order was challenged and upheld on appeal. 
The fact that the order accomplished the goals of the court and withstood legal 
challenges suggests that other courts facing a similar situation might look to Judge 
Matsch’s sealed documents procedures as a model. 
Change of Venue 
 Another dominant fair trial/free press issue in the early months of the case was 
the issue of a change of venue. The findings show that calls for a change of venue came 
from the defense teams as early as McVeigh’s initial appearance in late April 1995. 
Stephen Jones continued the effort in the pre-indictment period, and Michael Tigar 
would join the cause after the indictments. The main factor in the push for a change of 
venue was pretrial publicity. Granting a change of venue was one of the remedies 
specifically mentioned in Sheppard v. Maxwell for cases in which pretrial publicity 
threatened the court’s ability to seat an impartial jury. This was exactly what the 
defense teams claimed had occurred in the early months of the bombing case. The 
defense teams claimed Oklahomans had been subjected to so much publicity about the 
bombing that finding an impartial jury panel in Oklahoma would be impossible. The 
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government said such claims were impossible to prove without attempting to seat an 
Oklahoma jury and a change of venue should not be considered unless and until it 
became apparent an impartial jury could not be found in the state.  
 The change of venue motions filed by the defense teams focused heavily on 
pretrial publicity. Though both defense teams and the government conducted polling of 
potential jurors, the findings show that evidence of pretrial publicity was a more 
important factor for the court in deciding the change of venue issue. Both defense 
attorneys said in interviews that the testimony of media expert Scott Armstrong was 
pivotal in their opinion. Armstrong testified that coverage of the bombing in the 
Oklahoma press was more extensive and of a different tone than press coverage in other 
states and in the national press. Armstrong said that the theme and tone of Oklahoma 
press reports had created a sense of kinship between bombing victims and the people of 
Oklahoma. Jones claimed that the videotaped statements from Governor Keating, 
including his comments from the May 25, 1995, press conference, were highly 
prejudicial. The potential effects of a high-ranking elected official making prejudicial 
statements were of great concern in the bombing case just as the literature shows they 
had been in the Manson trial. Further evidence of prejudicial publicity came from the 
video of McVeigh being escorted from the Noble County jail and the photos and video 
taken of McVeigh and Nichols leaving the Oklahoma County Jail while the change of 
venue hearings were taking place. The findings show that the episode at the Oklahoma 
County Jail greatly upset Judge Matsch, and the defense attorneys considered that 
episode a key element in the judge’s decision. 
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 The findings show Judge Matsch exercised one of the prescriptive measures 
referenced in Sheppard v. Maxwell in granting the change of venue. To make his 
decision, the judge considered the evidence offered at the hearings, and he exercised 
judicial discretion. There seems little doubt that the judge found the evidence of 
prejudicial pretrial publicity valid and compelling, but he saw little value in the polling 
data. Judge Matsch determined that the press had “demonized” the defendants and that 
the coverage had prejudiced Oklahomans against the defendants.3 The judge referred to 
the testimony of Scott Armstrong in his order, noting the higher number of stories 
produced by the Oklahoma press and the framing of these stories that focused on 
sympathy for bombing victims. He wrote that the coverage had created a sense of 
family among the victims and the people of Oklahoma, suggesting that finding an 
impartial jury in the state would be difficult. The judge also said the repeated use of 
video showing McVeigh leaving the Noble County Courthouse and the images of 
McVeigh and Nichols taken during the change of venue hearings were further evidence 
of prejudicial pretrial publicity. Prosecutors claimed that moving the trial out of state 
would inconvenience victims and possibly violate their rights under federal crime 
victim statutes, but the judge said the defendants’ rights to a fair trial took precedent 
over any claim by the victims. For these reasons, the judge granted the change of venue, 
guided by remedies provided by precedent and exercising his experience and discretion 
regarding the facts in evidence.  
 The judge’s decision to grant a change of venue affected case management by 
physically relocating the case to Denver. This had the secondary effect of serving as the 
impetus for two more fair trial/free press issues the court would have to address in the 
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future – the press consortium and closed-circuit broadcasting. Almost immediately after 
the change of venue order was filed, the victims and members of Congress began 
working in earnest to draft closed-circuit legislation. Also, the press corps began to 
organize to prepare for covering the trials in Denver.  
The Press Consortium 
 The findings show that the press addressed the challenges posed by the change 
of venue by organizing and forming the Oklahoma City Bombing Trial Media 
Consortium. The consortium provided the press with a means to work with the court 
and the City of Denver as a unified group. In this way, individual press organizations 
could meet their responsibilities to cover the case without being forced to manage 
logistics and communication with the court on their own. The court and the city also 
benefited from this arrangement. The findings show that Denver city officials were 
concerned that the bombing trial would bring a disorganized media free-for-all to the 
streets around the downtown courthouse similar to what had happened at the O.J. 
Simpson trial in Los Angeles. The city’s interest was in maintaining order. 
 Other examples of massive press coverage of trials that created problems both 
inside and outside the courthouse can be found in the literature. The Hauptmann trial, 
the Sheppard trial, and the Estes trial were all cases in which aggressive coverage by the 
press was criticized by the courts and some journalists. By the time of the Oklahoma 
City bombing trials, these historic cases were well known to the courts and served as 
examples of what could happen if judges did not assert firm control and bring some 
sense or order to the activities of the press in and around the courthouse. The Supreme 
Court said as much in Sheppard v. Maxwell, claiming that the press had essentially 
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taken over the courtroom and that the judge had the power to prevent this and should 
have exercised this power. 
 The work of the consortium in conjunction with the city and the court meant the 
disruptive situations seen in other cases did not occur with the bombing trial. The 
number of reporters who received credentials to cover the McVeigh trial would 
eventually approach 2,000. Without some way to establish order outside the courthouse, 
the potential for pandemonium was high. The solution was the press work area on the 
courthouse plaza known as the bullpen. This gave trial participants and the press a 
common area designed for the interaction between the parties to prevent attorneys from 
being mobbed on the streets. Although press mobs did happen anyway, it appears that 
the bullpen was considered a success by the parties involved.  
 The court also avoided disruption of operations by working with the consortium 
to distribute documents and information to consortium members via the Internet. This 
appears to have streamlined operations in the court clerk’s office while meeting the 
informational needs of the press corps. 
 Inside the courtroom, Judge Matsch exerted firm control, but the findings show 
that he did work with the consortium to accommodate the needs of the press as well. 
The judge held a special meeting with journalists before proceedings began in Denver 
to explain his courtroom rules and to express his expectations of how journalists would 
conduct themselves in his court. He set aside nearly half of the courtroom seats for the 
press but left ample seating available for the pubic, thus avoiding criticisms of showing 
preferential treatment of the press such as were noted in the Sheppard decision. 
Through the work of the consortium and the court, the press also enjoyed the benefits of 
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the auxiliary listening courtroom and the extension of the sound feed to the pressroom 
across the street from the courthouse. 
 One aspect of the court/consortium relationship that explains much about how 
and why the press and the court worked together as they did was the personality of 
Judge Matsch himself. The press accounts and defense attorney interviews paint a 
picture of Judge Matsch as a judge who held his profession and the administration of 
justice in the highest regard. He is described as having no tolerance for delays or 
distractions in his courtroom, and he set strict rules for how attorneys, witnesses, and 
spectators should behave in his court. He was not a judge who would be influenced by 
the press attention a case like the Oklahoma City bombing would bring to him 
personally. The literature shows that the Supreme Court had repeatedly claimed judges 
had the power to police their own courtrooms, and the Court had been critical of judges 
who had not exercised that authority – especially in highly publicized cases. To his 
credit, Judge Matsch did work with the consortium, but the findings show that it was 
always clear that he was in charge and that he would not tolerate any actions on the part 
of the press that threatened his authority or the administration of justice in his 
courtroom. 
 The consortium was a unique aspect of the Oklahoma City bombing trials. The 
literature does not indicate that an organized press group had formed to cover previous 
trials to the degree that the consortium did for the Oklahoma City bombing trials. The 
consortium was successful enough that Sacramento, California, city officials preparing 
for the 1998 Unabomber trial contacted Denver city officials for advice. Thus, the 
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Oklahoma City bombing trial consortium has and may continue to serve as a model for 
courts and cities dealing with cases that draw widespread press attention in the future. 
Audio Feeds and Audiotapes 
 The use of audio feeds and audiotapes was a practice the court adopted to 
accommodate the press that became another fair trial/free press issue in the case. The 
first attempt at using an audio feed was at the change of venue hearings in Oklahoma 
City in January 1996. News reports indicate that the judge approved an audio feed to a 
second courtroom that would be used if more spectators showed up than the main 
courtroom could hold; however, later news reports indicate the overflow courtroom was 
not used at the hearings. Judge Matsch continued the practice once the trial moved to 
Denver. The judge allowed this because there were more reporters wanting seats in the 
courtroom than seats available. The judge was careful not to allow the press to take up 
all of the seats in the courtroom or to give them preferential seating. The Supreme Court 
had been critical of such arrangements in the Sam Sheppard case. Judge Matsch would 
eventually allow the audio feed to extend to the pressroom across the street from the 
courthouse but only after the press corps agreed to police its own and not tape or 
broadcast any of the sound feed. 
 The findings do not show that the judge followed any precedent in deciding to 
utilize the audio feeds case. What is notable is that the judge took steps he was not 
required to take in order to accommodate journalists. It is also notable that while the 
judge stood firmly on Rule 53 and its ban on broadcasting from the courtroom for other 
issues, he apparently did not view the transmission of the audio feed outside the 
courthouse as a violation of the rule. In the case of audio feeds, Judge Matsch placed the 
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responsibility of making sure the audio feed to the pressroom was not misused on the 
shoulders of the press corps, and the record shows the journalists met that 
responsibility. 
 The findings show that the fair trial/free press issue of audiotapes placed the 
court and the press corps at odds immediately after the practice began. Judge Matsch 
was following his own court rules and standard procedures when he allowed journalists 
to purchase audiotapes of the first proceedings in Denver. This taping of court 
proceedings and the sale of those tapes was allowed also under the rules established by 
the Judicial Conference. Both Stephen Jones and Michael Tigar believe the judge did 
not anticipate that broadcast journalists would use the actual recordings in their reports, 
but that was indeed what happened. Judge Matsch immediately stopped the practice of 
selling audiotapes, and the prohibition remained in place through both trials. In his 
order that stopped the sale of audiotapes, the judge looked to the precedent of Rule 53. 
He wrote that using the tapes in broadcast reports was the “functional equivalent” of 
live broadcasting.4 The judge determined that this was a violation of Rule 53, and he 
permanently stopped the practice. Judge Matsch’s decision to immediately and 
permanently end the practice of selling audiotapes meant the issue was immediately 
resolved and would not reoccur in the case. 
Information Leaks 
 Information leaks were a fair trial/free press issue in the bombing case from the 
beginning. The defense teams accused prosecutors early on of leaking investigative 
information to the press. Later the government would accuse the defense teams of doing 
the same. The issue came to a critical point shortly after the case moved to Denver, 
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when the Nichols team asked Judge Matsch to conduct an investigation to determine the 
source of information leaked to the press around the time of the first anniversary of the 
bombing. The findings show that the defense teams had the greatest concerns over 
leaked information. They feared investigative information leaked by the government 
would prejudice potential jurors against McVeigh and Nichols. Both Jones and Tigar 
said in interviews that leaks were a constant problem for the defense teams throughout 
the case. 
 The defense teams claimed that leaks most often originated with the government 
and that the stories produced from leaked information were prejudicial toward the 
defendants. Jones and Tigar both cited instances where reporters claimed to have gotten 
investigative information that should not have been released from government sources. 
The defense claimed the government held a decided advantage in access to the press 
through the institutional links between journalists and law enforcement sources. The 
defense also claimed the government used these institutional links to leak information 
about the case. In a case like the bombing case with vast amounts of information and 
investigators, finding the source of individual leaks would be difficult if not impossible. 
 The findings do not show Judge Matsch used any guiding precedent in deciding 
whether to investigate information leaks. Instead, Judge Matsch exercised judicial 
discretion in deciding not to conduct an investigation. The judge explained his decision 
by saying such an investigation would be difficult since there were so many people with 
access to information about the case. He also said that an investigation would delay the 
trial and that it would distract the court from its objective of getting the case to trial. The 
findings suggest Judge Matsch was particularly concerned with moving the case to trial 
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as expeditiously as possible. He feared a lengthy delay to investigate leaks would 
unnecessarily delay the process and perhaps allow more time for more stories based on 
leaks to surface. It is possible, however, that had Judge Matsch thoroughly investigated 
the leaks, it would have shown both prosecutors and defense attorneys that he was 
serious in his efforts to clamp down on prejudicial pretrial publicity based on leaks. It is 
also possible such a firm stance demonstrated by the court could have prevented later 
problems created by information leaks. 
 The court’s failure to address information leaks prior to June 1996 placed 
attorneys, primarily defense attorneys, in a position where they had to decide whether or 
not to respond to sensitive information revealed in the press. The defense teams in 
particular felt this put them at a distinct disadvantage. Ultimately, Judge Matsch decided 
to address the issue with orders that would restrict out-of-court statements, which 
directly affected case management. However, by the time the court issued the first 
restrictive order in June 1996, the case had been plagued by information leaks for more 
than a year. 
Restrictive Order and Gag Order 
 The Nichols team and the government had both asked for a gag order to resolve 
the issue of leaks, but the McVeigh team opposed the idea. There was precedent for 
restricting out-of-court statements in such a highly publicized case. This was one of the 
remedies mentioned in Sheppard v. Maxwell. In that decision, the Supreme Court wrote 
that had the court restricted out-of-court comments by attorneys and investigators, the 
press, “would have soon learned to be content with the task of reporting the case as it 
unfolded in the courtroom – not pieced together from extrajudicial statements.”5 The 
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judge in the Manson case issued a gag order immediately after the indictment to try to 
limit extrajudicial statements and any effects they might have on potential jurors. 
Nebraska Press Association showed that courts could not gag the press, thus the remedy 
would have to be focused on the parties under the control of the court. 
 Judge Matsch initially took a less severe approach than issuing a gag order by 
issuing a restrictive order instead. The restrictive order placed some limits on statements 
made outside of court and offered guidelines for participants when speaking publicly, 
but it stopped short of banning all communication. In crafting his restrictive order, 
Judge Matsch looked to the American Bar Association Model Rules as a guide. The 
literature shows that the A.B.A. Model Rules had evolved from the Sheppard v. 
Maxwell, through Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, to Gentile v. State Bar of 
Nevada. The rules allowed attorneys to comment about procedural issues out of court, 
and they could state that their clients denied the charges against them, but they could 
not offer opinions about the case or discuss evidence in the case. 
 Judge Matsch wrote the order so that it extended to all persons under the court’s 
authority. Specifically, the order mentioned “... marshals, deputy marshals, court clerks, 
bailiffs, court reporters, and employees or subcontractors retained by the court-
appointed official reporters.” 6 McVeigh’s lawyers would later accuse the government 
of attempting to circumvent the order after the Dateline NBC broadcast in September 
1996 featured interviews with two former federal prosecutors and a former F.B.I. agent. 
McVeigh’s attorneys claimed the government was leaking information through former 
investigators, who were not subject to the restrictive order by virtue of the fact that they 
were no longer government employees. This was one example of why the McVeigh 
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team claimed it should be allowed to continue its strategy of allowing McVeigh to 
speak with reporters even after the issuance of the restrictive order. Judge Matsch did 
not allow the McVeigh team’s media plan, and the restrictive order would stand until 
the McVeigh trial began. 
 In the gag order issued in April 1997, Judge Matsch wrote that the case had 
entered a critical period – the trial stage. The judge’s writings in the order show he had 
a particular concern that public statements made during the trial phase could influence 
jurors. Judge Matsch wrote that statements made by attorneys or defendants could be 
particularly influential on jurors, and though the judge had instructed jurors not to read, 
view, or listen to reports about the case, the best insurance against undue influence was 
to end all out-of-court statements. 
 Judge Matsch looked to the precedent of Sheppard v. Maxwell in crafting the 
gag order. The precedent of Sheppard v. Maxwell was evident in the gag order in two 
ways. Restricting statements made by persons under the court’s authority was one of the 
proscriptive measures specifically mentioned in the Sheppard decision. Judge Matsch 
did this in part because he had decided not to exercise the fourth proscriptive measure 
offered by Sheppard – sequestering the jury. Since Judge Matsch could not be certain 
jurors would avoid the press, he mandated that attorneys and all other trial participants 
avoid the press. The judge’s order affected case management by stopping all 
extrajudicial statements by persons under the court’s control at the beginning of the 
McVeigh trial.  
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McVeigh’s Media Access Plan 
 The restrictive order of June 1996 placed an obstacle before the McVeigh team’s 
strategy for dealing with the press and combating prejudicial pretrial publicity. Between 
June 1995 and April 1996, Stephen Jones had arranged four print media interviews with 
McVeigh for publication and two broadcast interviews. Jones had also arranged several 
off-the-record meetings between McVeigh and journalists in anticipation of future on-
the-record interviews as the case neared trial. The restrictive order, however, put that 
plan in jeopardy. 
 The detailed media access plan that Jones presented to the court in August 1996 
was a continuation of his effort to combat prejudicial pretrial publicity while remaining 
in compliance with the court’s restrictive order. Jones said that he designed the plan to 
include local, national, and international press organizations in order to access as wide 
an audience as possible. An examination of the plan shows it was a highly elaborate and 
detailed public relations proposal. If the plan had been successful, McVeigh would have 
had access to a range of press organizations from specifically selected markets – such as 
Denver and Oklahoma City – as well as a national and international audience. This 
would give McVeigh an opportunity to influence public opinion about him on a broad 
scale and in the area where prospective jurors could read, see, and hear the report also. 
Jones admitted the plan was part of his broader public relations plan, but he said it was 
not his intent to claim McVeigh was innocent of the crime. Jones considered the plan an 
attempt to rehabilitate McVeigh’s image. 
 The prosecution and the Nichols team objected to the plan, calling it a bold and 
elaborate attempt to influence jurors. Judge Matsch said it was exactly that in his bench 
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ruling on the matter. The judge denied the plan, thus ending McVeigh’s contact with the 
press for the remainder of the case. The literature does not show evidence that a media 
access plan like the one proposed by Jones had ever been attempted before. The degree 
to which the McVeigh plan might have helped McVeigh’s case will never be known. 
What is known is that the restrictive order on June 1996 greatly reduced extrajudicial 
statements, and the gag order of April 1997 ended them all together. 
 Judge Matsch’s denial of the McVeigh media plan suggests an inconsistency in 
the judge’s management of McVeigh’s media contacts throughout the case. The 
findings show that after Judge Matsch took over the case in December 1995, McVeigh 
had several off-the-record meetings with journalists as well as three print interviews and 
two appearances on network television. Judge Matsch did not seek to prevent these 
meetings nor did he sanction the McVeigh team following publication of the stories. 
However, Judge Matsch did deny the McVeigh media plan following his issuance of the 
restrictive order claiming the plan was an attempt to influence potential jurors. Why the 
judge saw the latter proposal for McVeigh to speak to reporters as a threat to the 
integrity of the process, but did not view the earlier meetings also as a threat is not 
clear. Even so, the judge obviously changed his position on media access for McVeigh, 
which the McVeigh defense team considered detrimental to its strategy. 
Confession Stories 
 Press reports implicating the suspects in the bombing case became a fair 
trial/free press issue just before jurors were seated in both the McVeigh and Nichols 
trials. In both cases, the information the stories were based on was information that by 
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court rules should have been kept secret. In each instance, the stories did not stop the 
trials, but the stories were of great concern for each defense team. 
  The McVeigh team faced a crisis just before jury selection began when The 
Dallas Morning News published a story based on internal defense documents claiming 
McVeigh had admitted to bombing the Murrah building. The story was picked up by 
other print media, and, less than two weeks later, a similar story appeared on the Web 
site for Playboy. Following the Playboy story, all three broadcast networks and the 
ABC news magazine Prime Time Live dedicated time to the confession stories. Stephen 
Jones said the network television coverage of the alleged confession was more 
damaging than the print reports, and he claimed the coverage essentially eliminated any 
chance of McVeigh receiving a fair trial. 
 Pretrial confession stories have been problematic events throughout the history 
of American jurisprudence. In the Manson case, the reported confession of suspect 
Susan Atkins frustrated both prosecutors and defense attorneys. Prosecutor Bugliosi 
said the Atkins confession made it more difficult to find jurors who had not heard 
stories about it. In the Shepherd case and in the Irvin case, there was evidence that 
jurors had heard reports that the suspect had confessed to the crimes prior to trial. The 
Supreme Court was highly critical of these confession reports. 
 The findings show that the information that led to The Dallas Morning News 
story came from internal defense documents. Jones has written that the defense team 
member who leaked the documents did so without authorization; however, the findings 
also suggest Jones’s quid pro quo strategy with the press created an environment in 
which such a situation could arise. Had Jones not established a give and take 
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relationship with the press, the meeting during which the documents were leaked might 
never have happened. The end result was that a highly damaging story appeared in the 
press on the eve of jury selection in the McVeigh Trial. 
 Jones filed a motion seeking to dismiss the charges against McVeigh, to delay 
the trial, or to receive another change of venue. Judge Matsch exercised judicial 
discretion in denying the motions. Judge Matsch wrote that the solution to the problem 
created by the confession stories was to move forward with the case and bring it to trial 
as soon as possible. Jones called the judge’s decision an inconsistency in his 
management of the case. Jones claimed the judge had gone to great lengths to prevent 
pretrial publicity from impacting the case, but after the McVeigh confession stories 
appeared on the eve of jury selection, Judge Matsch expressed little concern the stories 
would influence potential jurors. The findings show Judge Matsch relied on experience 
and discretion in determining that the McVeigh trial should move forward. Judge 
Matsch wrote that he had admonished prospective jurors to begin avoiding press reports 
about the trial when summonses went out prior to The Dallas Morning News’s story, 
and the judge apparently felt those precautions were sufficient to protect against pretrial 
publicity that might emerge after that point.  
 Judge Matsch’s decision to move forward with the trial in spite of the confession 
stories suggests he had come to the conclusion that voir dire would be the best 
protection against juror bias. This was a complete reversal from the position he had 
previously held. In February 1996, the judge determined prejudicial pretrial publicity in 
Oklahoma was so great that a change of venue was in order because voir dire alone 
would not be sufficient protective measure, and yet, on the eve of the trial when news 
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spread across the country that McVeigh had confessed to the crime, the judge had 
changed his mind and claimed voir dire was indeed enough to protect McVeigh’s right 
to a fair trial. Jones noted the inconsistency in Matsch’s decision. Jones also claimed 
that the national coverage of the confession stories eliminated any chance McVeigh had 
at receiving a fair trial. The findings suggest that with so much time, effort, and expense 
invested in the case, the judge apparently decided the court must move forward with the 
case and voir dire would have to be the court’s primary tool to use in preserving the 
integrity of the process. 
 The Nichols defense team faced a somewhat similar situation on the eve of jury 
selection in that trial. Just days before jury selection was to begin, The Oklahoman 
published portions of Nichols’s statements to the F.B.I. during his questioning at the 
Herrington, Kansas, Police Department on April 21, 1995. The information from the 
story apparently came from Exhibit 72, which had previously been sealed by the court 
with only redacted portions released publicly. While the government denied leaking the 
document to the press, the findings suggest that the information almost certainly had to 
have come from either the government or a member of one of the defense teams. As in 
the McVeigh trial, the publishing of Nichols’s statements did not result in a delay of the 
trial. In this respect, the court was consistent in its rulings, and it allowed the Nichols 
trial to move forward. The findings suggest Judge Matsch had little choice but to again 
rely on voir dire to identify and excuse potential jurors who were biased against 
Nichols. This had been the course he set following the confession stories preceding the 
McVeigh trial. Had Judge Matsch taken a different course of action prior to the Nichols 
trial, it would have given the McVeigh defense ample grounds for appeal. 
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 In regard to the confession stories, Judge Matsch turned to what he apparently 
believed was the most venerated precedent – voir dire. In doing so, the judge set his 
own precedent that required him to take similar actions when an incriminating story 
appeared on the eve of the Nichols trial. Judge Matsch had to rely on voir dire again in 
the Nichols case. Had he not done so and allowed a delay or a change of venue for 
Nichols, the McVeigh’s attorneys would have seized on this inconsistency as grounds 
for appeal. To the extent that the incriminating stories that appeared just before both 
trials were not successful grounds for overturning the convictions of either McVeigh or 
Nichols, Judge Matsch’s strategy was successful. However, his decisions related to the 
confession stories suggest an inconsistency in his rulings regarding the threat of pretrial 
publicity and the protective power of voir dire. 
Restrictions on Juror Information 
 The findings show that the court took special measures to protect the identities 
of jurors and to shield them from contact with the press. Judge Matsch used a system of 
numbers instead of names to identify jurors and ordered voir dire transcripts sealed until 
after the trials. He also had a wall constructed to shield jurors from the view of the 
closed-circuit camera and part of the courtroom. Though the press protested, these 
measures would stay in place through the McVeigh trial, and they were altered only 
slightly for the Nichols trial. During the voir dire for Nichols, Judge Matsch granted the 
defense request to hold challenges in open court, but the anonymity of individual jury 
candidates was still protected. 
 Judge Matsch showed particular concern about the press speculating on the 
background and psychological profiles of the jury. In the Sheppard v. Maxwell decision, 
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the Supreme Court was critical of the fact that the press had published pictures of the 
jurors and their names and home addresses. Jurors later told the trial court that they had 
been contacted by people offering opinions about the case. Judge Matsch wanted to 
avoid such a situation. The judge exercised his discretion in crafting his rules for jurors. 
Though the press sought to make the process more open, the judge stood by his order, 
and it was not appealed. The record shows no evidence that the press attempted to 
contact jury candidates, jurors, or their associates during either trial. In that respect, the 
judge’s restrictions on juror information met their intended goal. 
Closed-Circuit Broadcasting 
 The Oklahoma City bombing trials were and to date still are the only federal 
criminal trials to include live television broadcasts of any kind. The broadcasts were 
conducted via a closed-circuit feed and viewed only by court certified victims. This was 
a truly unique feature of the bombing trials. Two of the research questions in this study 
focused specifically on the closed-circuit broadcasts, asking how the closed-circuit 
viewing provisions became a part of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
of 1996 and how the court implemented and managed the closed-circuit viewing 
provision of the new law. 
 The finding show closed-circuit broadcasts became part of the Antiterrorism 
Act, and later the trial, as a result of the change of venue that moved the case to Denver. 
The possibility of the change of venue spurred some victims to actively explore the 
possibility of closed-circuit broadcasts before Judge Matsch issued the change of venue 
order in February 1996. Attorney Karen Howick, working on behalf of thirteen victims, 
had already had discussions with members of Oklahoma’s congressional delegation and 
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Court TV about the feasibility of closed-circuit coverage. Once Judge Matsch granted 
the change of venue, the efforts to make closed-circuit broadcasts part of the trial 
increased quickly. 
 The day after the judge issued his change of venue order, Senators Don Nickles, 
Jim Inhofe, and Orin Hatch sent a letter to Janet Reno asking for the Justice 
Department’s help in getting closed-circuit broadcasts. Attorney General Janet Reno 
said the department would explore the possibilities, but by mid-March 1996, the Justice 
Department had decided not to take an active role in facilitating closed-circuit 
broadcasts. The decision was based on fears that involvement by the Justice Department 
in advocating for closed-circuit legislation might be grounds for an appeal. The Justice 
Department was not willing to take that risk. The closed-circuit issue was left to 
Congress. If there were to be closed-circuit coverage, it would have to come through 
legislation, and there was no guarantee the court would comply.  
The findings show the closed-circuit legislation that became a part of the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 was drafted quickly, and it 
focused squarely on accommodating the victims. The victims were a driving force 
behind the legislation. The group led by Howick actively pursued elected officials, and 
they made public appearances with those officials at key stages in the legislative 
process. Victims appeared with lawmakers at a news conference announcing plans for 
the house bill, and victims appeared with President Clinton at the signing ceremony for 
the Antiterrorism Act. The advocacy of the victims for the legislation and sentiment for 
the victims appear to have played a significant role in passage of the closed-circuit 
legislation. It is likely that without the advocacy of the victims and the actions of 
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Congress, closed-circuit broadcasts of the Oklahoma City bombing trial would not have 
happened. 
 Though the legislation passed, bringing closed-circuit broadcasts to the trials 
was not a certainty. Section 235 of the Antiterrorism Act could only be implemented if 
the court set aside its fifty-two-year-old ban of photographs and broadcasting contained 
in Rule 53. The path for the closed-circuit provisions was made somewhat easier when 
the Judicial Conference of the United States sent word to Congress that it did not view 
the closed-circuit provisions as a precedent threatening Rule 53, provided the legislation 
was limited in scope and allowed for judicial discretion in its implementation. 
  In May 1995, the government filed its motion asking the court to comply with 
the Antiterrorism Act and allow closed-circuit broadcasting. Prosecutors claimed the 
law called for limited viewing, and it allowed the judge to use his discretion in 
establishing criteria for viewers and operation of the feed. Prosecutors claimed the court 
could operate within the law and not threaten the integrity of the trial. Though the 
Justice Department would not advocate for the creation of a law to provide closed-
circuit broadcasts of the trial, fearing the implications it might bring on appeal, the 
Justice Department actively advocated for the law once it was passed.  
 The defense teams objected, claiming that the law violated the separation of 
powers doctrine and that it threatened the defendants’ rights to due process and to a fair 
trial. The major concerns expressed by the defense teams focused on the detrimental 
effects cameras would have on trial participants and threats the cameras might pose to 
courtroom decorum. These were two of the factors referenced in Estes v. Texas that led 
the Supreme Court to determine that cameras had interfered with the trial. In the end, 
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however, Judge Matsch determined that the law was not unconstitutional, and he 
decided to make closed-circuit broadcasting a part of the trials. As the findings show, 
Judge Matsch used the provisions as stated in Section 235 and judicial discretion in 
implementing the closed-circuit broadcasts.  
The findings show Judge Matsch restricted the viewing to court-approved 
victims and utilized the registration process already established through the Western 
District Victim Assistance Unit to ensure that only qualified viewers would be allowed 
to attend the viewings. The press was unsuccessful in attempting to gain access to the 
closed-circuit viewing. Press attorneys presented a seemingly contradictory argument in 
seeking access. First, they claimed the remote viewing was merely an extension of the 
Denver courtroom. From this extended courtroom position, press attorneys claimed the 
court could not deny the press and public access. But then press attorneys claimed that 
the remote viewing location was a new public space that the press and public should 
have access to with only minimal court oversight. The government and both defense 
teams objected to the press request for access to the viewing. They argued that the law 
was clear in its intent to provide the closed-circuit broadcasts for victims who could not 
attend proceedings in Denver due to the change of venue. The McVeigh team in 
particular expressed concerns that opening the viewing to the press and public would 
create a spectacle in a stadium atmosphere, which had been one of the chief concerns 
addressed in the Estes and Chandler decisions. The press request for access was not 
successful. The findings show that Judge Matsch interpreted Section 235 as a narrowly-
tailored law providing a right of access to the victims only. The judge also determined 
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that since the press had ample access to the actual courtroom in Denver, the press could 
not make a claim that their right of access to the court had been violated. 
 Next, the court turned its attention to the practical aspects of operating the 
closed-circuit broadcasts. To ensure the signal would not be pirated, the judge made the 
court responsible for all equipment associated with the broadcast. He also forbade any 
recordings of the broadcasts, and he set the viewing site at a federal facility with limited 
public access. To protect the integrity of the proceedings, the judge allowed only a 
single camera with a panoramic view to be mounted to the wall in the back of the 
courtroom. This was similar to the provisions of the Florida courts, which the Supreme 
Court claimed in Chandler made the presence of cameras less problematic. Judge 
Matsch also had the jury wall constructed to obscure the camera’s view of the jury and 
to obscure the jurors’ view of the camera. The judge had the ability to turn off the feed 
at any time from the bench, and he required the viewing location in Oklahoma City to 
operate under the same rules for decorum as the courtroom in Denver. 
 In creating the procedures for the closed-circuit broadcasts, Judge Matsch did 
not have much relevant guiding precedent in what to do. No other federal judge had 
faced a similar situation. There was, however, some guidance in what not to do. It came 
in part from the Supreme Court’s opinion in Estes v. Texas. The case was cited by 
Nichols’s attorneys in their motion seeking to prevent the closed-circuit broadcasts. In 
the Estes opinion, the Court determined that the presence of the cameras, lights, and 
other apparatus had disrupted the courtroom to such a degree that the defendant’s rights 
had been violated. The findings of this study show that Matsch took extensive measures 
to make sure the equipment for the broadcasts and the operation of the broadcasts were 
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as unobtrusive as possible. Judge Matsch’s procedures protected against two of the 
primary concerns about cameras expressed in the Estes v. Texas decision. These were 
the fear that the presence of cameras would distract trial participants and the fear that 
cameras would intrude on the relationship between defendants and their attorneys. 
Matsch opted for a single camera attached to the back wall of the courtroom that 
provided only a panoramic view of the courtroom. This meant that the jury and intimate 
exchanges between the defendants and their council would be shielded from the 
camera’s view. The judge also mandated that he control the feed. The judge apparently 
did not find this to be a distraction; rather it was a necessary requirement for him to 
maintain control of what was transmitted out of the courtroom. In press reports, Judge 
Matsch’s brother claimed the judge was well aware of the criticism that followed the 
O.J. Simpson trial and the court’s use of cameras in that trial. One of the primary 
criticisms was that trial participants performed for the cameras. What is known about 
Judge Matsch’s rules for courtroom decorum made such a situation less likely in the 
bombing case as well as the fact that the proceedings would not be broadcast to the 
public. Limited viewing lessened the chances that trial participants would feel 
compelled to perform for the cameras. 
 Trial participants had differing reactions to the closed-circuit broadcasts. The 
findings show that prosecutors asked the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals to allow 
closed-circuit coverage of McVeigh’s appeal hearing. This suggests that the 
government found the broadcasts useful and not problematic. Though he had concerns 
that the presence of cameras would influence the courtroom performance of trial 
participants, Michael Tigar expressed a positive opinion of the closed-circuit 
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experience. Tigar said the broadcasts did not have a negative effect on the Nichols trial, 
and he suggested any future court using closed-circuit broadcasts of a high profile trial 
should consider taping the proceedings and releasing the tapes after final disposition of 
the case. Stephen Jones expressed an opposite opinion. Jones said the closed-circuit 
broadcasts did have a negative effect on the press’s trial coverage. Jones said a remote 
viewing location provided a platform for victims to voice opinions critical of the 
defense. After each day’s testimony, Jones claimed victim viewers left the auditorium 
and spoke to reporters most often in support of the government’s case. This, Jones 
claimed, amounted to cheerleading for the government. 
 The availability of closed-circuit viewing of the Oklahoma City bombing trial 
was clearly a response to the court’s decision to move the trial to Denver. Bombing 
victims who claimed the change of venue prevented them from attending the trial were 
influential in securing the legislation in the Antiterrorism Act that opened the door for 
closed-circuit viewing. The findings show that the court reluctantly agreed to comply 
with the closed-circuit provisions of the act over the objections of both defense teams. 
Once the court decided to allow closed-circuit broadcasts, Judge Matsch crafted 
stringent rules that limited viewership to court approved victims only. The judge also 
established strict procedures for technical aspects of the closed-circuit broadcasts so that 
the integrity of courtroom proceedings was protected, the security of the feed was 
ensured, and the judge’s control over the broadcast equipment was complete. Should 
another federal court face circumstances in which closed-circuit broadcasts are an 
option, the procedures established by Judge Matsch will likely provide a model to guide 
the court. 
  
 
272 
Summary and Overall Conclusions 
 Research question #1 asked what were the fair trial/free press issues brought 
before the courts in the Oklahoma City bombing trials. The findings confirm there were 
several of these issues. These fair trial/free press issues arose from the intense press 
attention given to the case. Press and public interest in the case was understandable. The 
Oklahoma City bombing and ensuring trials were unique events in history. The 
bombing itself was an act of terrorism that had resulted in the deaths of 168 people. It 
was a case of great public importance, and the press and the public claimed a right to 
know about the crime, the suspects, and the prosecution of those suspects. With so 
much attention focused on the bombing case, fair trial/free press issues pitting the First 
Amendment right of the press to report on the case against the Sixth Amendment rights 
of the defendants to receive a fair trial were bound to emerge. 
 The court’s primary goal was to ensure that the defendants received a fair trial. 
The primary threat to a fair trial came from press coverage and the possibility that it 
would make seating an impartial jury difficult. Pretrial publicity was implicit in almost 
every fair trial/free press issue raised in the case. This threat was magnified in the 
Oklahoma City bombing case due to the nature of the crime and the nature of the mass 
media at the time.  
 The crime attracted the attention of press organizations from across the nation 
and around the world, and by 1995 their reach was expanding. Newspapers had begun 
using the Internet, giving them more access to the public. The Internet also provided an 
empowering new medium for people interested in the case to seek out information. The 
broadcast news media also had an expanded reach through twenty-four-hour cable news 
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networks and prime time news magazines. These technological advances meant the 
press had the ability to spread more information to more people more often than ever 
before. 
 The literature shows most of the precedent-setting cases regarding pretrial 
publicity took place before 1980. The courts in those cases did not have to contend with 
the Internet, cable news networks, and other mass media technologies present at the 
time of the Oklahoma City bombing. The Supreme Court recognized this fact in Gentile 
v. State Bar of Nevada. In the Gentile decision, Justice Rehnquist pondered whether the 
increasingly pervasive press made some existing remedies to pretrial publicity less 
effective. The Oklahoma City bombing trials provided a test of established fair trial/free 
press in this enhanced media environment.  
 Research question #2 asked how the courts relied on precedent to resolve the 
fair trial/free press issues raised in the case. Research question #3 asked how the courts’ 
resolution of fair trial/free press issues affected management of the case. The findings 
show the courts often relied on precedent in resolving fair trial/free press issues in the 
Oklahoma City bombing case, and resolution of those issues impacted the management 
of the case in several ways.  
 The findings show Judge Matsch did use precedent to resolve several of the fair 
trial/free press decisions. In his first decisions regarding sealed documents, he used 
Press-Enterprise II to craft a narrowly-tailored order that protected discovery 
information and gave the press a means of challenging future requests to seal 
documents. Guided by Sheppard v. Maxwell, the judge made the decision to grant the 
change of venue and move the case to Denver. Sheppard, Nebraska Press Association, 
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and the A.B.A. Model Rules were influential in the judge’s restrictive order on 
extrajudicial statements and the later gag order. All of these decisions were made to 
preserve the defendants’ rights to a fair trial and to counter the effects of pretrial 
publicity. None of the orders was overturned, and the convictions of the defendants 
stood as well, thus the orders can be considered successful in achieving the court’s goal.  
 The findings show the court was not successful, however, in stopping 
information leaks that plagued the trial. In Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, Justice 
Kennedy wrote that prosecutors hold a distinct advantage in access to the press 
compared to defendants. In the Oklahoma City bombing case, Kennedy’s observation 
was illustrated on a grand scale. Thousands of journalists were hunting for information 
in the case, and they had multiple avenues to get that information. Hundreds of law 
enforcement personnel had worked on the case from the F.B.I. to Oklahoma City Police 
officers. Tracking down the individual source of any one information leak would be a 
difficult task at best. It would also delay prosecution of the case. These were the reasons 
Judge Matsch gave for not conducting an investigation prior to issuing his June 1996 
restrictive order on extrajudicial statements. Had the judge attempted to investigate the 
source of leaks, it might have sent a clear message to prosecutors and defense attorneys 
that the court would take a firm stand against leaks and do what was within the court’s 
power to sanction those who released information that threatened the case. Judge 
Matsch was not the only judge who could have taken a more firm stance against leaks. 
Had the Western District judges restricted extrajudicial statements from the beginning 
of the case, the stream of leaks may have been slowed, though it is doubtful it would 
have stopped them completely. In Sheppard v. Maxwell, the Supreme Court said that 
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trial courts did have the power to restrict extrajudicial statements made by persons 
under the court’s authority, and that included law enforcement. 
 The findings suggest that restricting extrajudicial statements early in the case 
might have also prevented other fair trial/free press issues that emerged as the case 
progressed. A restrictive order or gag order would have made the McVeigh team’s 
three-prong press strategy impractical. The findings show this strategy played a 
significant role in the confession stories that threatened McVeigh’s trial just before it 
began. An early restrictive or gag order likely would also have prevented McVeigh 
from speaking to the press, an aspect of the trial that drew criticism from both the 
Nichols defense team and prosecutors. The findings show that the June 1996 restrictive 
order blocked the McVeigh team’s plans to take their public relations campaign to a 
national and international audience. Still, McVeigh had already given interviews to 
several publications and had appeared on network television prior to that time. Jones 
claimed that he needed press access to combat the steady stream of leaks from 
government sources, and the findings show his argument had merit. However, had the 
court issued an order that applied to all persons under the court’s authority – including 
law enforcement – at the beginning of the case, it may have leveled the legal playing 
field and made the McVeigh defense strategy focusing on actively seeking the press 
unnecessary. 
 Sheppard v. Maxwell clearly stated that judges could exercise discretion in trial 
management to protect the integrity of the trial process. Judge Matsch did use discretion 
in managing some aspects of the case, particularly those that involved the press working 
in and around the courthouse. The case attracted a large number of journalists. Nearly 
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2,000 would receive credentials to cover the McVeigh trial. Judge Matsch had to 
balance the First Amendment rights of press access to the court with the court’s need to 
maintain decorum.  
 The findings show Judge Matsch was accommodating to the press, but his 
accommodations had clear boundaries, and he was quick to step in when he felt the 
press had overstepped his boundaries. Judge Matsch gave the press reserved seating in 
the courtroom, and he held a special meeting with journalists prior to the beginning of 
proceedings in Denver to inform them of his rules for courtroom decorum. The judge’s 
decision to establish the audio feed to the auxiliary courtroom and eventually to the 
pressroom was a result of the extreme press interest in the case, and the findings show 
that the audio feed did not interfere with the court’s operations. The sale of audiotapes 
of court proceedings was a different matter. The findings show that the court did not 
anticipate that some broadcast news media would air the recordings. Matsch’s local 
court rules did not directly prohibit airing the tapes as some courts did, thus the 
journalists may have believed they were not prohibited from using the tapes as they 
chose. The judge clearly thought otherwise, and he exercised his discretion in stopping 
the sale of audiotapes immediately. 
 Judge Matsch was not as accommodating to the press during the jury selection 
process. The findings show that the judge did not want juror information in the press, 
fearing such information would invade the privacy of the jurors and possibly interfere 
with a fair trial. In Sheppard v. Maxwell, the Supreme Court was critical of the fact that 
the press reported jurors’ names and published photographs of them. Judge Matsch 
exercised his discretion and established procedures to prevent such things from 
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happening in the Oklahoma City bombing trials. Having seen the volume and veracity 
of press coverage leading up to jury selection, the judge indicated he was concerned that 
the press would aggressively pursue stories about the jurors and their backgrounds 
unless he took measures to prevent it. The findings support the conclusion that the press 
did not produce stories that threatened jury selection, and, in that respect, Judge 
Matsch’s protective measures achieved the results he wanted. The findings show that 
Judge Matsch’s actions illustrate how a judge could use his authority and discretion to 
manage a crucial aspect of a highly publicized case. 
 While both defense attorneys generally praised Judge Matsch for his overall 
management of the case, Jones claimed the judge’s decision to move forward with the 
McVeigh trial in spite of the damaging confession stories doomed McVeigh’s 
opportunity for a fair trial. The findings support Jones’s claim that Judge Matsch 
completely changed his stance on pretrial publicity and the power of voir dire to 
mitigate such issues between February 1996 and April 1997. In this respect the judge’s 
decisions were inconsistent. In February 1996, Judge Matsch determined pretrial 
publicity was such a substantial threat and voir dire was such an insufficient remedy 
that a change of venue was required. However, in April 1997, the judge had come to the 
opinion that vior dire could effectively combat the effects of pretrial publicity generated 
by the McVeigh confession stories. The findings suggest that Judge Matsch may have 
come to recognize the limits of his control, and with so much time, effort, and expense 
already invested in the case, he believed the best option was to move forward with the 
McVeigh trial and to use voir dire as the method to mitigate the effects of the 
confession stories. 
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 One of the unique fair trial/free press issues that occurred as part of the 
Oklahoma City bombing trials that may inform scholars and future courts was the press 
consortium. The consortium was a direct response to the large number of press 
organizations planning to cover the trials. There were historical examples of highly 
publicized trials in which journalists had been criticized for their performance during 
trial. These examples included the Hauptmann trial, Sheppard v. Maxwell, and the O.J. 
Simpson trial. The press corps took the lead in forming the respective print and 
broadcast groups that would serve as the foundation of the consortium. Members of the 
press corps realized that they held the responsibility to police their own and not to 
disrupt the trial process. The City of Denver and the court had obvious concerns with 
the onslaught of the press, and the consortium provided a means for all parties to 
communicate concerns and coordinate logistics, thus preventing a situation that could 
have easily turned into chaos. The findings show that the consortium was successful in 
meeting the needs of the press, the court, and the city. The legacy of the consortium is 
that it showed how the courts and the press, often adversaries in fair trial/free press 
issues, can find common ground and work together in a fashion that protects both the 
court’s interest in preserving Sixth Amendment rights and the press’s interest in 
preserving First Amendment rights. 
 Research questions #4 and #5 addressed closed-circuit broadcasts of the 
Oklahoma City bombing trials. Research question #4 asked how the closed-circuit 
viewing provisions became a part of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
of 1996. The findings support a conclusion that this was a direct result of Judge 
Matsch’s order moving the trials to Denver. Research question #5 asked how the court 
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implemented and managed the closed-circuit broadcasts. The findings support a 
conclusion that Judge Matsch looked to the specifics of the new law and exercised 
judicial discretion in his acceptance and implementation of closed-circuit broadcasting.  
 The findings regarding the closed-circuit broadcasts of the trials support the 
conclusion that these broadcasts were some of the most unique aspects of the Oklahoma 
City bombing trials. The trials were the first and to date the only federal criminal trials 
with any type of live television presence. The change of venue, moving the trial from 
Oklahoma City to Denver, was the catalyst for the closed-circuit campaign led by 
bombing victims. Congress was sympathetic to the victims’ plight, and the closed-
circuit provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 passed 
and were signed into law in just more than one month. 
 The quick passage of the closed-circuit provisions was evidence of the 
groundswell of support and sympathy for the victims. Some of those victims felt 
betrayed by Judge Matsch when he moved the trial to Denver, and they would feel 
further betrayed if the judge did not allow closed-circuit coverage. Judge Matsch’s own 
public comments about the issue show he was firmly opposed early on, but by the time 
the law was passed, he said he would at least consider it. The judge said he would 
consider the closed-circuit broadcasting the same week the justices of the Judicial 
Conference of the United States said they would not oppose the new law. It can be 
concluded that the position taken by the Judicial Conference influenced Judge Matsch. 
 Judge Matsch had no direct precedent to guide him in deciding whether or not to 
comply with the new law. He had before him a new law that no court had considered 
before. The findings show that Judge Matsch determined that the law did not violate the 
  
 
280 
Constitution’s separation of powers doctrine. He also determined that the law was 
tailored to the interest of the victims and that the broadcasts could be restricted to this 
limited audience. Furthermore, the law allowed the judge to exercise his discretion in 
how to manage the broadcasts, giving him total control over the process. Under these 
conditions, Judge Matsch agreed to make the Oklahoma City bombing trials the first 
federal criminal trials conducted in the presence of a closed-circuit camera. 
 The Oklahoma City bombing trials brought cameras to a federal criminal trial. It 
was a forum that cameras had been banned from for more than half a century. The ban 
established in Rule 53 was based on the belief that cameras threatened the court’s 
ability to conduct a fair trial. The Oklahoma City bombing case showed that, with a 
tightly-controlled process and with a limited audience, cameras could be a part of a 
federal criminal trial without prejudicing the process. The findings of this study suggest 
that should another federal court face the prospect of closed-circuit broadcasting, the 
Oklahoma City bombing trials will provide the precedent to guide that court. 
 The Oklahoma City bombing case was like no other case before or since. It was 
a terrorism trial of great national importance, and it generated great public interest. The 
press attention focused on the crime and the prosecution of the suspects made the case 
replete with fair trial/free press issues. The courts managing the case employed 
precedent and judicial discretion in resolving those issues.  
 Judge Matsch was responsible for most of the major fair trial/free press 
decisions in the case, and all of his decisions survived appeal. Judge Matsch also 
became the first federal judge to manage a capital criminal case with live closed-circuit 
broadcasting. This aspect of the trial was unprecedented. Stephen Jones suggested that 
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the legacy of the Oklahoma City bombing case might well be the trial court’s 
management of fair trial/free press issues.  
As an overall conclusion supported by the findings of this study, the Oklahoma 
City bombing case stands today as perhaps one of the most thorough tests of fair 
trial/free press doctrine in a single case. The intense and widespread press coverage 
focused on the case, the magnitude of the crime, the number of fair trial/free press 
issues raised in the case, and the fact that the trials were the first and only federal 
criminal trials to include closed-circuit broadcasting support such a claim. The trial 
court managing the case developed fair trial/free press strategies that withstood all 
appeals under the burden of intense national and international press coverage. This 
suggests courts can rely on existing precedent to balance First Amendment and Sixth 
Amendment issues even in the face of the most extensive press coverage. The media 
environment in which the case unfolded included a new medium for news dissemination 
– the Internet. This likewise suggests courts can successfully employ existing precedent 
and procedures to manage fair trial/free press issues when faced with new media 
technology. The trial court in the Oklahoma City bombing case also adopted and 
implemented the closed-circuit provisions of the Antiterrorism Act, indicating that even 
federal courts can incorporate cameras without threatening the integrity of trials. The 
findings show the courts managing the Oklahoma City bombing case negotiated all of 
these fair trial/free press issues by developing legally sound strategies based on 
precedent and judicial experience and discretion. Considering all of these facts together, 
it seems clear that attorney Jones is correct in his assessment. The successful strategies 
the courts developed to manage the fair trial/free press issues in the Oklahoma City 
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bombing case have established valuable and important precedents as to how future 
courts facing highly publicized trials may also successfully manage conflicts between 
the First and Sixth Amendments. 
Limitations 
 This study was limited by the availability of some source materials. Archival 
information at the Oklahoma City Memorial Museum Archives is extensive; however 
the research revealed some limitations. The archive’s holdings of motions, orders, and 
opinions from the District of Colorado appear almost complete, but the archive’s 
holdings from the time the case was under the management of Western District judges 
are less so. Also, the archive has only a few transcripts for pretrial motions hearings. 
Access to these documents would have assisted in analysis of some issues presented in 
the study. 
 The study was also limited by the participation of only defense attorneys in oral 
history interviews. Interview requests were sent to the judge, prosecutors, the press 
attorney, and the defense attorneys, but the two lead defense attorneys were the only 
trial participants who agreed to interviews. While the participation of Stephen Jones and 
Michael Tigar added greatly to the study, the perspective of other trial participants 
would have brought other valuable perspectives. 
Suggestions for Future Research 
 This study has shown how fair trial/free press issues played a role in one of the 
most highly publicized criminal cases in American history – the Oklahoma City 
bombing case. One of the unique aspects of the case that could have consequences for 
its effects on future highly publicized criminal trials was the formation of the press 
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consortium and its efforts to work with the court and the City of Denver. The findings 
of this study show that the logistical details worked out between these parties were 
extensive and effective in meeting the needs of all parties. The findings also suggest 
there is much still to be learned about the bombing trial consortium, and there is little 
research in existence that examines the consortium in depth. A historical study focusing 
on the bombing trial consortium itself would add to the fair trial/free press literature. 
 Another area with potential for future research is to examine the extent to which 
the closed-circuit coverage of the case influenced press coverage of the trials. Stephen 
Jones claimed the closed-circuit broadcasts led to public comments made by victim 
viewers that amounted to cheerleading for the prosecution, which in turn influenced 
press coverage and public perceptions of the trials. A content analysis of press coverage 
during the trials would help determine if Jones’s claim had merit. 
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